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The Inquiring Mind

INTRODUCTORY PHILOSOPHIC STUDIES

by

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FOREWORD

"LET NO ONE DELAY," said Epicurus, "to study philosophy while he is young, and when he is old let him not become weary of the study; for no man can ever find the time unsuitable or too late to study the health of his soul. And he who asserts either that it is not yet time to philosophize, or that the hour is past, is like a man who would say that the time is not yet come to be happy, or that it is too late."

In terms of this dictum the writer offers this book. It is intended primarily as a text for all college students, whether young or old, lower- or upper-classmen, who are interested in a beginner's course in philosophy. It should prove of interest to non-college men as well.

On the other hand, there is an increase of interest in the study of philosophy. The writer has found a growing number of college freshmen urgently asking admission to an introductory course in philosophy, which course is usually open only to sophomore and more advanced students. Furthermore, courses in philosophy are being offered in many of the best junior colleges—and why not, since graduates of standard junior colleges are admitted to junior standing in colleges and universities? In view of this growing constituency it was felt that a text with appeal to all such students, embracing the major concepts and problems of philosophy, should be prepared.

Again, because of the intimate relation between philosophy and the sciences, advances in the latter often yield material of great value in dealing with basic philosophic issues. This requires the revision of older and the occasional writing of newer texts. For these reasons the present work was undertaken.

The difference between this and other introductory texts is not so much in content or subject matter, but rather in that throughout an effort was made to present as far as possible in simple, nontechnical, and straightforward manner the main themes as they arise in experience and confront any thoughtful student, whether of junior or senior college level, interested in current philosophic thinking. The reader will readily sense a social interest as flavoring the text throughout.

My obligations are manifold. I was originally urged to the preparation of such a manuscript by Mr. Charles Frederick, a Graduate Assistant in the department. Later I was greatly aided by my col-

leagues, Professor Sellars and Dr. Bergmann, by their reading of chapters and by their constructive criticism. I am deeply indebted to Mr. Troy Organ, a Graduate Assistant, and to Mr. Alden Salstrom, a Research Assistant, for source material, references, and other forms of aid. And, of course, without the assistance of my secretaries, Miss Roberts and Miss Green, the mechanical details could never have been accomplished. In spite of all this the shortcomings in the text are mine.

Reference books for collateral reading are listed at the end of the chapters. Appendix A contains a glossary of those terms that might offer some difficulty to beginners. It was thought that a list of authors quoted or referred to, and their dates, might prove helpful. This is found in Appendix B. Further, I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to publishers for the privilege of using brief excerpts from their publications. In footnotes the texts quoted with specific references are given. A selected bibliography is given in Appendix C.

H.M.

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I
EVERY MAN A PHILOSOPHER

Mr. Dooley, after defining a philosopher as "a man that is thryin' to make a livin' be thinkin' about things that no man can think about without th' top iv his head blowin' off," says, "If I had a son wud I advise him to take a coorse in philosophy? Ye bet I wud. It won't help him much in gettin' a job as a motorman. It wudden't do him much good to presint a litter fr'm Pro-fissor James to the train-boss sayin': 'I can safely recommind th' bearer f'r any position iv thrust or confidence. He was th' brightest philosopher in my class an' he received hon'rable mention f'r his essay entitled: "Why Hegel Niver Cashed." ' But th' exercise wud be fine f'r his little head an' wan iv th' best things about a college is that ye're taught things there that ye don't have to take out into th' wurruuld with ye. At th' end iv th' coorse th' philosophy team can safely go out on th' campus an' burn their philosophy togs an' grajally acquire mental clothes more suitable to our rugged an' changeable intellechool climate. It don't take thim long to larn that f'r wan truth that cashes they've got to take a milyon on credit."¹ Voltaire said, "When he to whom one speaks does not understand, and when he who speaks does not himself understand, that is metaphysics."

1. PHILOSOPHY NOT A FOREIGN IMPORTATION

In that charmingly written and delightful book, *Things and Ideals*, Professor Otto has for the title of his first chapter the query, from Shakespeare's *As You Like It*, "Hast Any Philosophy in Thee, Shepherd?" After referring to Chesterton, James, and Dewey, each of whom would answer this question affirmatively, Otto expresses his conviction that all such views are but illusions, that "the job-lot of odds and ends in Tom Sawyer's pocket" is more akin to philosophy than the mental contents of the average man. This conclusion is based on the view that "we know so little and so superficially." On such a basis who is a philosopher? Was Socrates, who knew that he knew nothing, a philosopher?

That our mental furniture is of poor quality and arrangement is lamentably true. Yet may it not be that philosophy is not to be identified with knowledge? Perhaps in identifying philosophy with a con-

¹ F. F. Dunne, "Mr. Dooley on Philosophers," *American Magazine*, March, 1908.

sistent world view we are setting it on too high a pedestal and giving it too ominous form and mien. Such a concept may yield two results. In the first place, it may prove forbidding to would-be initiates, causing them to turn aside from an area of interest ranging beyond, yet connected with, their present interests and needs. Professor James in his *Pragmatism* tells of a college graduate who, in one of his classes, wrote that "he had always taken for granted that when you entered a philosophic classroom you had to open relations with a universe entirely distinct from the one you left behind you in the street." In the second place, it may lead to the total rejection of philosophy in the lofty, "high-pedestal" sense. It may purge life of that traditional indulgence or "scandal" called philosophy. This might be no great loss, might be but release from a fictional or rainbow pursuit. In other words, perhaps there neither is nor ever was any such philosophy.

But even if we deny philosophy in this lofty sense, the fact remains that we have persons at every stage of development, seeking to meet and adjust themselves to problems that perpetually confront all attempts at satisfactory living, and arriving at convictions, beliefs, and value judgments, more or less coherent, which emerge out of the inextricable web of life's processes. In this business of living man is more than a biological animal, more than a "pig satisfied." He entertains aims and purposes, and makes conscious choice between alternatives at a level far above their incipient forms in the organic responses of lower animals. To this extent we are philosophers, end-seeking persons, possessors of values—value hounds, if you will, and value bound. Philosophy, on the other hand, i.e., philosophy as such, is little more than the residue cast upon the shores of time by life currents as they have moved on, not unlike Bergson's matter, which is de-energized energy. By this is meant that philosophy is a vital experience, a co-operative effort on the part of individuals to discover meanings and controls in experience, to evaluate entertained values. Philosophy is of the very fiber of life, neither a supernumerary indulgence nor the prerogative of a favored few. So viewed, philosophy becomes philosophizing, an actual component of the process of living. Unfortunately, we are prone to use the term *philosophy* as a product of those vital experiences, rather than as an aspect or phase of the process of living as human beings. "Not philosophy but to philosophize," a colleague's motto, expresses the active philosophical process. William James speaks of philosophy as "our more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means." Again, he says: "A man with no philosophy in him is the most inauspicious and unprofitable of all social mates." Who shall set the limit to this dumb sense of life's meaning above which

it is, and below which it is not, philosophy? For Plato philosophy, in a consummatory sense, is the effort to envision enduring values in our changing experience.

It is, then, out of and in connection with the business of human living that this thing called philosophy, yes, thought itself, arises. Thinking is not the activity of an abstract entity called mind. One might properly inquire as to what mind is when no "minding" occurs. The simple fact is that thinking, so far as we know, is embodied, i.e., it does not occur in the blue; it is a form of organic response at a higher level—shall we say?—just as assimilation and digestion are organic processes at a lower level. As mind is a more inclusive term than thinking, so philosophy, as here used, is a broader term than strictly logical processes. From the high indulgence of the few, philosophy ranges down to and includes even those unreasoned habits and beliefs of the many that give determination to their conduct, and by which they live. The difference between the philosophy of the common man and that of the professional thinker is found in the greater range, rationality, and consistency of the convictions and beliefs entertained by the latter. One might further distinguish between the two by saying that the philosophy of the common man is more directive of his life than is the philosophy of the professional philosopher. At all events, philosophy begins with the data, the beliefs and values by which men live. Growth in philosophy means a more conscious and critical evaluation of these contents of experience, yielding increasing consistency and harmony and suggesting new vistas and meanings. The initiate in philosophy, then, does not find himself confronted by and thrust into an utterly alien world. No, his introduction is a happy process of self-discovery, of observation, analysis, and criticism of the principles by which he lives and which give meaning to his life.

Problems, points of view, facts, and all features of one's mental equipment, whether for youth or adult thought, are intimately related to the culture conditions of time and place. This is pre-eminently true of the educational aims and methods imposed upon the German youth in the Third Reich. Since education is an important agency in the promotion of a national program, the content of education is necessarily different in a dictatorship from that in a democracy. James expresses the conviction that temperament is a major determinant of one's philosophical leanings. Temperament and culture conditions combined give fashion to our thought forms, habits, and value estimates. That is to say that subtle factors, biological, social, and psychological, influence our thought frames, our judgments, and even our perceptual activities and contents. Our solutions are not the result of pure thought applied

without prejudice and bias to problems as they arise in experience. In more positive terms, culture status, temperament, and other complex factors weight our premises and conclusions alike. Sometimes certain temperaments recoil from tradition and proceed at a tangent to the culture curve. Our preferences and evaluations are geared up with predispositions and situational factors past and present; they are not arrived at by pure mental processes unsullied by the personal, social, and factual texture of experience.

2. DATA OF EXPERIENCE

a. Facts

What are some of those data of the common mind that soon assume problematic form? We may sketch them introductorily under two heads—facts and values. Such grouping is for purposes of method only and does not imply two necessarily distinct classes of data. One basic universal assumption is that *I am*. What the nature of this ego is passes with little reflection in immaturity. It is just accepted as a fact which no normal mind could possibly question. It frequently takes fashion from theological tradition in terms of a soul, a sort of divine deposit. It is a very substantial entity whose reality is an immediate and indisputable fact of consciousness. "I know that I am" suffices; let him who will, question further and quibble. When one is confronted by the proposition that knowledge *that* implies some knowledge of *what* the object is, embarrassment begins to appear. With the non-acceptance of this proposition, the *status quo* remains; no problem arises. Its acceptance necessitates some definition of the ego or self. Am I a highly attenuated substance, a system of habits, an activity, an aggregate of feelings, a point of reference, a set of purposes, or what? Am I a thinking being, as for Descartes, with my seat in the pineal gland? Can the *I* be traced to its lair? Is my locus in the brain, am I widely distributed throughout my organism, or am I one with the activity of my nervous system? Or, again, does the reality of the self consist in the fact of *becoming* rather than in that of *being*? Perhaps, as for Berkeley, I am a spiritual being, not suffering the limitation of Cartesian locale to the pineal gland. When such specific questions are posed and entertained, a higher reflective level is attained.

Another of the accepted data is the fact of other selves. Only under sophistication does doubt arise. That I myself alone am (solipsism) is rarely affirmed. Although the logic of some idealistic thinkers drives in that direction, yet, finding the position uncomfortable, they hesitate to acknowledge its implication. Berkeley's view—that "to be is to be perceived"—is of this type. Even though solipsism were satisfactory in

theory, it cannot be translated into practice. We live "as if" other selves are. Furthermore, in a very real sense other selves and things are essential to, and are constitutive of, my own being. My language, my ideals and purposes, my general slant on things, are socially mediated. Consciousness of self is said to imply a not-self, i.e., other selves and things. The unreality of self and (or) other selves would make life *the* great illusion. The reality of self and the reality of other selves stand or fall together.

That there is, in addition, an objective world of things and events confronting us, in which we have our being, between which and ourselves reactions continually occur, is a fundamental assumption. That something is, whatever its ultimate nature may be, is no longer disputed even among philosophers. Dispute occurs when we inquire as to the nature and knowability of this physical order in which we find ourselves. Is it a thing-in-itself (a *Ding an sich*) as for Kant, the unknown and inaccessible source of our sense data, the noumenal (underlying) ground of our phenomenal (appearing) world? Is it, as for Plato, a world of pure forms or concepts which somehow get translated into our language in the forms of sense experience? Are things, then, as we experience them, but inferior copies of an underlying reality? Is our knowledge of appearances (phenomena) only, and not of things as they are in themselves (noumena)? Is the sweetness of the sugar, in Lockian phrase, a secondary quality, that is, an effect produced in us by the sugar? In like fashion is the red color *in* the brick, the fragrance *in* the rose? Do we see the star or only rays of light from it? Do we see the sun above the horizon, while it is still below, because of the bending of its rays in passing through our atmosphere? Is the green table upon which I write, a thing of substance—or is it, as for Eddington, but an orderly dance of insubstantial and colorless electrons? In these forms the familiar distinction between appearance and reality arises. Philosophizing is here well under way.

b. Values

Values bulk large even in the common mind. In the more philosophic mind in recent years the value concept has assumed large proportions. An extensive literature is now available. Slight reflection might yield the conclusion that we live in a world of values rather than in a world of things. Perhaps things are of interest because of their value. Anything that meets or satisfies a need has thereby value. Science, art, industry, and all institutions such as education, church, and state, although factual realities, are primarily forms of value. They are either values in themselves (intrinsic) or valuable as means to the

securing of values (instrumental or extrinsic). Money is an instrumental value; a Beethoven symphony, a baby's smile, has intrinsic value—i.e., it satisfies, it is an end in itself, not a means to some other end.

As we spread before us a map of our life interests and activities, we notice that they fall into a few major types. Obviously basic are what we may call the biological pursuits, expressive of the will to live. Food, sleep, shelter, work, and recreation, sometimes called bodily or health values, are included here. Good health to many people is an intrinsic value, whereas for another type of temper it is instrumental or extrinsic; i.e., it is a valuable asset toward the realization of further values. Closely allied to this group are the economic values. Economic values are exchange values; i.e., their value consists not in the mere having of them but in their use as means of exchange for objects that satisfy needs whether real or imaginary.

Another level, or rather type, of values is what we may call cognitive or intellectual. The immature mind reveals knowledge values. Even though much of the so-called knowledge is knowledge of what is not so, yet the fact is that such habitual knowledge is determinative of conduct, of ways of behaving. The appearance of a comet to the more primitive mind had a superterrestrial meaning; it was a sign of something impending, often a warning against errant conduct. A. D. White's *History of the Warfare of Science with Theology* is an admirable compendium of such knowledge. At a much higher level modern science is making large contributions to the enrichment of life and is giving man increasing control over nature. The gasoline engine and the electric motor are instances in point. Although these achievements are instrumental in character, there are areas, in physics for example, where the knowledge gained is intrinsic in character. Critical, logical thought is of this type

Another group of value data includes moral, aesthetic, and religious values. At the "shepherd" level there are ways of behaving that are approved and others that are disapproved. In Mosaic phrase there are the "thou shalt's" and the "thou shalt not's." Every individual is born into and subject to group customs. "It is our custom" is the final basis of authority and approval. Soon questions arise as to the source or principle of conduct evaluation. Did the sense of justice in man stem from a moral principle inherent in the cosmos, as enunciated by Anaximander, for whom the world order was fundamentally a moral structure? Are moral laws, as for some of the lesser Sophists, but prescribed conventions, prudential devices that make for success in life with no deeper underlying ground? Or, are our moral approvals and dis-

approvals products of the long era of struggle for existence, their sources having been lost in prehistoric times? Food, shelter, sex, and defense against enemies are of the necessities of existence. Modes of behavior that secured these elemental needs became habitual procedures. Emerging intelligence favored these and disapproved ways that yielded negative results. May right and wrong, good and bad, have had their origin in this way? Ways of behaving that satisfied life's needs, proving their value, became in the course of time habitual and controlling in conduct. Forms of conduct yielding negative results were soon frowned upon by the group and rendered taboo. Primitive and rather rigid taboos were the "thou shalt nots" of later conduct norms.

So much evidence has been furnished concerning the practically absolute character of taboo in primitive life that one might ask how escape from this circle of controlling taboos ever became possible. It may be said that the fact of taboo in group life is a testimony to a tendency on the part of some members to depart from customary conduct. Apart from this tendency, taboo would have little or no meaning. On the basis of this tendency, other factors—such as success attending private initiative in increasing food supply or signal victory over enemies—yielded prestige and consequent privilege. A tangent to the curve of conduct thus appears. Among other contributing causes the transition from the immediacy of results in the hunting and fishing stage to deferred returns in the beginnings of agricultural life simply necessitated changed ways of behaving and modified conduct sanctions.

The immature mind finds itself impinged upon by a world in which aesthetic values obtain. Beautiful and ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, harmonious and discordant, etc., are terms used to describe the objects of experience. The concept of beauty is a continuing possession from prehistoric and primitive man. It is historically related to the intellectual, the moral, and the religious. There is beauty in logical, mathematical, and other knowledge processes, in nobility of aim and life, and in attitudes and practices motivated by ideals usually called moral and religious.

Questions arise as to the locus of beauty. Is beauty or its opposite, the ugly, a quality or property resident in an object apart from experience of that object? At the other extreme, is the aesthetic experience a purely mental product with no implication or reference beyond the mental state? Between these two there is a middle ground. May not the experience of beauty be an effect produced in us by the perception of an object? Is the sugar in the bowl sweet, the salt in the salt shaker salty, or are sweetness and saltiness effects produced in us by the action

of these ingredients upon our sense of taste? The truth may well be that neither in the object itself nor in the subject himself does beauty reside, but rather in a relationship of the two factors. Experiment has shown that beauty is predicated by the experiencing subject of certain objective forms and relations, whether of lines, colors, or sounds. Nor does the fact that aesthetic evaluations vary with peoples and individuals, and with the same individual at different times, prove the subjectivity of beauty or disprove its objective aspects. One's past, environmental patterns, temperament, and growth in experience are factors that fashion, differentiate, and change our attitudes and evaluations. Must the beautiful be true, or good, or useful? is beauty absolute or relative? are other interesting questions.

That youth possesses religious values there can be no doubt. At times in high school and college these values become overlaid by the pressure of social conventions. Under the thrill of adventure in new areas and wider ranges of knowledge the older values sometimes, to say the least, became obscured. Newer insights, difficult and sometimes impossible to harmonize with earlier views, yield inattention or indifference to traditional values. Occasionally the new-found freedom rejects the past. In youth it is easy to take the pendulum swing, especially in religion. Yet in the face of all this, on sympathetic acquaintance and understanding one finds almost invariably deeper currents and concepts essentially religious. There is much truth in Bacon's observation that "a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion." In somewhat similar strain Berkeley declares that "the same Principles which, at first view, lead to Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense."

In such circumstances youth frequently feels itself irreligious. Not necessarily so. The difficulty is that the youth has identified his religious life with a set of beliefs, a content of doctrine. He has not yet learned that the content of belief may change while the spirit of religion remains, indeed may deepen. Growth in knowledge means outgrowth, reshaping, renewal, as well as acquisition. Religion is an attitude, a spirit pervasive of outlook and action. The scientist in his laboratory seeking facts, the teacher before his class acknowledging frankly when he does not know that he does not know, the pupil and teacher alike faithful in the preparation of their work, each is at the same time fundamentally religious. Religion is not a vague somewhat hovering about or an addendum to normal life; it is a way of living, a spirit sympathetic, understanding, inquiring, devoted, reverent, joyful, and buoyant. Youth must learn that while values change, value

remains. To outgrow religious concepts does not mean irreligion. Once religion was an insurance enterprise against the possibility of future high temperatures. In the change of its character from fire insurance to life assurance, religion has not lost; it has gained ennoblement and life significance. When Genesis and geology disagree, nothing is lost save error. Dr. Lightfoot's pronouncement that the creation of the world and man, on the basis of biblical chronology, occurred 4004 B.C., October 23, at 9 a.m., has been superseded by geology's evidence that the age of the earth is not less than two billion years. Intelligence is grateful for this new truth, which in no way invalidates religion.

It is not long since religion had its borders marked off by signs saying, "Change cannot enter here." These have been taken down. Religious concepts, no longer immune, have submitted to the inexorable law of change. From a private preserve or sector of life, religion has spread and is now inclusive and pervasive of the whole area of human life. It has descended into and is mingled with the stream of the world's life. As a qualitative life, a developing spiritual experience, rather than an unchanging content of belief data of absolute truth, religion no longer fears and trembles in the presence of new facts. On the contrary, it accepts and welcomes them as a matter of course. They yield enrichment of the spiritual life. Consequently, creative thinking is at a premium here quite as much as in any other area of our experience. No, we must not deceive ourselves into thinking that our inability to accept inherited religious dogmas unchanged necessarily puts us outside the pale and classifies us as irreligious. This applies to all our major religious concepts, such as God, revelation, prayer, authority, inspiration, conversion, and forgiveness.

3. CONCLUSION

These then are some of the controlling facts and principles of the growing mind. Our conclusion is that it is not a question of how from no philosophy one comes to possess the philosophic mind and outlook. In taking up the study of philosophy one is not turning his back upon a familiar world and entering into a strange new world. It is rather a matter of beginning where we are, of using what mental equipment we have, however scant and inarticulate it may be, and, through the exercise of critical faculty forced upon us by situational conflict, of gradually bringing order, consistency, meaning, and control into the mysterious universe in which we find ourselves and of which we are a part.

Each of us finds himself in a network of relationships—to his fellows, to life and death, to present, past, and future, to the world in which

he lives, and to the larger frame of things, the cosmos. He hungers and thirsts, loves and hates, fears and fights, suffers and triumphs. Upon this kaleidoscopic world with which he is so deeply involved he cannot as he feels its pressures but try to think his way, to find some meaning in it all. In so far forth every man is a philosopher. It has been said a philosophy is as inescapable as one's shadow. It is this, doubtless, Aristotle had in mind when he said, "Whether we will philosophize or whether we won't philosophize, we must philosophize."

PART ONE
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER II

RELATIVITY

1. ORIGINAL DATA AND PRIMITIVE ADVENTURE

Primitive man began his career without inherited or vested capital. His slate was clean; he started from scratch. Of this condition Aeschylus says in Promethean phrase (paraphrasing freely) :

Mankind was witless erst. They had eyes that saw not,
and ears that did not understand. Like shapes in dreams
they wrought all things confusedly. They knew not of
building houses of brick or wood, but dwelt like swarm-
ing ants in sunless caves. No steadfast sign had they of
winter, of flowering spring, or fruitful summer. In all
things they wrought blindly.

That man's world was once so disorderly and lawless, so little understood, is difficult of grasp to the modern mind. Perhaps Aeschylus overstated the case. It is even difficult for us to think of that comparatively recent period prior to the printing press, much more so of that pre-writing stage in man's experience, and it is practically impossible to appreciate or grasp a pre-language level of human existence.

In the course of time man's varied experience began to yield habit controls over nature. Faint gleams of order appeared, recurrences were observed and anticipated, caprice and chance gradually gave way as repetitions in nature occurred and were noted. The once wide-ranging, unbroken and uncharted sea of his ignorance became an Aegean archipelago whose island crests rose higher with bases broader. Slowly, very slowly this process got under way and continues today. Between those peaks or spots shoal waters appeared, and later sandbars rose and maintained themselves. This is the status of our scientific knowledge today. The far-off dream is of the day when this archipelago shall become, if not a continent, at least a lake country.

This long story from primeval darkness to dawn, this psychological and biological evolution of the species, finds recapitulation, is epitomized, we are told, in the development of each individual. The analogy at least is helpful. It agrees with what we know of our own and others' growth. Growth toward and into the fullness and richness of human potential is a slow process and a rare attainment. We find human beings strung all along the course. They crowd and clutter the way soon after the course is entered upon; they thin out increasingly, they

vary in number inversely with the distance from the starting point. To the question, Has man come from the monkey? the factual reply may be made that, if so, some have not come very far.

The human being is a highly sensitive organism not unlike the photographer's sensitized plate or film. He is a recording instrument or agency. His early growth processes consist largely in an unconscious absorption of social patterns or copy. In these he lives and moves and has his being. For him the heavens above, the earth beneath, and the underworld are and were and shall be. God, angels, and Satan are real beings. The Bible is a supernatural revelation; it came from God; it declares that God is, and therefore He is. At this level the niceties of logical reasoning do not disturb. By Him the world and all that is was made in the beginning. As there was a beginning so shall there be an end. The heavens will be dissolved with fervent heat and man brought to judgment. The righteous shall pass to heavenly bliss, the unrighteous to eternal anguish. Thus the human drama ends. Time somehow limited and eternity as endless time equally are. Illimitable space is, and of three dimensions. The coursings of the heavenly bodies are determined by law. Law was given unto them. Cause and effect are in the nature of things. Truth is, falsehood and error are, independent of human participation. The Protagorean dictum that man is the measure of all things is a willful perversion of the fact, approaching blasphemy. Facts confront man; they are independent of and indifferent to him. In like fashion magnitude and measure thereof, quality and quantity, substance, relation, location, the soul, other selves, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, have an absolute status.

2. EMERGING PROBLEMS

a. Direction and Distance

With this equipment of convictions and beliefs, of unquestioned certainties, man ventures forth into his world. While much appears to him that justifies his faith, now and then he finds situations that demand modification or reconstruction of some of his mental molds or patterns. Till now "up" was up and "down" was down. When challenged to read out clearly the meaning of his vague knowledge that the earth revolves on its axis every twenty-four hours, he discovers that "up" and "down" at noon have exchanged places at the midnight hour. In other words, our zenith is the nadir of the man in the antipodes. These concepts of direction lose their absoluteness when seen in their larger setting, in the system to which they belong and in which alone they have meaning. They become relative to position and time on the earth's surface. In like manner right and left are seen

to depend upon the direction in which the subject faces. Seen from within the clock the hands turn counterclockwise. Here and there, in and out, are relative, the one to position, the other to frame of reference; i.e., one could be *in* a house and at the same time be *out* of a certain room, or out of Iowa but in the United States. The earth is ninety-three million miles distant from the sun, a very great distance. This distance, however, shrinks into very nearness when compared with Alpha Centauri, the nearest star, distant 4.3 light years, or approximately twenty-six trillion miles. Under comparison distance tends to shrivel.

Such alphabetical experience is transitional and significant. Until this hypothetical now the youth's mental world was mainly of the old-fashioned pincushion or flypaper type. His data were just so much stuff on board, unrelated, unorganized, and therefore with little or no meaning. The dispersed character of his data was one with his mental level or stature. His mental actuality and outfit consisted of events not yet become experience, for to have experience is to discover meaning. Experience minus meaning can hardly be dignified by the term event or series of events. Experience or meaning may be said to be a distillation or residue of happenings or events of such character as to give perspective and outlook, making possible a measure of control in like situations or, as we say, of new experience. This is but another way of saying that a process of organization has set in. The jumble or chaos of events begins to assume order; system appears in his world. He himself becomes organized, his world too. Recognition that he is organic to his world is a later mental achievement.

b. Rest and Motion

"A body is either in motion or at rest" is another hereditary factual item in the unreflective mind. Let us suppose that we are standing on a dock at the ocean side looking due east. Out perhaps a quarter of a mile a steamer is sailing leisurely northward at the rate of four miles per hour. On the steamer a man is walking south, i.e., from bow to stern, at four miles per hour. The problem now presents itself: Is the man moving or standing still? Were a line drawn from our viewpoint at right angles to the direction of the ship with the man at the point of juncture, he would be seen to remain at that point. His angle of position would not change. The two motions cancel each other. To us it is perfectly obvious that he is standing still. Perhaps the ship moves under him. This is the story from our frame of reference or point of view. When we transfer ourselves to his place and condition he is clearly energizing freely as he moves at four miles per

hour. Now who is right? The answer is, each is right: he is in motion or at rest according to the point of view. In more formal and perhaps philosophic phrase we should begin our answer by saying, "That depends." The paradox of "in motion" and "at rest" is solved by remembering that neither is an independent fact, that each must be considered in its setting, now from one center or frame of reference and again from another. The absoluteness of each disappears; the fact depends upon the point of view and the system within which the observation is made. In Einsteinian phrase, there is no hitching post in the universe.

Again, a group of persons hear cannonading in a certain direction in a war zone. In an hour's time it occurs again at the same point and is heard by the same local group from the same direction. Suppose someone outside the earth zone heard both detonations. The first was heard at a given angle. Let us suppose, further, that the outside observer maintained a stationary position in the interval. He would hear the second bombardment at a different angle, for in that interval of an hour the earth, moving in its orbit about the sun at the rate of $18\frac{1}{2}$ miles per second, has traversed a distance of some 66,000 miles, an appreciable angular distance for the outside observer. Now the question arises: Did these bombardments occur at the same place or in the same direction? Again the answer should be, *That depends* on the position of the observer. Apart from the system of relationships the answer is without factual significance, is but a verbal indulgence. One is here reminded of James's happy illustration.¹ In the unlimited leisure of the wilderness a member of a vacation group proposed for consideration the following problem: A squirrel is imagined to be clinging to a tree trunk. On the opposite side a person stands. As he moves around the tree the squirrel moves, keeping the tree between them. The man completes the circuit without seeing the squirrel. The "ferocious metaphysical dispute" was as to whether the man goes round the squirrel or not. True he went round the tree and the squirrel was on the tree, but did he "go round" the squirrel? Some said yes, others no. The group being equally divided and "obstinate," appeal was made to James as he returned from a "solitary ramble." His reply was that, first, definition must be made of "going round." To this some of the "hotter disputants" replied that they wanted no "shuffling evasion," no "quibbling," no "scholastic hair-splitting," but meant just plain honest English "round." Yes, he went round the squirrel if by that you mean he was first east of him, then north, then west, then south, and then east again. No, he did not "go round" the squirrel if by that you mean

¹ William James, *Pragmatism*, chap. ii.

that he was first in front of him, then at his side, then at his back, at his other side, and in front again. The distinction in meaning being made clear, there was no further ground of dispute. There was no absolute yes or no in the matter. The answer depended upon the meaning of the phrase "going round."

Suppose two trains are running west at the same speed on parallel tracks with no intervening objects, the south side of the south train and the north side of the other having no windows or openings through which the passenger may see. Neither is there sight of the ground or the car wheels or any intervening objects. There is no jarring or jolting, no sound of moving wheels, nor any such sensation. For the passenger, are these trains in motion, or at rest? On the other hand, one of the two trains is running faster than the other. Is the slower train at rest, or in motion, or is the faster train at rest, the slower moving backward? Or, again, these two trains are moving in opposite directions. They meet. The situation presents the following problem: Are both trains in motion? If not, which one is moving? It may be yours or the other. Or, are both trains moving in the same direction, the one at much greater speed passing the other? Here rest and motion are difficult if not impossible of distinction.

Again, let us suppose the earth to be enveloped by an impenetrable darkness as of Pittsburgh smoke or London fog. Could we then know of the earth's rotation on its axis or of its orbital motion? Without entering upon the niceties of experiments undertaken by physicists, which yield negative results, they and we alike find ourselves incapable of longer entertaining the concept of absolute motion or absolute rest. Motion and rest appear to be relative. The motion of an elevator car shooting upward, unrelated to any external object, were the pressure on the feet of the occupant eliminated, would be to him in no whit different from its standing still. The motion of any body must be referred to some other body.

c. Measurement

Poincaré, a French mathematician, poses the problem of measurement. On the supposition that overnight every object in our world, including ourselves, were increased in size in every dimension one hundredfold, he asks what difference would this change make to us the morning after? The man 6 feet tall yesterday is now 600 feet in height, his shoulder breadth increased from 20 to 2,000 inches. His yardstick is now 3,600 inches in length, his pen some 800 inches long inscribing letters enlarged in proportion, his shoe size now 850, and so of all objects. The answer of those in that one frame of reference

is, that no change whatever would be noticed since in the new world the same ratio prevails as in the old. The 600-foot man would still be 6 lengths of the new foot-rule, the 800-inch pen 8 lengths of the new inch measure, etc. The magnification has made no difference because our measuring units have no absolute length, weight, or size. To one in another frame of reference who had experienced no increase of dimension the answer would be very different. Our units are arbitrary, our magnitudes relative. Shape, too, is an aspect of measurement or form. Neither is it a constant or absolute. He who has visited a palace of mirrors on the midway knows what art can do to form. Practically speaking, distortions of bodily form are not confined to laughing galleries. Were there weeping galleries or wailing walls, such distortions might appropriately be found there. Did we live in a convex or concave rather than in a planar world, our form or shape would be other than at present. In other words, shapes would differ in a more obviously curved space world. Or, from another aspect, the shape and size of a body depend upon its rate and direction of motion. Lines are straight or curved depending upon the angle of observation. Mass varies with velocity.

It was long thought that length was a constant factor in all bodies and for all observers whether these bodies were in motion or at rest. This view is being seriously disputed. Lorentz, a Dutch physicist, advanced the view that a body in motion appears shorter than its measured length when at rest. To illustrate: two bars are of equal length. One is placed on a train, its length in the direction of the train; the other is on the station platform pointing in the same direction. Now imagine this train at very great speed running past the depot and the bar. To those standing on the platform the bar on the train will appear shorter than the other. To those on the train the bar on the platform will be seen as shorter than that on the train. While the bar on the train appears shorter for those standing on the platform, the bar on the fast-speeding train remains of constant length for those on the train. Increase the speed of the train toward that of light, and the length of the bar to those on the station platform would approach zero. To say that an iron bar is a certain length irrespective of circumstance or system of reference is, for relativity, no more than a meaningless combination of words. Space lengths are relative to a system.

In like manner the concept of absolute time, as for Newton, is denied by Einstein. The simultaneity of distant events depends, as in the other cases, upon the frame of reference of the observer. Suppose that on a ship sailing north two lights, a green one at the bow, and a red one at the stern, are flashed and are seen, by an observer on the

ship midway between the two lights, as simultaneous. To an observer opposite on the shore, because of the movement of the ship, the red light is seen first—as it is nearer to this observer, and the green light later, a slightly longer time being required for light to travel the greater distance. Thus the same phenomenon, the flashing of the two lights, is simultaneous for the one and successive for the other, depending upon the position of the observer and the distance of the events. For the same reason, were the flashings of the lights separated by an interval of time, the length of that interval would depend upon the system of reference of the observer.

d. Duration

We may consider now the concept of duration as an interval of time between two events. Suppose two clocks are at rest at points A and B in a system C. At nine o'clock by clock A a light is flashed. It takes time, say one second, to reach clock B, i.e., it reaches B at one second past nine. Assuming the constancy of the speed of light, this flash reflected from B would be received at A two seconds past nine. These two clocks are then said to be synchronized. Here the space distance from A to B and the time interval of one second are equivalent measures. Suppose, however, a parallel system C', with clocks A' and B' situated and regulated as in system C. This system, C', is moving at a high rate of speed parallel to system C in the direction A to B. In each system it is nine o'clock as the light flashes from A in system C. As before, the flash takes one second to reach B, and another for the reflection from B to A. In this interval the clock B' in system C' has moved away from the point B in system C. For the observer on C then the light ray will require more than one second to travel from A' to B' and, since A' is moving toward the point or instant where B' was when the light was reflected, less than one second is required for the reflection to reach A'. To the observer on C' this is not so since for him, relatively at rest, the ray traverses the distance A' to B' and from B' to A' in equal times. Thus the duration between two events in the one system C' for an observer in system C differs from that of an observer in C'. That is, duration, or a time interval, is relative to the frame or system of reference from which it is measured. Time like space has local implications. Or in terms of the clocks, they may synchronize for an observer in that system while, at the same time, for an outside observer for whom that system is in motion, these same clocks may not synchronize. Thus time as an instant or as an interval is relative. We should observe, however, that the divergence of views between Newton and Einstein appears at its maximum when we pass from ordinary low

velocities toward those approximating the velocity of light. For Newton mass, too, was a constant, whereas for Einstein it varies with its velocity. Such conception of time gives added significance to the lines:

We live in deeds not years; in thoughts not breaths;
In feelings not in figures on a dial.

It should disturb the prevalent theological view of immortality as an endless, eternal existence in time. Nor in such view need any value be lost. Possibly immortality is qualitative rather than quantitative.

e. Royce's Time-Span

Should the reader survive these modestly taxing reflections, we may continue in a related area. Whereas for Einstein time is relative to the frame of reference of the observer, for Royce it is relative to the "time-span" of consciousness of the observer. His theory is based on the view that the present instant is not a mere knife-edge between the past and the future, but has within itself a duration inclusive of a before and an after; i.e., the instant includes both its *passing* into the past but not yet past and its succeeding event *not yet* present. Although the components of a musical phrase, a rhythmical series, or words in a sentence, have an objective temporal succession—i.e., each, save the first and last, has a before and after—yet each series is grasped "at once" as a whole. This temporal grasp or spread of consciousness Royce calls the "time-span" of consciousness. This time-span may vary among finite beings. The longer the time-span, the shorter the duration of an event. The duration or measure of an event will vary according to the time-span of consciousness. But the time-span of consciousness of Deity is of infinite duration, with the result that the whole temporal succession or procession is for Him an eternal *now*; a thousand years are but as yesterday or a watch in the night. Perceptual time is not only relative to mind as such; it varies with mental moods due to bodily conditions and circumstances. Drugs affect time's flow. Hashish prolongs the duration of an event; it slows time down much as the slow-motion film slows action of a football game or prize fight. While waiting for a train to keep an appointment or make a connection, when the scheduled time margin is narrow, one finds time drag almost unendurably. This we may call a psychological relativism not wholly unrelated to the relativity of time as discussed above.

In an omnibus paragraph we may present a few still more general observations of relativism kindred to, but in most instances distant in varying degree from, the current theory of relativity. More closely related, perhaps, is that of a level Iowa farm. To the observer it appears

level in longitudinal direction. To one supplied with instrumentation and from a lateral view its surface may prove curved. Sections of land at or near the equator are practically a mile square. As we go north we find jogs in the road at regular intervals due to convergence of the longitudinal lines toward the pole. North and south boundaries vary according to latitude; adjustments must be made. Whether a coin is round or oval in varied degree depends upon the position of the percipient. Let one immerse his arms in a basin of water. If just prior to this act one arm had rested for some little time on a block of ice while the other had been submerged in a vessel of hot water, the felt temperature of the water in the basin will vary for the two arms. A bit of red paper will assume a purplish hue when placed on a blue background. A field of yellow grain in sunlight will under cloud conditions have a brownish cast. A stake projecting from the water will be *seen* as bent at the surface but will be straight for *touch*. For a man at the center of a rotating glass cube, having only the sense of sight, the room rotates about him, just as the sky is seen to rotate daily about the earth. For an organism whose life cycle is but a day the apparently changeless caretaker of its area is immortal. In perceptual space the railroad rails appear to converge, whereas in the conceptual space of the geometer parallel lines meet only at infinity.

For Newton space and time were absolute in character, they had independent being. For Kant they were but forms of perception, molds in our sense outfit that impose themselves upon all sense data. For many of us they are concepts, or dare we say devices, by which we order our experience—means for the placing of objects and events. An object may be located in terms of space, whereas an event requires the additional dimension of time. Mr. A and Miss B were married in the parlor on the third floor of Hotel X. Here we have employed three space dimensions. We are interested, however, in more definite location of the event. When we are told that it occurred at noon, October 19, 1946, a fourth aspect, time, is added, and we are satisfied. Time here is an additional factor in the specification of the event. Because of our spatializing of time, we speak of it as a fourth dimension. That we live, says Einstein, in a four-dimensional space-time continuum is now a commonplace. Popularly speaking, this four-dimensional continuum embraces the four sets of space and time relations within our experience, viz. forward and backward, right and left, up and down, and before and after. By S. Alexander and Lloyd Morgan space and time are hyphenated into space-time, which assumes a metaphysical character and is declared to be the original matrix or source whence space, time, matter, and all that is emerge.

These are some of the problems that confront every adventurer on the intellectual way. This chapter presents in elementary fashion some phases of the widely current theory of Relativity.

3. RELATEDNESS AND RELATIVITY

A distinction should be observed between relatedness or relationship and relativity. That food or sleep is good for one does not make either good relative. Each is integral and necessary to a person and not, therefore, relative. In the relatedness of food, sleep, etc., to a person the relation is inherent and constitutive. It underlies consciousness, is prior to and wholly different from any comparative evaluation of this or that food or of the best time to sleep. Relativity appears when there is a choice between tea and coffee or a heavy or light meal at the evening hour. The need for food has about it an absoluteness in comparison with which the valuableness for the person of this or that food is relative. Every human being is "unconditionally subjected" to food. This relationship between food and organic life is not what we mean by relativity as illustrated in the foregoing pages. In other words, the relation is not a consciously willed one, nor is it one that may be modified or annulled at will. It is, to repeat, an inherent, elemental, essential, constitutive relation irrespective of any assessment by a conscious subject.²

References in addition to those in footnotes

1. Einstein, Albert. *Sidelights on Relativity*.
2. Luckiesh, M. *Foundations of the Universe*.
3. Russell, Bertrand. *The A B C of Relativity*.
4. Schlick, Moritz. *Space and Time in Contemporary Physics*.
5. Slosson, Edwin E. *Easy Lessons in Einstein*.
6. Talmey, Max. *The Relativity Theory Simplified*.

² It is this, if I interpret him correctly, that Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. 1, chap. xv, expresses in his discussion of "The Relativity and Absoluteness of Values." Likewise W. T. Stace in *The Concept of Morals*, chaps. i, ii, *et passim*, presents, if not the above distinction, at least one not unlike it as he denies both ethical absolutism and ethical relativity in his exposition of a universal morality "relative to the universal needs of human nature", rather than to any particular people, place, or time.

CHAPTER III

LAW

Whether Aeschylus oversimplified the "witless" character of the primitive mind is a question difficult to answer definitely. It is probably a fact that at the initial human level man wrought practically blindly in all things. This view may well be the result of a genetic method of approach, i.e., the effort to account for the more complex by tracing its more elementary forms. To arrive at an ultimate simple marked by the utter absence of the quality in question is to pass beyond explanation, is to arrive at an unattainable limit, or, what is equally or still more miraculous, to pass beyond a limiting concept.

1. THE PRIMITIVE MAN AND THE MODERN YOUTH

Whatever the merits of the matter, we have a clearer case when we come to the child and youth of today. From birth family and group forces play upon him constantly with the result that vague notions of order and system in his world begin to arise early in his consciousness. That his behavior toward his family and playmates must exhibit some pattern or regulative form soon dawns upon him. Some things he must do, some he must not. In this way he finds that his social world is an ordered world. In like fashion the physical world, including his body, reveals order. Day and night, the round of the seasons, the sun in his northern and southern journeyings, seedtime and harvest, the ebb and flow of the tides, the waxing and waning of the moon, the showers of meteors, the planets in their courses, the regular return of the comets—these yield their impress of an orderly world. His bodily energies rise and fall. He hungers and needs food. He cannot do without sleep. He must recognize and satisfy bodily needs. For the primitive man shelter and shade from storm and sun were indispensable. His outfit of habit responses, begotten through his efforts to satisfy organic needs, implied and formed the basis for his subsequent consciousness of a more or less ordered world. In his repeated acts, incipient memories, and anticipations was implicit the concept of nature, of *a* nature. The primitive man was the original trail blazer. His well-being depended upon his discovery of simple uniformities and regularities in his world. His long conceptual travail is short-circuited in the modern youth by the conscious capitalization of experience in terms of social concepts and forces that play upon him from birth. Standing on the shoulders of his ancient predecessors the youth of today soon finds that he is living in a lawful

world.

From the lawless character of events in the life of primitive man to the idea of a world order or system is a long and uncertain story. From early reflection when natural phenomena were attributed to personal powers, favoring or demonic, up to the concept of a world shorn of such spiritual agencies, a world where law reigns, is the story of man's developing mind. Interesting and fascinating a pursuit as this would be, it is not the author's purpose to trace it, even were he able. The fact of immediate interest is that the reign of law is a prevailing concept in our scientific age. It controls our thinking so deeply that the suggestion of the lawless, even in the microscopic world, utterly baffles most minds.

2. THE MEANING OF LAW

What, then, is this fact or principle that we call law? What do we mean by the "reign of law"? We understand what the reign of a monarch or dictator means. Does law "reign" in the physical world in this sense? Is it some sort of power outside and above nature to which nature's processes are subservient or obedient? Does law control or govern nature? Is the law of gravitation some ghost-like power or latent force watching over natural objects, pouncing upon them as they pass from rest to motion? Or whatever it may be, is it probable or possible that gravity operates upon a body while at rest? These and other questions might be raised with respect to other natural laws, such as the law of the conservation of energy, of growth and decay, of attraction and repulsion, of inertia, of acceleration, or of entropy. But law in the physical world is none of these things. What then, we repeat, is law?

Comparatively limited experience, even, reveals repetitions in the behavior of natural objects. We observe in like situations, so far as that is possible, likeness of behavior. When this experience is extended to some considerable area we speak of this observed uniformity as a law. When, further, between two widely separated areas, in each of which uniformity obtains, a likeness is discovered we are inclined to capitalize the relationship into Law. Newton's hunch of an intimate relation between the fall of the traditional apple to the earth and the pull of the earth upon the moon or of the sun upon the earth, when submitted to calculation, yielded the law of gravity. Scientific laws are descriptive summaries of the orderly sequence not only of our perceptions but of nature's processes as well. The law of gravity expresses a uniformity of behavior in natural phenomena over a wide area, often indeed cosmic in sweep. It is a form of activity, not an entity; in fact, it is a verb rather than a noun. Apart from gravitating bodies there is

no gravity. That things behaved as happily before as after Newton's discovery is obvious to minds free from philosophic blight.

3. ARE LAWS SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE?

One is disturbed, if not perturbed, to find Karl Pearson¹ answering the question "Does it [scientific law] really exist before man has given expression to it?" by an emphatic *no*. It "exists only when formulated by man." Possibly Pearson begs the whole issue in his emphasis on "scientific" law. Granting that science is the product of human activity, scientific laws are, as the scientist believes, his discovery and formulation of regularities in the natural processes of his environment. Physical laws are mental transcripts of processes occurring in the physical world. They have been wrought out by the mind acting upon the raw material of nature furnished through the senses. Their validity is determined by their ability to give man control over environing nature. Scientific law expresses a constancy in nature upon which expectations are based and planned conduct becomes possible. Scientific law for Pearson is a résumé or shorthand formula expressing "the sequences among our sense-impressions" covering a wide range of facts. For him the "outside world is a construct" growing out of our perceptions and conceptions. Law then appertains only to this mentally constructed world. The attempt to apply the concept law to any world of things-in-themselves apart from man's mind is futile and meaningless. One would find difficulty in defending Pearson against the metaphysician's charge of subjectivism. His thesis as to the nature and area of scientific law does not get him beyond psychology. Observed sequences of perceptions—much the same,' he says, for primitive man, Ptolemy, Newton, and ourselves—are not scientific laws. These sequences become laws only when classified, generalized, conceptualized, and expressed in concise form. Scientific laws then, for him, are products of and exist only in and for mind.

Although Pearson's view is clearly presented and stresses an important aspect, we fail to find it satisfying. A feeling of futility remains. Experience seems to demand more objectivity in the concept of law than is here expressed or implied. When law is so defined and limited, it appears that we are shut off from the external world. Just how the transition is made from psychology to physical nature is not clear. Into the merits of subjective idealism and objective realism we shall not now enter. Somewhat dogmatically, perhaps, we may say that though the laws of nature may and do frequently require retouching, sometimes even to the point of complete restatement, though the formula-

¹ Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (3rd ed.), chap. iii.

tion of the law is a mental product, it is not wholly or merely a creation of mind—it is also a discovery of an orderly behavior believed to be intrinsic in nature. Laws of coexistence or implication, as in geometry, where the equality of two sides of a triangle implies the equality of angles at the base, exhibit the same principle.

A more realistic view of the matter is that our recognition and formulation of nature's uniformities into laws are a transcript of processes actually occurring in nature. That the formulated statement is a mental product, as for Pearson, we admit. But that it is more we insist. Law is the resultant of our mental working over of observed natural processes. Physical laws, then, are mental formulations, psychic counterparts, shorthand expressions for regularities that obtain in the physical world. They express, as James would say, "the natural go of things." Paulsen speaks of nature as "a unified system of facts governed by laws." We would take little exception to this statement if for the phrase "governed by" the word "expressing" or "revealing" were substituted. Physical laws do not govern, control, or determine nature's processes; they are not coercive or prescriptive; they are rather descriptive of the ways in which things behave or events occur. They are carefully calculated results of a sufficiently large series of observations in a given area which in varying degree experience validates. Scientific law is a form of prediction based on experience which offers a clue to future expectations. Conversely, things and events do not *obey* laws. Necessity is foreign to natural law. Law is not a power, agent, or force constraining phenomena in their behavior. The truth of the matter is, the practical significance of law consists in the fact that it yields a confident expectation as to the future.

4. STATISTICAL LAWS

In a broad general way what we have in mind in the foregoing may be illustrated by what we speak of as statistical laws. These laws are purely empirical. They are based on a wide range of cases common to a class. In the instance of life insurance companies it is well known that premium rates are lower for those in youth than for persons of more advanced years. For youth the expectation of life is greater: premiums will extend over a longer term. This fact of life expectancy is not arrived at on the basis of general experience alone. It is reached by very careful study of a wide range of cases extending over a considerable period of time. An average is thus obtained. It is found that in the large a rather definite number of persons will die per hundred thousand at different ages each year, the number increasing with age. Emergencies such as epidemics enter into the calculation. Premiums

vary with occupation too. In extra-hazardous classes rates are usually higher. Now from the fact that during any age period a certain percentage of the insured will die, we cannot say that so many or say who will die in any given year. Dr. Edmund Halley, discoverer of Halley's comet, formulated the first mortality table, the original basis of life insurance. Statistical laws are based on long-range averages. By their use premium rates in fire, accident, and life insurance companies are determined. They tell us what has happened and what the probability is as to the future. About these laws there is no necessity, no "must." They furnish us probabilities, not certainties; they deal with groups, with mass phenomena, not with any particular individual of a group. Our knowledge of what will happen to any individual, in respect to the problem at issue, is limited to the fact that he is a member of the group. Statistical laws *do* nothing; they are résumés of the past; they furnish grounds for anticipation of the future. In like manner we have such laws concerning birth rate and death rate, marriage, divorce, suicide, crime, business failures, industrial accidents, unemployment, wages, rainfall, population shifts, etc. In fact, it would be difficult to find an area of practical or professional life where this method is not used. These laws are not determining causes; they tell us *that* such and such is the case, not *why*; they are records, and create expectations. For the sake of greater accuracy we should note that statistical averages may vary from one period of time to another. Because of scientific knowledge of conditions that make for improved health, the life span may be, and has been, extended. The prevalence of tuberculosis, yellow fever, and smallpox has been reduced almost to the vanishing point. This leads to the need for new averages and yields the conclusion that the time factor must not be overextended in determining averages. Statistical data, we may add, frequently suggest inquiry into possible causal relations between physical, social, and economic conditions and the phenomenon in question.

5. LAW IN SOCIAL LIFE

Much of our difficulty with the concept of law in the natural world is due to our earlier acquaintance with what is known as civil law or law in our social life. Here law "reigns," lawgivers *are*. The constitution and statute laws set limits upon conduct. The will of the dictator where it is the supreme law is a forceful fact. Divine law, as idea or concept at least, is as real as human law. Sinners are violators of God's laws and must therefore suffer punishment for their offenses. Hell is their unavoidable desert. "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." Youth, too, finds itself hedged about with community customs and

standards of conduct. That a youth breaks them, usually secretly, is a testimony to their existence and authority. By virtue of these and other such social conventions and beliefs the youth is pretty well weighted with the conviction of law as agential, as prescriptive in character rather than descriptive, as authoritative in and determinative of conduct. It becomes an easy matter and quite natural to carry over the same concept of law when employed in the realm of nature. At this extreme all law in nature and conduct is prescriptive, whether by God or man. At the other extreme all law is descriptive. While there are still those who accept the former view, there are few, if any, who accept the latter. This and the following paragraph suggest the possibility that all law, even human law, may be descriptive. Neglecting traffic and such conduct regulations, which are but imposed and changeable *rules* of convenience and not *laws* in the above sense, we may say, ideally speaking, that human laws are descriptive in character. The idealist might say that all moral imperatives and conduct controls are temporary devices, perhaps pointers, which shall be done away with when man learns and expresses in conduct his fundamental nature. Any approach to such far-off level of human stature would mean a passage of human laws from prescription to description.

One cannot say that such interpretation of law in the social realm is impossible. It may be brought into accord with the concept of law in the physical world as already presented in this chapter. May not law in this realm be but the natural *go* of human beings in their more ideal social relationships? May not truly moral laws be discoveries and revelations of essential human nature? Why does the practice of certain moral values lead lives to their best, a faith experimentally verifiable and frequently verified? If such is the case, and I believe it so, does it not mean that moral principles and practices are inherent in, expressive and constitutive of, human nature itself? In like manner is there not something ideally real, attractive, and of unquestionable value in the life that is truly religious? It is not yet determined what we shall be. The religious life has a magnetic pull in a direction approved by us at our deepest depths and highest levels. Does this not suggest to us somewhat of what we fundamentally are and may become? It is not, therefore, wildly imaginative or absurd to think of genuinely moral and religious principles or laws as expressive and revelational of man's essential nature, as inner motivations rather than as external or supernatural forces in constraint of human nature. They are rather the natural *go* of human life at its best.

What shall we say now of our statute laws? Surely they are external to and coercive of conduct. Would an effort to swing them into line with

the foregoing interpretation of law be but a transgression of reason's range? Not necessarily so. Nor is such attempt here a purely satirical indulgence. It is true that many of our laws belong to the "thou shalt not" class, are restrictions especially upon antisocial behavior. They *are* because social offenses are possible and because social offenders are. This is their negative aspect. On their positive side they recognize and seek to protect and promote the enjoyment of basic human rights and values. Law portrays in general terms and seeks to preserve a level of values inherent in man, belonging to him peculiarly at the stage of his development when they were promulgated. The story of the growth of law is that of a growing insight into man's developing nature and needs. In saying this we are not passing from fact to fiction, rather the reverse. Laws reveal what is believed to be integral to and constitutive of man. Laws not in accord with, that do not express, basic human nature cannot promote man's well-being and are usually short-lived.

To the same conclusion may we not come when we consider the processes of lawmaking, the legislature, and the legislators? It is here that one may be accused of satire. Nevertheless, it may emphasize by implication the point of view so far presented. The author acknowledges that this interpretation is idealistic, but it is not therefore a matter for mirth, nor wholly a bit of mythology. Who are those legislators? They are presumably selected persons. Why selected? Because of our need and their superior training and insight into man's nature. Analysts of souls are they. For this reason they are chosen by their constituents. The legislative session is convened. The promotion of the well-being of their constituency is the sole purpose of the legislators. To this great end with thorough objectivity they dedicate and devote themselves. Nothing shall deflect them from this purpose. After protracted high counsel together they announce the results of their researches. These we call laws. The legislature adjourns. And what is this biennial batch of laws other than revelations of our essential selves to our cluttered, feverish surface selves! Specialists in the psychology and metaphysics of souls, knowing us better than we know ourselves, legislators plumb the depths of our being and, in the form of laws, report their findings with respect to ourselves. Living in the light of this knowledge we attain new measures of freedom; laws are no longer coercive or restrictive; they are revelations of the substance of selves in respect to the natural *go* of their behavior. To any possible critic of this interpretation the author, if pressed, will grant the possibility that in some instances what *is* may not be identical with what *ought* to be.

Logic is another area of experience which reveals the operation of law. I refer to certain principles or postulates employed in thinking, known as the Laws of Thought. They express the structure of thinking. To Aristotle we owe the formulation of three of these—the law of *identity*, the law of *noncontradiction*, and the law of *excluded middle*. The law of identity is stated in the form A is A . So commonplace and platitudinous does this appear that a non-initiate might flippantly observe, “Well, what of it? Of course A is A .” An apple is an apple (shades of Gertrude Stein!). A is A is a formal principle, not a metaphysical affirmation or reference even. It means that in any realm of discourse, whatever the initial meaning of a term, that term must be used in that sense throughout; i.e., it must have a definite and constant meaning. When conclusions differ in a thought procedure, each might ask, “Is A , A ?”—i.e., have I used the term throughout faithful to its first intent? Without the fidelity implied in this form, so-called thinking simply gets nowhere unless by sheerest accident. As the human body would collapse into a shapeless mass if its skeletal structure were withdrawn, so thought that disregards the formal principle of identity yields nothing that could be dignified even as mental gel. More metaphysically speaking, identity could be expressed as A *is*, the italics meaning that throughout the vicissitudes of its being A maintains its identity, that change is gradual.

The second principle or law of thought is noncontradiction in the form A is not non- A . This makes more explicit an implication of the law of identity. It says that when A is A it is preposterous that A should stray from its initial nature or use and later in that process become, or be used as, not- A —i.e., become changed into not- A or B . As stated so familiarly in textbooks, A cannot at the same time be both A and not- A . This means that a term or thing cannot have a meaning or character and at the same time not have that meaning or character. Such procedure would be an utter stultification of thought. To say that A is not B means, if it means anything, that each has a character, that the two terms are different and cannot be identified, and that throughout the use situation, for the time being, each term shall maintain its uniqueness. Disregard of this is contradiction. Noncontradiction is a challenge to consistency, a warning against contradiction in the use of terms and ideas.

The first law states that a thing is, that it is unique, that a term has a definite meaning which must be faithfully observed. The second law declares that a thing or term cannot have contradictory predicates or qualities. The third law, excluded middle, says that between contradictory predicates there is no middle ground. This law gives fur-

ther emphasis and definition to contradiction. An object is either red or not-red. May it not be green, blue, or yellow? Yes, but these are all included in "not-red." Thus, excluded middle rules out every other alternative between any predicate term and its contradictory. The principle of noncontradiction denies that any subject-matter can have at the same time and in the same sense contradictory predicates. Excluded middle is of the *either . . . or* type; i.e., an object must be *either* red *or* not-red. Contradictory terms are thus exclusive of each other and at the same time exhaustive of all possibilities. Neither between nor beyond them is there any other possibility.

Here then are the three traditional laws of thought. Without these principles thinking is meaningless. They are constitutive of all accurate thinking activity. Though they may be regarded and are employed as checks upon thought processes, yet in such use we are but rethinking our thinking; i.e., we are proceeding with maximum care to see that nothing alien to the real nature of thinking has entered into the process. Do the laws of thought, then, control thinking? Yes, but not externally. They permeate and saturate; they are constitutive—are the very substance, fiber, and essence—of thought activity itself. They range themselves with the nature of law in fields already examined. Laws, we conclude, express the "natural go of things" under the relations in which things have their being.²

References in addition to those in footnotes

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2. Drake, Durant. *Invitation to Philosophy*. Chap. xv.
3. Evans, D. L., and W. S. Gamertsfelder. *Logic*. Chap. xiii.
4. Levy, H. *A Philosophy for a Modern Man*. Pp. 142-159.
5. Schrödinger, Erwin. *Science and the Human Temperament*. Chap. vi.
6. The University of California Associates. *Knowledge and Society*. Chaps. iii and vi.
7. Von Mises, Richard. *Probability, Statistics and Truth*. Lecture V, *et passim*.

² In this discussion certain aspects of the concept of law have been passed over unnoticed. The author's effort to present a common denominator in the areas discussed must not be taken as failure to recognize, or as a denial of, the logical differences between these types of lawfulness — laws of nature (empirical laws), man-made laws (norms), and formal laws (rules of logic).

CHAPTER IV

CAUSE

1. PRIMITIVE CONCEPTIONS

Another familiar concept, closely related to law, is what we call cause. On it we have all been nurtured. It has had wide vogue in both the racial and the individual mind. It is a concept by which we relate and explain our experience. It is, perhaps, as old as man. The primitive man employed it. He knew that he could produce changes in his environment, even though his knowledge of himself was at a minimum. He had not yet sharply differentiated between himself and nature. He and nature were kin. What was in him was in nature. Totemism testifies to this. When we say that the primitive man's attribution of causality to nature was but a transfer of his own experience to the outer world, and that this is the origin of his concept of natural causation, we are probably crediting him with insight beyond his attainment. Such transfer would be possible only at a higher level of consciousness. However that may be, we do find at a later stage that the phenomena of nature were conceived of as produced by spirit agencies or powers like unto man's own. The gods of Greece, Rome, and India were of this type, perhaps very slightly refined. By these agencies with human tempers, raging seas, destructive cyclones, and ravaging epidemics were explained. Coincident with these, magical means of control appeared. By a psychology not yet wholly outgrown man's will was held to be a power or independent entity capable of *producing* change. A long list could be compiled of those spirit agencies controlling the sun, moon, crops, trees, etc. Reference to a very few must suffice.

Of this type in prescientific astronomy days was the belief that the heavens, cylindrical in form, were made to revolve by angels turning a crank attached to the axis; sunset meant that the sun was swallowed by a great monster; the stars were hung out nightly by the Almighty; comets were "missiles hurled by an angry God at a wicked world"; clouds were stirred up by "most foul spirits"; lightning was either the flash of God's anger or the work of malicious spirits; thunder was the threatening voice of Jupiter or Thor; meteors and eclipses were accents of Divine displeasure, foretokens of certain calamity; hail, frosts, and floods were caused by witches in the service of Satan, the Prince of Darkness. Satan was the "power of the air." Later these and

such powers were frustrated by means of prayers and incantations, by exorcism, and, later still, by processions in which were borne and prominently displayed statues, relics, and other sacred symbols, and above all by the ringing of consecrated church bells. For Aristotle God was the Prime Mover. For St. Thomas winds and storms were frequently caused by demons. For seventeenth-eighteenth century Increase Mather, American divine and early president of Harvard College, tempests were caused by angels, sometimes good, sometimes bad. Remnants of such beliefs lingered on toward the beginning of the nineteenth century. Group prayers for rain, for the cessation of some pestilence, or for victory in war are not unknown today. When we realize that this level of insight finds exact parallel in the six-year-old child of today,¹ we are led to conclude either that we are still not very far along the highway of knowledge, or that in the last fifty or one hundred years amazing progress has been made. We are inclined to accept the latter alternative.

2. SOME HISTORICAL CONCEPTS

Such were some of the more primitive concepts of causation. What is cause? we ask. Unlike Pilate we wait for a satisfying reply. Is it an agency or force compelling results, that which makes things happen? Does every natural event have a cause? Are all events in the world of nature and consciousness caused—i.e., is causation a universal law? Does the cause *produce* the effect? John Locke defined cause as “that which makes any other thing . . . begin to be,” and an effect as “that which had its beginning from some other thing.” Are cause and effect terms applied to a chance or accidental concurrence of events? Is cause but the totality of conditions in another aspect? A set of conditions means not only a concurrence of otherwise independent elements, but also their mutual interaction. This view of cause suggests the possibility that rain is but another name for a continuing series or set of conditions. Are happenings “conjoined but not connected”? Is cause, as for John Stuart Mill, an invariable relation of antecedent and consequent? True, there are regular sequences of phenomena, but is this the whole story? Is there between phenomena so linked a linkage? For science interested in exact description of events in nature, the answer is *no*. The history of philosophy, on the other hand, in the main has favored an affirmative reply. Philosophy has been interested not only in the *that* and the *what* of phenomena but also in their *why*. Into its reflections words such as *purpose*, *reason*, and *value* have entered. The problem may be reduced to the following: Are the

¹ See the author's *Formative Factors in Character*, p. 16.

sequences in nature mere coincidences, or is there some closer underlying relationship?

a. David Hume

It was David Hume who, by his theory of causation, jolted the philosophic world out of its complacency. He awakened Kant out of his "dogmatic slumber." The basis of Hume's theory is that all our knowledge consists of "impressions" and "ideas." When I see a tree, I have certain visual impressions; when I hear a dog bark, I have certain auditory impressions; and so on. When I merely think of a tree or a barking dog, I have certain ideas, which differ from impressions "in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind." Impressions enter the mind with more "force and violence" than ideas do. Ideas, which are the content of our thinking and reasoning, are but faint images of impressions that linger after the sense impression has ceased. Although our ideas resemble impressions, they are not always exact copies.

Now, every simple idea has its simple impression. In a word, no impression, no idea. To reason correctly we must understand "perfectly the idea concerning which we reason," and this means, for Hume, tracing an idea to its origin, i.e., to its primary impression. What, then, of the idea of causation? For this idea, there is no sense impression. We see one thing happen, then another, but we do not see the necessity of the connection. Thus to say that the cause *produces* the effect is meaningless, as "production" has no antecedent impression. Contiguity and priority as factors in the cause and effect relationship are not adequate to a complete explanation of what we mean by "cause," and for the idea of "necessary connection," implied in the popular conception of causality, there is no adequate ground—i.e., no original impression.

When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other.²

For like reason the popular maxim "that whatever begins to exist must have a cause . . . is neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain." Such beliefs fail us when we inquire as to the original impression and the ground on which the transition is made to a cause and effect con-

² *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Sec. VII, Pt. I.

nection. Our only resort, therefore, is to experience. A billiard ball in motion strikes a second, and the second is put in motion. A flame is seen and heat is felt. The sun rises and darkness disappears. These conjunctions repeated, remembered, and supplemented by the imagination yield in us an *expectation* that, given the one, the other will follow. Conjunction, then, is equivalent to contiguity in time and place. From a constant conjunction of events to the idea of necessary connection the transition is easy (though fallacious), due wholly to a mental "propensity," which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. This, therefore, is the essence of necessity. Necessity "exists in the mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality in bodies."³ Events or objects are "conjoined but not connected." Necessary connection originates in an "impression of reflection"—that is, in an impression of what our own mind is doing when, seeing one thing happening, it expects another. Succession is sensed, necessary connection is not. Necessary connection exists only in the mind, not in objects. It is determined by custom. Causal connection is nothing more than "the constant conjunction of objects" as given in experience.

In a final effort at clarity Hume offers two definitions. (1) Philosophically, cause may be defined as "an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter." (2) More psychologically, cause is "an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it in the imagination, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other." In neither of these is there any suggestion of necessity or necessary connection. Cause is an idea or expectation, based on custom and habit, that, given a repeated sequence of contiguous events, the presence of the one will be followed by the other.⁴

b. John Stuart Mill

It is clear on Hume's theory that, given an event X, the likelihood of its being followed by X' is only probable. Where there is no more intimate linkage between congestion of the lungs and pneumonia,

³ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, Vol. I, Pt. III, Sec. XIV.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, under "Cause" in Index, for exposition and criticism. For his own criticism of his theory see Appendix, Vol. I, pp. 559 f.

or between decapitation and death, than mere repetitions in experience and consequent mental propensity, our knowledge structure rests upon a rather insecure foundation. To remedy this situation Mill sought a more demonstrative logical method. For him, as for Francis Bacon, inductions by simple enumeration were not sufficiently dependable. Such induction is "puerile," says Bacon. Mill offers five methods for a more analytic determination of the causal relationship, viz., Agreement, Difference, Joint Method, Residues, and Concomitant Variations. These are known as his Methods or Canons of Induction. He defines the Method of Agreement:

If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.

If an epidemic of typhoid breaks out in a community, and in a study of the circumstances surrounding each case the only common factor is found to be the use of drinking-water from the town pump, the water is probably the cause of the fever or causally related thereto. Danger lurks here. Because of propensity to fly from particulars to generalities, to use wings rather than weights (Bacon), our first impressions possess our understanding to the neglect of others that might appear on more reflective study. In our illustration, although typhoid is traced to the use of water, it might be due to the condition of vessels employed in its use or to other factors revealed by further analysis. The student will note the similarity of this method to Hume's explanation by repeated instances. Through multiplied instances, simple enumeration, a chance relationship between coexistent or sequential phenomena may be eliminated.

The Method of Difference is defined:

If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.

If the drinking water is suspected, take an instance where typhoid appeared and one where typhoid did not appear. The factors of possible significance were the same so far as that is possible in both cases, except that where typhoid appeared water was drunk from the town

pump, and where typhoid did not appear no water was drunk from this well. In such a situation according to this method the water is probably causally related to or, perhaps better, is a condition of the phenomenon in question. Further data are necessary to approximate a true solution. One may observe that apparently significant factors may, under analysis and experiment, be revealed as insignificant, and that seemingly insignificant data may later prove to be significant.

For Mill the Method of Difference rates high. It supplements the Method of Agreement in that he recognizes that a phenomenon under investigation, such as the destruction of a building, may result from various sets of circumstances. Here what is known as the Plurality of Causes must be taken into account. We may well neglect the magnitude of the task of assuring ourselves of "the circumstance in which alone the instances agree," an impossible undertaking. Current intemperance, vulgarity, lawlessness, and lowered morals are not explained by any single cause.

Whereas the Method of Agreement does not employ experiment in "the spontaneous operations of nature" the Method of Difference is especially a method of "artificial experiment." In the latter method there are but two instances, one positive and the other negative. This reduces the problem to the limits of experimental treatment and is "sufficient for the most complete and rigorous induction." So much is this true that for Mill "it appears to be by the Method of Difference alone that we can ever, in the way of direct experience, arrive with certainty at causes." One may properly question whether induction is ever capable of passing beyond probability and arriving at certainty.

Mill defines the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference:

If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.

This method is a combination and extension of Agreement and Difference. By the plurality of instances, positive and negative, it provides a further check and may yield a heightened probability of the causal relation.

Two other of his methods remain. The Method of Residues is thus stated:

Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known

by previous inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents.

This method proceeds by elimination as do the foregoing. The temperature of a room may be accounted for by the heating apparatus, by the lights, and by the thought activities of the students. If we can measure the heat given off by the radiators and by the lights, the remaining difference in temperature is that caused by the energizing students. This method is one form of the Method of Difference, partaking of its "rigorous certainty" and "thus one of the most important among our instruments of discovery." Though the "most fertile in unexpected results" we do not dwell on it since it is prevailingly deductive and quantitative.

The Method of Concomitant Variations is defined as:

Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.

One's weekly wage varies directly with the rate per day or the days worked. The force necessary to raise a given body varies inversely with the distance from the fulcrum. The surface and volume of a sphere vary directly with its radius. It is possible to regard the Method of Concomitant Variations as a refinement of the Method of Difference. It expresses difference in more quantitative form.

For Mill invariability of sequence is not a sufficient sign of causal relationship. Were it so, then day would be the cause of night. The sequence must be unconditional or necessary. Necessity means "*unconditionality*." "That which is necessary, that which *must* be, means that which will be, whatever supposition we may make in regard to all other things."⁵ How Mill justifies, in accord with his method, his use of *must*, i.e., necessity, is not clear. Again we are told that it is unimportant whether "the cause, or assemblage of conditions, should precede, by ever so short an instant, the production of the effect."⁶ Here sequence is practically given up.

Because of these and other inconsistencies we feel that, strictly speaking, Mill's pursuit of causation has not gotten him much beyond observation and simple enumeration. Although the Method of

⁵ John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic*, Bk. III, chap. v, pars. 6 and 7. For brief quotations above see chap. viii, *passim*. For a statement of the Canons of Induction, see chap. viii.

⁶ *Ibid.*, par. 7.

Difference is of the experimental type, yet experimental method is more than this. It means experiment under controlled conditions, careful observation, analysis, record, and imagination to frame hypotheses on facts observed as guide to further observation and experiment. Throughout Mill's methods a questionable atomism appears as when two instances are said to be "exactly similar" save the presence in the one and the absence in the other of the inferred cause and its effect. The circumstances attending the presence or absence of a phenomenon seem to be but an aggregation of atoms. His use of illustrative symbols obviously different from each other tends to confirm his conviction. James tells us that in a world where every fact is unique and singular "our logic would be useless, for logic works by predicating of the single instance what is true of all of its kind."⁷ So in an utterly atomic world, where the presence or absence of one circumstance will leave the two sets of circumstances "exactly similar in all other respects," no intellectual enterprise would be possible. Further, from the absence of an invariable antecedent and the accompanying absence of its consequent we cannot infer a causal relationship. Then, too, to find cases "exactly similar in *all other* respects" would require an insight possible only to a super-intelligence. The system sounds mechanical; causes are seldom, if ever, simple or single. A match struck on sandpaper will light ordinarily because, we say, of friction; but if struck on same in a vacuum it will not light. Friction, therefore, is not *the* cause of the burning. Cause here is a complex of factors including friction, brimstone, sandpaper, air, etc.⁸ There is some justification for thinking that Mill made little real advance beyond his predecessor Francis Bacon.

c. Francis Bacon

Bacon, in his *Novum Organum*, offers us three Tables of Instances as guiding principles or methods toward the discovery of Forms: Tables of Existence and Presence, of Deviation or Absence, and of Degrees or Comparative Instances—or, in other words, positive, negative, and varying instances. In this way "the foundations of true induction" are laid down. Upon these, especially by exclusion and rejection "correctly effected," the understanding operates and is enabled to arrive at an affirmative conclusion "solid, true, and well

⁷ James, *Pragmatism*, pp. 139 f.

⁸ For exposition and criticism of Mill's methods see: Eaton, *General Logic*; Stebbings, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*; Burt, *Principles and Problems of Right Thinking*; Cohen and Nagel, *Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method*; and MacIver, *Social Causation*.

defined." It is interesting to observe that Bacon's three tables find practically an exact parallel in Mill's Methods of Agreement, Difference, and Concomitant Variations. Bacon says:

The first work therefore of true induction is the rejection or exclusion of the several natures which are not found in some instance where the given nature is present, or are found in some instance where the given nature is absent, or are found to increase in some instance when the given nature decreases, or to decrease when the given nature increases.⁹

Whereas Mill sought causes, interpreting the causal relationship as unconditional invariability of antecedent and consequent, Bacon sought Forms. By Forms Bacon seems to mean the essential nature or *go* of things. To discover Form is to comprehend "the unity of nature in substances apparently distinct from each other." Forms are thus constitutive and permanent while causes are of a more temporal character. Form is a concept of the understanding and does not exist in nature as an individual. Forms are one and the same with laws. "When we speak of Forms, we mean nothing else than those laws and regulations of simple action which arrange and constitute any simple nature." The form of heat or light is the same as the law of heat or light.¹⁰ Causes, as sought by Mill, were but temporary instances of what, for Bacon, were permanent laws or forms. In a deeper sense than for Mill causal laws are enduring aspects or processes in the nature of things.

3. MORE CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS

In assuming that every event has a cause, and that this cause in turn is a caused event, we are led to an endless regress. In pursuing this regress imagination soon weakens and, under theological influence, tradition posits an uncaused First Cause, apparently unaware of the fact that in so doing the assumption that every event has a cause is thus contradicted. This notion of cause is that of efficient agency, a principle, enunciated by Aristotle, to which natural events must conform. Science abjures this concept of cause. It assumes that our world is an intelligible *order* within which the concepts of law and cause appear. Cause and effect are working concepts *within* the whole rather than applicable to the whole itself. Without this assumption of

⁹ *The Works of Francis Bacon*, Vol. I, p. 204, Aphorism 16, Second Book of Aphorisms.

¹⁰ See Bacon's *Novum Organum*, Bk. II, Aphorisms 1-18.

order, the first letter in the alphabet of science, the scientific enterprise is impossible. Absolute idealism says that to know any object or event thoroughly is to know the whole of reality. Science deals with lesser wholes. It seeks proximate, not ultimate, causes. Consequently, given a phenomenon to be investigated, science proceeds by isolating the complex of conditions under which the phenomenon is known to appear. The law of gravity, planetary orbits, are instances of such partial isolates in that they have been wrought out irrespective of the influences of other systems than our solar system. Laboratory procedure seeks to isolate more remote influencing factors. When the scientist finds that the phenomenon under investigation is invariably related to a set of conditions, this relationship he calls a law. For science causation is the "working hypothesis, that it is possible to predict the happening of particular events when certain complexes of antecedent conditions are known."¹¹ Causation, then, is no supervening agency of force and compulsion in nature; it is a discovered and dependable relation of events.

That the cause and effect relationship is more than psychological, more than an accidental conjunction of events in the procession of nature's phenomena, is a deeply inwrought human conviction. It is on this conviction or belief that we live, move, and have our being, that we plan with reference to our future. Experience justifies our confidence. By belief as used here we do not include a welter of indifferent traditional acceptances, from which few minds are altogether free, but those of a vital character that are determinative of behavior. Of the former are such superstitions as the danger of undertaking some new enterprise on Friday and especially on Friday the thirteenth, or the belief expressed by Mr. Peggotty in *David Copperfield* that along the coast death occurs only near the low of the outgoing tide and birth near the high of the incoming tide. "He's going out with the tide . . . They can't be born, unless it's pretty nigh in—not properly born, till flood." To the latter class belong those principles by which people live, those factors that condition results. In Iowa, for example, there are seasonal limits within which corn and other grains must be planted in order that a harvest may reasonably be expected to result. Soil, season, and climate determine the type of agricultural products. Thus the pineapple industry does not flourish here, whereas the production of pork and beef prospers. Such beliefs and practices (and beliefs are essentially practices) are validated by experience. They either already are scientific in character or are well along the way to

¹¹ E. W. Hobson, *The Domain of Natural Science*, p. 78. See also chaps. ii and iv.

such recognition. This controlling relationship between results or consequences and conditioning circumstances is of the causal type. Our control over nature implies and justifies the conviction or belief, predictive in character, that the causal concept is grounded in the system of relations within which the events or phenomena in question occur.

To this conclusion Whitehead's concept of reality as "process" conducts us. For him the view that reality is fundamentally plural, i.e., that it is atomic, individual in character, that matter exists, that events occur in spatial and temporal isolation is meaningless and absurd. Why the artificial abstraction of picking out of the stream of experience two events, designating one as cause and the other as effect? The naive view of causation as agency effected between otherwise distinct and static entities Whitehead of course rejects. Nor is Hume's theory of conjunction between phenomena but without connection, essentially the scientific point of view, acceptable to him. He substitutes sensitivity for isolation between natural entities, "non-indifference" for solitariness or separateness, bias or interest for indifference. Natural entities "take account of" each other positively and negatively. Chemical affinities, the magnet and iron filings, crystal formation, the sensitivity of the thermometer and the barometer, and heliotropism in plants exhibit the principle of non-indifference or "Natural Election" in the organic realm. That this principle is present at higher levels is obvious. It is a sort of inherent disposition, a constitutive pre-established harmony in the "sub-mental, sub-conscious, and sub-organic" world. Non-indifference in nature is called "Natural Election" by Laird, "interest" by Perry, "perception" by Francis Bacon, and "feeling" by Whitehead.¹² This principle in the nature of actual entities, this innate tendency "to take account of other things," this feeling or sympathy is a "real component of actual entities" and exists "throughout the actual world." It is analogous to Alexander's "enjoyment," to Bergson's "intuition," to Locke's "idea," and it is reminiscent of Descartes' "feeling and thinking."¹³ Feeling at the conscious level is an outflowing of this principle of responsiveness or non-indifference in the inorganic world. This interpenetrating "patterned process" of events in nature, their mutual sensitivity, yields unity in the cosmos, is the ground of rationality and the basis of the causal concept.

It is difficult to rest content with the view that causation has no

¹² R. B. Perry, *General Theory of Value*, p. 27; John Laird, *The Idea of Value*, chap. iii; A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 52 f.

¹³ A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, pp. 65, 268, 287.

meaning other than regularity of sequence (Schlick). This is a disavowal of any constitutive, inherent relationships in the order of nature. On this view we have links in the causal series but no linkage, "no mysterious tie." Strictly speaking this may be true as in the case of several clock dials where the movement of the hands is determined by a single central mechanism. In such case no dial activity influences another. The concomitant variation of "going" or "stopping" is due to the action of the system or pattern within which these phenomena appear. But it is not clear that the increasingly favored concept of statistical laws avoids or nullifies the causal concept. Actuarial mortality rates are based, we have seen, upon data in a given area and extending over an adequate time interval. Higher premium rates for hazardous and extra-hazardous classes testify emphatically to an objective order or set of determining conditions. That statistical laws cannot specify what individuals of a class will die per year is no evidence that the law of causality is absent in such instances. Statistics on business failures, on depressions or other cycles, seem to deal with and depend upon principles inherent in the very nature of business and economic enterprise. Otherwise all such laws would be idle and empty indulgences.

That certainty has given way to probability in no wise negates causality. It rather expresses the complexity of reality. Probability is more functional and factual than certainty. Certainty is an ideal limit toward which probability approaches. Statistical method yields probability, not certainty. Certainty would be possible only to a super-knower who could see the total ramification and setting of every smallest element or least event. Our finite vision enables us to see in part, and as a consequence we prophesy or predict in part. That winds prevail at the vernal equinox, or that we look for April thunderstorms and showers succeeding upon winter's blasts, seem to be based upon *an order* other than mere chance repetition, or uniformity of sequence. In the execution of Charles I we have causation but neither repetition nor uniform sequence.

Prediction and explanation imply some "patterned process" in nature's events. Without this, prediction would be impossible. Causality is an aspect of the behavior of things seen in their contexts. Things and events as such are abstractions from nature's highly complex process and, so isolated, are seen as static. Nature is not an aggregate of independent elements functioning individually. Were events loose and separate, prediction could not be. With the assumption of order, pattern, or form, prediction becomes possible. The degree of its probability will depend upon the completeness of grasp of the factors

involved in the process. Prediction that is of any significance is based upon an assumed and justified uniformity of nature which is of the substance of the causal concept. The same is true of explanation. To explain any phenomenon in nature is to place it in its context. Not to do this is to give up explanation. Even chance implies some order. It is a minimum form of prediction. It is related to probability. To ask what the chances are in a given situation would be utterly meaningless were complete indetermination the rule. The probability is that chance as popularly employed is but a term to screen our ignorance of the cause.

An illustration of the view here presented must suffice. Psychologists tell us that a series of chance words, say a thousand or more in number, approximates a symmetrical curve. On the other hand such a series of words taken from a chapter in a book would yield a non-symmetrical or skew curve. To what is the difference due? We may observe in passing the extreme difficulty in securing a list of utterly uninfluenced chance words. The difference is due to the fact that the words in the successive paragraphs taken from a book have been selected; i.e., they were carefully chosen under the dominance of an idea or purpose. What the author has in mind furnishes the setting which gives sequence to the terms employed. There is sequence in each case but with an obvious difference. The words of the former series represent a maximum of disunity, an atomic verbal aggregation, whereas those of the latter express a maximum of unity, an organized system. Meaning is found in the latter but none in the former. Perhaps one should note that there is meaning in the chance words only when related to the purpose on the part of the experimenter. The difference between the two is the more obvious presence in the one of a determining idea and its much less obvious presence in the other. This dominant idea or plan expressing itself in an organized sequence is what we mean by causality. Our question is: May not the assumption of uniformity in nature be implicitly and fundamentally causal in character?

In our interpretations we assume that our world is an intelligible *order*, a system of relatedness, a structure whose elements, parts, and events are mutually dependent. Causality may be thought of as those relationships within the partial isolates or lesser wholes expressed in uniform sequences of phenomena. In view of this order of events within the lesser areas of our experience, cut out and limited by us according to need and convenience, which in turn are continuous with larger areas, cause and effect are elements or terms selected from the situational pattern because of their apparent bearing on the prob-

lem confronting us; they are aspects of an order, series, or procession of events continuous and interdependent, rather than selected factors in an atomic world.

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5. Levy, Hyman. *A Philosophy for a Modern Man*. Chap. iv.
6. Robinson, D. S. *The Principles of Reasoning*. Chap. xix.

CHAPTER V

EVOLUTION

It is not our purpose in this chapter to expound types of evolution such as cosmic, organic, creative, emergent, social, etc. These are not so much different kinds of evolutionary processes as different areas or aspects of the same process. We shall not attempt even a sketch of the concept from Anaximander through Aristotle to Darwin and his successors. Neither need we stress again the factors in biological evolution—such as struggle for existence, natural selection, adaptation, survival of the fittest, variation, heredity, etc. These have been presented competently in endless publications of scientists and philosophers. It is said that were the works written on evolution, since it gained practically universal acceptance, placed end to end they would reach from the earth to the moon. It would be difficult to find a high school library without some volume bearing on the subject, or to find a high school student unfamiliar with the broad outlines of the doctrine. Our purpose is to emphasize some aspects and implications of the theory and relate these to some currently associated concepts.

1. CHANGE

Orderly change is probably one of the most obvious facts in experience. It is a fundamental feature of the universe. Nothing is immune. Time does not tarry. Morning is succeeded by noon and night. Spring, summer, autumn, and winter gradually merge, each into the succeeding. Infancy, childhood, youth, and maturity constitute an invariable temporal sequence. Objects and events change in the perspective of time and experience. Time itself is inconstant. To the child the time from the recent visit of Santa Claus until the next seems well-nigh interminable. To that same one in age time moves with torrential flow. He would slow it up if he could. When one is engaged in an interesting piece of work, time flies; when one is waiting for a train at a lonely crossing, time's flight is perceptibly slowed down. What of pure time, in which no events occur? All this raises the interesting query whether events occur in time, or whether time is a means by which we organize our experience. Eventless time would be dull, not to say unimaginable and unendurable.

That man ages needs no demonstration. With or without man's participation, physical nature suffers change. Soil conservation is now an agricultural problem of the first magnitude for the individual and

the nation. The Mississippi carries into the Gulf of Mexico a million tons of mud per day. Floods and storms, frosts and sun make their contribution to change. Growth and decay are all around. Because of change man is ever on the defensive. To maintain himself he must ever readjust himself. He lives in expectation of the unexpected. His highest controls are liable to fail him or be interfered with at critical moments. There is something suggesting futility or pathos in his ceaseless struggle with change, in his quest, as it were, of the abiding, of permanence amid the change. There are also here courage and potency. These conflicts become steppingstones to human stature and proportion. Were the primitive assumption of and preference for the changeless, the immobile, the certain, for finality and fixity, the basic fact and principle of things, man's status would still be that of his first appearance; growth would be impossible. His constantly changing world presenting series of perpetually new problems makes progress possible and readjustment imperative.

It is a long way from the anthropoid ape to man,¹ from tribal life in the primitive group to citizenship in a modern democracy, from tribal separateness and sufficiency to the interrelatedness and interdependence of modern states, from the comparatively undifferentiated tribal organization to the highly specialized forms of our institutional life such as industry, finance, law, and medicine; from primitive *manufacture* to machine production, from the floating log and dug-out to the "Queen Mary," from the primitive path to the modern highway, from the industrialized home of fifty years ago to the non-occupational apartment life of today, from nineteenth century certainties to twentieth century probabilities, from oxcart to airplane, from the centering of life in the "sweet by-and-by" to the "here-and-now," from the college as a place of study for the few to a place whither populations present themselves for varied purposes, and where the "grind" is disesteemed if tolerated at all, from Genesis to the science of geology, from alchemy to chemistry, from miracle to law, from morality as custom to reflective morality, and from the cosmos as a comparatively recent creative event to the view of it as an agelong and still continuing process.

It would appear then that change is a universal phenomenon, that it is a fact of experience, not an illusion. Perhaps Heraclitus was not

¹ In a circus side show on the West Coast man's evolution was exhibited in picture fashion. The order was: the Java, the Peking, the Piltdown, the Heidelberg, the Neanderthal, and the Cro-Magnon. Next appeared a ruddy-faced individual, erect and tall with whiskers on his neck and straggling hairs on his chin. This, we learned, was the Irishman. Then next came the human being. This is a true story as to the exhibit, but its scientific accuracy has been doubted.

far wrong in his affirmation that the universality of change is the most abiding constant in experience. Santayana in *The Realm of Essence* says, "He is closest to existence, and most at its heart, who lives on the wing, intent always on the not-given." The nineteenth century industrial revolution radically changed our modes of life. Many of us can remember when baking and buttermaking, when carding, spinning, and weaving, when tailoring, dressmaking, and knitting, when preparing meat, pickles, and preserves, when building, shoe repairing, and barbering, when plastering and paperhanging were all home processes and activities. These words constitute a dead language to most of the present youth generation. With the gradual passing of these activities into outside industrial forms, the home has assumed an undreamed-of dimension; its present status is that of a problem. Once accepted as an elemental, unquestioned basic form of our social life, we now ask, "Will the home endure?" Applied science is transforming practical life. Even our entertainment, once homemade, is now machine-made. Witness the player piano of yesterday and the radio of today. The latest gadget, I am told, is an instrument for shuffling playing cards. What release were another instrument devised for playing the game of bridge! Research in the sciences has changed our intellectual climate. The concept of evolution has compelled reconstruction of our entire mental map; it substitutes dynamics for statics, fluidity for fixity, process for product. The modern doctrine of relativity compels a revaluation of our more primitive assumptions. Change stimulates and presents challenging problems. How drab life would be were there any area immune against change!

2. CHANGE AND THE CHANGING

Our interest here, however, is not in mere change if *mere* change there be. Change without a changing is meaningless. Is continuity an essential implication of change? Does the concept of change imply a somewhat that abides? Could *utter* change have meaning, as such? When we note some change in an object, does it not mean that that object is still in a very real sense the same, that it endures and is at least recognizable after the observed change or through the series of changes? Otherwise change appears as a meaningless concept. This phenomenon of gradual change wherein any succeeding state is seen as a modification and outgrowth of an earlier, as continuous and orderly, as a later and up-to-date revised edition, is what we mean by evolution.

In a concrete way the concept of Evolution means that the present is the child of the past and the parent

of the future, that the present-day fauna and flora and all the system of inter-relations have arisen in a natural knowable way from a preceding state of affairs on the whole somewhat simpler, and that from forms and inter-relations simpler still, and so on backwards till we lose all clues in the thick mist of life's beginnings.²

In emphasizing continuity in organic evolution the author here quoted³ recognizes mutations, i.e., discontinuous variations, as steps in "a process without gaps."

Evolution, then, says that what *is* in some sense was, that it has a history. This does not mean, of course, that evolution is but a recombination or rearrangement of an originally given content. Where, as in the planetesimal theory, an original undifferentiated mass became redistributed, broken up into what we call the solar system, the process of change, it is thought, is better called development than evolution. Biological evolution is more than a mechanical adaptation to chance circumstances. It registers struggle and adventure, gains and losses. Not so in inorganic change. Evolution is other than the unfolding of a prearranged plan. It is, on the whole, a cumulative forward movement. New directions and forms appear.

Bergson⁴ explains the varied forms and directions that evolving life takes by assuming an original impetus or life force (*élan vital*) whose form is fashioned in terms of the resistance of its environment. Three drams of powder ignited in the open would yield but an ineffectual puff of smoke. That same powder shot out of a loaded 12-gauge shell would prove explosive and, under skillful use, effective. In witnessing fireworks we see a bright ball shot into the air; it explodes into other balls which in turn explode again. So, says Bergson, of the multiplying directions and forms of the life impetus. Evolution for him is fundamentally creative. It is a commonplace that what we *do*, in the main, depends on what we *are*. Action expresses being. It is also true that what we *are* depends on what we *do*. In this interplay of action and being we become what we were not. This self-becoming is essentially a creative process, an instance of creative evolution, if the individual may properly be said to evolve at all. Perhaps he too only develops. To the same conclusion does Bergson's emphasis upon the "actual and acting" presence of the past in the present, as the rolling snowball, lead. Evolution means something new.

² J. A. Thomson, *The System of Animate Nature*, II, 361.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 379.

⁴ Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, chap. ii.

3. EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT

A distinction, just referred to, is sometimes made, though not regularly observed, between the concepts of evolution and development. It is to the effect that the individual develops whereas the type evolves. Men and minds develop; man and mentality evolve. We have perhaps already violated this distinction in describing self-becoming as an instance of creative evolution. Be that as it may, it is fair to say that where change is only a redistribution of matter and energy, as in a booth whose sole function is the changing of money where the original amount remains the same, the concept of evolution does not apply. There is here no adventure, no struggle yielding success or failure as in the realm of organic life.⁵ Neither where the growth process is but an unfolding of a pattern implicit in the germ, as in an apple or egg, does the concept of evolution apply. In such cases development occurs, not evolution. Contrary to this, however, we speak of the evolution of the cosmos. Professor Boodin has written a book entitled *Cosmic Evolution*. We may properly speak of the evolution of the race, of institutions, and of cultures.

An interesting question is suggested by the foregoing: viz., does the cosmos evolve? If with Bergson we say that the evolution of life depends upon the inherent force or "internal push" of life itself and also upon the resistance it meets with in its environment of inert matter, then, if all evolution proceeds on this twofold basis, the cosmos as a whole cannot evolve. To say this, however, is not to deny the fact of evolution within the cosmos. The converse of this proposition is that the fact of evolution within the cosmos is no justification for the assumption that evolution applies to the cosmos as a whole. The cosmos as a whole, i.e., the totality of whatever is, having no environment cannot therefore evolve.⁶ The initial limitation imposed upon life by matter is gradually overcome by adaptation. Adaptation does not mean that life submits itself to matter or that matter imprints itself upon life. It is a two-sided process. Adaptation means *replying* rather than *surrender*. This brings advantage rather than loss. Czechoslovakia and Poland *replied* to German demands; they were finally overcome, but did not surrender. So life "by dint of humility" gradually insinuating itself into matter increasingly gives direction to evolutionary processes. Bacon's view that observation of nature's laws is the way to control nature and make it serve us appears in point here.

⁵ See Thomson, *op. cit.*, pp. 132, 358.

⁶ G. Dawes Hicks, *The Philosophical Bases of Theism*, pp. 185 f.

4. EVOLUTION AND CAUSE

Neither in like manner, evolutionarily speaking, does the cosmos in its entirety have a cause. The operation of the causal principle within the whole does not necessitate its application to the whole. Evolution is not concerned with or interested in ultimate origins and beginnings. It is therefore not necessarily incompatible with any theory of origin. Evolution is not a cause, nor does it deal with first causes; it is but a description of the way in which what is has come to be what it is. It is interested primarily in outcomes. Given life, evolution seeks to explain the relations between varied species of organisms in the plant and animal worlds. After all, cause is, psychologically speaking, primarily a relational concept by which we organize events and experiences. When translated into agency it yields confusion. One might say the concept of cause as a form of relatedness or organization within a given is meaningful, but when put behind or before, i.e., outside, the given it becomes substantially meaningless. In other words, to account for the existence of the cosmos as a special creative act is no explanation whatever. An evolutionary explanation, which proceeds by discovering similarities between divergent species and tracing these back to some common ancestry, is not to be identified with causal explanation. A description of the processes involved in the construction of a great highway with its elevation of valleys, its bridging of rivers, and its partial reduction of hills is one thing; the reason for the road is another matter.

5. EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS

Unreflective thinking readily identifies evolution and progress. Progress is difficult of definition. We assume knowledge of it until we are asked to define it. Progress, from a short-range view, may be thought of as action that on the whole results in a gradual attainment of a desired goal. The frog that climbs from the bottom of a well three feet by day and slips back two at night makes progress, we say, and, if persistent, finally gains the top. A person sets before himself a goal. In striving to reach it new insights, meanings, and possibilities occur to him while on the way. As a result the goal may become revalued and consequently reshaped in the process. This enrichment of the self is progress in personal development. Progress is a measure and evaluation of activity; evolution is activity revealing form.

Perhaps our difficulty with the notion of progress is due to its being nothing but a sounding word signifying nothing, a sort of poetic term of whose substance dreams are made. Dean Inge and others tell us that progress is a superstition. For Spengler civilizations come in cycles;

they appear and disappear. Ours is fast approaching its setting. Many of us regard recent world events as justifying this view. Are we like squirrels in a revolving cage travelling at high speed but getting nowhere? The issue is not yet finally settled. Taking a long or short view, progress, regarded as advance, may be affirmed. The question remains as to whether advance is to be identified with progress. Is advance spatial and temporal in character whereas progress is necessarily neither? Is progress essentially a long-range view and different from advance? As such is it an evaluation of advance? So interpreted, the question arises as to the criteria of progress. Yes, the practical applications of science have made life easier for all of us, we consume more and demand more, knowledge has increased amazingly in range and depth; but what has this done to us and for us? Are we softer, more self-centered and indulgent, have we retreated toward the animal and the vegetative level, are our heroisms gone, have we lost our moral fiber, our capacity to endure hardship in behalf of a great cause? With these suggestions the question, What is progress? is left to the reader.⁷

Slight reflection reveals the fallacy of the identification of change, evolution, and progress. Although evolution and progress imply change, change does not necessarily imply either. Progress may be declared on a short-range process; evolution may not. An army may make progress but not on a straight-line front. It presents, rather, a broken line, an advance salient here and at the same time, perhaps, a withdrawal there as the tactical situation demands. Neither, says Bergson,⁸ are the vegetative, the instinctive, and the rational life three successive points on a straight line; they are rather three divergent directions into which the original life impulse became grooved in its flow. Thus evolution proceeds by differentiation as well as by integration. Within its sweep there are ups and downs, forwards and backwards, progress and regress. Its currents do not run smooth. In the human species we are told that the Java ape man (*Pithecanthropus Erectus*) stood much more erect than the Neanderthal man some hundreds of thousands of years later. The development of ants and bees and many insects appears to have come to a standstill at the level of instinct. Some individuals we know, and peoples too, exhibit, to use Bergson's phrase, a retrogression toward vegetative life.

A glance at a cross section of the world order during the recent war should convince the most optimistic believer in social evolution that we are in or are entering upon a lower level of human relationships

⁷ See J. E. Boodin, *The Social Mind*, chaps. xiii and xiv, on "The Idea of Progress."

⁸ For references to Bergson in this paragraph see *Creative Evolution*, pp. 134-139.

than exists in the memory of this generation at least, if not of man. What a relapse into barbarism and brutishness within and between nations! Although it is true that this era in terms of evolutionary time is infinitesimal, yet face to face with such inhumanity and faithlessness among peoples no one with any social horizon can remain complacent. He may believe that God is in His heaven; he cannot believe that all is well with our world. That man is a rational animal is increasingly difficult to believe. We have not yet arrived. Ten thousand years from now people will look back to our era and speak of our inventions and mechanical contrivances, says Bergson, much as we view paleolithic man. Should our methods in dealing with social and international conflicts be then remembered at all, we can but be regarded as an altogether archaic people. Then our easy divisions of history and philosophy into ancient, medieval, and modern will be lost in a period assessed as predominantly primitive. In the course of time we shall be but children of the dawn.

We may note a further distinction between evolution and progress. Evolution, we have said, is a descriptive term. Progress, on the other hand, is an evaluational term, a human assessment of a process. Evolution, to repeat, is a theory descriptive of the fact that what is is a variation of what was. It also undertakes to show how what is came to be what it is. In evolution as descriptive of series of events there is no place for good or bad, higher or lower, accidental or purposeful, beautiful or ugly, progress or regress. These are but our appraisals in terms of progress of the datum in question. Evolution reveals similarities and relationships between large groups of organic life. This was Darwin's contribution. He did not undertake to account for the origin of life. The origin of species was his objective. According to the creation theory we had separateness, uniqueness; according to the evolution theory we have kinship between contemporary and also between contemporary and ancestral forms of life. So much is this so that the once distinct species now fade into one another. Their distinctive borders are gone. The traditional classification in logic into artificial and natural, the former based upon some accidental property such as in the cataloguing of books alphabetically according to authors, and the latter based upon some inherent property which is of the very essence of the objects classified, has lost its validity and standing. Objects are usually classified according to our interest and need. In fact such terms as species, genera, orders, classes, etc., are, strictly speaking, now little more than convenient concepts for the organization of experience.

6. EVOLUTION AND BEGINNINGS

It may be well to make clear in concluding this chapter that evolution is not primarily a causal theory. It is not concerned with or interested in beginnings, in "first forms." Evolution strikes in at some point in a series, it begins with something given, it does not pretend to offer ultimate origins. Anaximander and his fellow physiologists in their cosmic theories began with a *given*. Biological evolution begins with life. To find its source in tempered slime does not avoid or antedate a given. Evolution deals with issues or consequences, not with origins. In so far as evolution is a causal theory, it is concerned with causal relationships within a series; it accounts for a given type of plant or animal by relating it to a contemporary or preceding type; it sees a present species as a modification of a preceding species; it seeks causal explanation within, not outside, the series.

Such facts as these have been capitalized by theologians as necessitating and confirming the traditional creation view of Genesis that: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth . . . the living creature after its kind . . . (and) man in his own image." As an alternative to this view one may ask, Why a beginning? May not the universe always have been? The difficulty experienced in entertaining such a possibility is due to our habits in dealing with time and cause. We cut our experience up into partial periods and brief units of time and thus become so familiar with beginnings in experience that we feel the concept of beginning must obtain beyond experience. And so with the concept of cause. To most people a timeless time or period is incomprehensible. For such, time is, and was, and ever shall be. Space likewise. Cause is popularly conceived as an external agent, a free lance in spatial and temporal areas. A precreation, timeless expanse is unthinkable. Consequently, the "beginning" in Genesis is a temporal event in a time prior to which happening nothing occurred so far as intelligence can grasp. This creative activity, we are told, is subsequent to or antedated by "the beginning" of John's gospel, at which time the "*Word* was" and "*was God*." Since God, *in vacuo*, appears rather as a superfluity, might it not be that creation was or is an eternal, timeless fact and therefore without beginning? Or, may not our insistence upon beginnings be but an expression of habit based upon mental limitations? Perhaps our conviction of the reality of time is but the translation into a substantive entity of a useful experiential device for the distinction of events. Evolution is not incompatible with an eternal universe. Perhaps "eternal" is a qualitative rather than a quantitative concept.

To the same conclusion do we come with respect to the creation theory. Evolution, we have said, is concerned with causes inherent in the series. It exhibits proximate not ultimate causes. The creation theory presents an ultimate cause prior to, outside, the series. Aristotle, assuming rest as the original condition of things, posited God as the first and continuing cause of motion. Prior to creation God could not be cause, since cause without effect is meaningless. He therefore is without attributes—a difficult concept. God and the cosmos as coeval is a less difficult concept. Be that as it may, our primary interest here is in the intellectual value of the creation theory. What clarification does it yield, what increment to our knowledge? The scientist in explaining an event seeks the conditions under which that event occurs. These conditions without which the event does not occur are causally related to the phenomenon in question. When one has had a rather restless or sleepless night he does not go outside his recent experience to explain it. No malicious sprite is charged with his discomfort. To guard against a recurrence he inquires into his eating and drinking and smoking, whether late indulgence in crab meat, coffee, or gin, whether overexertion and fatigue or some form of nervous tension may not have been the cause. Cause is thus the complex of conditions within which the phenomenon in question occurs. Outside this complex the scientific investigator does not go. He remains *within* the series. The creationist, on the other hand, is not content with this. Under the urge toward certainty and finality, having exhausted his mental repertoire and still feeling dissatisfied, he makes a leap beyond the natural series and posits a Final or First Cause, utterly outside the series. That this satisfaction is emotional rather than intellectual needs no elaboration. No clarification, no increment of knowledge has been gained whatever. Since the evolutionist is content to remain within the series of the given and not transcend it, he has no necessary quarrel with the creationist. He is but critical of the creationist's use for intellectual purposes of the causal concept.

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■

PART TWO

MAN AS AGENT

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CHAPTER VI

BODY AND MIND

It has been said that until the twentieth century, physics was essentially a materialistic enterprise, whereas philosophy was predominantly idealistic. The statement continues to the effect that physics, under the influence of Eddington, Jeans, and others, is becoming idealistic in character, while philosophy, under the lure of empirical science and logical method, is fast becoming materialistic. With definite limitations, one might say that body was once substantial, and therefore well known, whereas mind was a rather vague, shadowy, and insubstantial thing, very real, but less well known. Today there is less certain knowledge of body in terms of substance, and more claimed knowledge of mind by those who confidently identify mind with nerve process. The probability is that increasing awareness of the complexity of the concepts of body and mind finds us with less certainty than when these concepts were confidently conceived and expressed in simpler terms. Innocence makes dogmatism possible; intelligence should make it impossible—or, negatively expressed in Turgot's phrase, "The less the knowledge the less the doubt."

The distinction between body and mind is a product of experience. It was not an original endowment of the primitive man, nor is it of the child of today. It is an item of our social heredity. Among other factors in its promotion religion has played a major role. Centuries of thought have favored it. Only comparatively recently has its truth been questioned. Science tends to discourage its acceptance. Some current tendencies are indicated in Chapter VII.

The story of mind begins, if one may so say, with its practical identification with body. The term generally employed to designate it was soul. Soul differed from body in that it was a much more attenuated matter or, again, a shadowy image or duplicate of the body which in sleep temporarily absents itself from the body, and at death, in Homeric thought, is finally separated therefrom. This concept is probably the original of the Greek notion of a future state. To many of the early Greek thinkers, this soul of things was hardly more than a refined matter. Thales spoke of soul as a moving force or principle in things, which was diffused throughout the whole universe. Nature is ensouled. Magnets have souls. The heavens and all things are full of gods. Anaximenes identified the soul with air, Heraclitus with a fiery vapor. Thus, the soul is the breath which vitalizes the body in life, and leaves

it at death. Love and hate, as uniting and separating principles among the elements of nature, are not for Empedocles wholly immaterial. With Leucippus and Democritus, the soul or mind was of the same substance as body, except that it consisted of "the finest, smoothest, and most mobile" atoms. For Anaxagoras, mind or soul "is the thinnest of all things, and the purest." It is self-moved, and the cause of all motion and order in the universe. It (*nous*) appears as an animating, purposive principle of the nature of mind.

1. DUALISTIC THEORIES

a. Plato

In Plato we come upon the idea of an immaterial reality, the world of Ideas. This immaterial world is, however, not yet psychical in our use of the term. Ideas are not contents of individual minds, such as my idea of a tree, but rather objective universal concepts expressing the basic essences of the world, such as the Idea of "tree-ness," or the Ideas of Truth, Beauty, and the Good. For Plato, there are two rather separate—at least, radically different—worlds, the world of Ideas or concepts, and the perceptual world; the world of true Being, and the world of Becoming; the world of pure forms, and the material world. The soul is an intermediary between these two worlds. In its relation to body the soul rules while the body serves. The soul has a twofold nature in that it is kin to, and active in, each of the aforesaid worlds; it participates in both. Knowledge is thus possible. In its participation in the world of Ideas, the soul is rational. In its relation to the sense world, its rational aspect or quality does not abdicate, but expresses itself in the form of Spirit, or Will. At the same time, its natural linkage to the world of sense finds expression in sensuous desires or appetite. In this threefold function of the soul as rational, spirited, and appetitive, the concept of soul, for Plato, has passed beyond its more primitive view as a material thing. On analogy with this psychology, Plato builds his concept of the just state, the Republic.

b. Aristotle

Plato has left us with a metaphysical dualism—the world of Ideas and the world of things. Things somehow "participate" in Ideas through the agency of the soul. "Participate" is one of those habitual miracle-working terms, useful in a way, but utterly unclear. To Aristotle, this was unsatisfactory in two respects. He denied this separation. Ideas can have neither meaning nor existence apart from things. If, Aristotle asks, Ideas are the substance of things, how can they exist separately? He says Plato's theory of Ideas is "just piffle and hot air"

(Shorey). Again, soul and body are more intimately related. For him, the soul is the organizing principle of the body, resident in it, yet different therefrom. Critics have made much of Aristotle's likeness of the relationship as that of "sailor to his boat," rather neglectful of the fact that, whereas the sailor is other than his boat, i.e., in practice may tie his boat up, or anchor it, and go away from it, in thought terms neither a boatless sailor nor a sailorless boat has any meaning whatever.

Aristotle uses the concepts of *Form* and *Matter*. By matter Aristotle does not mean physical substance. It means capacity or potentiality for actuality. Matter in abstraction from form is wholly indeterminate; it is potentially everything but actually nothing (determinate); as such, however, it is more than nonbeing. Form is the moving and organizing principle in matter which, by attraction, yields determinate objects. Matter and form are synonymous with potentiality and actuality. Growth or becoming is the passage of matter into form, of potentiality into actuality. As music is to its instrument, as form is to matter, so is soul to body. The soul is the organized body in its functioning.

Any entity is a concrete instance of the union of form and matter. Pure form and pure matter are but limits, between which the series of entities or objects occurs. An object is matter molded by form. A brazen sphere is brass fashioned into spherical form. Soul, for Aristotle, is related to body as the figure impressed upon the wax is to the wax. It is the immanent form, or idea, the constitutive principle, the perfect realization of an organic body. It is the essence or substance, the animating principle, that gives fashion to a developing organism.

There are three levels of soul. First is the *vegetative* soul, which determines plant processes and functions. Again, there is the *animal* soul, which, in addition to possessing plant functions, is marked by sensation, desire, and action toward the satisfaction of needs. For Bergson, plants are immobile; they gain sustenance from earth, air, sun, and moisture, whereas animals are go-getters in satisfying their needs. At the *human* level, the soul, possessing all the needs and functions of the other two levels, reveals an added dimension, viz., reason, the unique differentia of man. Aristotle furnishes us with what may be called a logical or spatially ordered map of the world of existing objects, of varying grades or levels. Strictly speaking his is not an evolution theory since these grades are constant in character. But we may say he laid a foundation for the modern evolutionary view. Speaking concretely reason, man's distinctive quality, is not an emergent from the sense level. Reason (*nous*) has its source elsewhere. In a vague way it is sourced in spirit. It belongs to the soul and yet is not

conditioned by any bodily states. It is a sort of gift of the gods. Reason in man is like to, yet other than, divine reason. As receptive of form, reason is *passive* and temporal; as form-giving, it is *active* and eternal. It is in active reason or spirit that man partakes of the divine.

As a sort of mediating principle between God and man Aristotle uses the concept of motion. He defines motion as "the actuality of that which is potential, so far forth as it is potential." God, the absolute spirit, is the prime mover, himself unmoved—a difficult concept. As prime mover he is beyond matter, motion, and change; he is pure form. How or why this tranquil being beyond the vicissitudes of things, this "thought of thought" engaged solely in pure contemplation, can or should descend into the hurly-burly of a world of objects is not made clear. While Aristotle makes significant contribution in his criticism of Plato's dualism, he did not free himself wholly from a tincture of dualism in his treatment of the relation of body and mind, of spirit and matter, of God and the world.¹

c. Christianity

In early Christian thought, the separation of reason and soul, of the spiritual and the sensuous, of mind and body, was further emphasized by Philo, Plutarch, Plotinus, and others. The soul as reason is incorporeal, spiritual, sourced in God, pure, and eternal. The soul as corporeal belongs to the world of matter. This material world, the prison-house of the spirit, is evil and perishable. From it escape must be made. In the *Phaedo* Plato tells us that death is the "separation and release of this soul from the body." The divorce between mind and matter was ultimately brought to completion by Descartes in his metaphysical doctrine of the substantive character of each, of mind whose essence is pure thought, and of matter whose essence is extension in space. (In this utter dualism we are left with the problem of how, if ever, "the twain shall meet." It is a problem of how two such distinct natural entities can get together and hold converse in terms of knowledge.)

d. Interactionism

This dualism of mind and body is a part, then, of our reflective and religious inheritance. Putting the problem pointedly, the question before us is: What is the relation between these two entities? Broad offers seventeen theories.² After eliminating those considered impos-

¹ For exposition and criticism see Robert Adamson, *The Development of Greek Philosophy*, pp. 227-255; also W. T. Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, pp. 288-313.

² C. D. Broad, *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, chap. xiv.

sible, eleven remain. We shall, however, deal only with the major types more or less current. The popular or common-sense view is that mind and body mutually interact, i.e., that mind acts upon body, and body upon mind. This is the Interaction theory. As evidence, a desire to rearrange objects, to raise my arm, is followed by the appropriate act. Purposes guide conduct. Prolonged mental effort results in bodily as well as mental fatigue. Much thinking yields the "lean and hungry look." On the other hand, external objects are said to affect the mind in sensation. Further, stimulants, such as coffee, alcohol, and drugs, have mental as well as bodily consequences. Opium smokers, we are told, experience increased capacity for beatific vision and heavenly discourse. Drunkenness affects the experient and his world. Its forms have been described as jocose, verbose, bellicose, lacrimose, and comatose. In advanced degree it is said to revert to reptilian experience. Over- or under-glandular secretion in our bodies is accompanied by mental abnormality or subnormality. The feeling of hunger is the mental concomitant of a bodily condition called hunger. Organic and atmospheric conditions affect one's outlook and mental processes. A bright, clear morning at twenty above favors mental alertness. These are taken as typical evidence that mind and body mutually influence each other.

Our practical assurance of interaction is disturbed by reflection. How can two entities interact, the one spatial and extended, the other nonspatial and unextended, the two separated well-nigh by the whole diameter of Being? Descartes sought mediation between the two by locating the soul or mind in the pineal gland, whence control of nerve processes is had; i.e., mind acts on the "animal spirits" via the pineal gland. This view is slightly reminiscent of the Platonic concept of soul as an intermediary between the world of Being (ideas) and that of Becoming (things). Descartes, however, did not make it "clear and distinct" (his own criterion for knowledge) how an immaterial and unextended substance could be located spatially. The assumption of the Conservation of Energy—viz., that the quantity of energy in the physical world is constant—has long done service against the causal influence of mind upon body or brain. Changes within the physical system are explained as but redistributions of energy within that system. The conservationist reasons that were influences to filter in from without, i.e., from the mind, the dogma of conservation would be violated; it cannot, therefore, occur. On the other hand, it is interesting to hear Broad³ say "that the Conservation of Energy is absolutely irrelevant to the question at issue," i.e., the interaction between mind and body. For

³ *Ibid.*, chap. iii.

him, the conservation of energy is not incompatible with interaction.⁴

An added difficulty with interactionism, as a causal relationship, may be noted. A causal relationship between processes within the body, such as between nerve excitation and muscular activity, i.e., between members of the same series, is ordinarily assumed as understood or at least understandable. In like manner, causal connection between the events in a mental series is regarded as comprehensible. The difficulty appears greater when a causal relationship is affirmed between two declared radically distinct series. Of course, inconceivability on our part is not synonymous with impossibility in the realm of fact. On the other hand, it may well be that our initial assumption of an extreme dualism between body and mind needs correction. Possibly the traditional dualism is but an overemphasis of a legitimate distinction, pushed to the point of separation. A disembodied mind we know not of. A consciousness of hunger, i.e., to be hungry and to desire food, as a mental state apart from bodily conditions, is meaningless. Again, a substantive mind taken in abstraction from the processes of "minding" is a bit of verbal metaphysics. A human being, as a going concern, is an organism exhibiting two types of processes, bodily and mental, either of which taken alone is an abstraction from an experienced whole called self.

e. Psychophysical Parallelism

Another theory of this dual relationship is known as Psychophysical Parallelism.⁴ While accepting the dualism of body and mind, it denies that a causal relationship obtains between the two. Each is a closed system. The two series of processes or events accompany each other in time; there is no interaction, no interference—neither influences the other. There exists a causal relationship within each series, but none between the two. Between the two series of processes or events, there is a one-to-one relation of correspondence; i.e., for every brain event there is a corresponding mental occurrence, and vice versa. It accepts as valid the unverified assumption that there is no neurosis or brain process without an attending psychosis, or mental event.⁵

f. Occasionalism

Of this dualism there are variant forms. Descartes' solution of the relation between soul and body, it was felt, was unsatisfactory. Their

⁴ For a criticism of Broad here, see Stout, *Mind and Matter*, Bk. II, chap. ii.

⁵ For charts, see William McDougall, *Body and Mind*, pp. 131 f.; Durant Drake, *Invitation to Philosophy*, p. 347; and Vergilius Ferm, *First Adventures in Philosophy*, p. 423.

togetherness in the pineal gland was contactual rather than rational. He did not come to real grips with the problem. Two members of his school, Geulincx and Malebranche, in an effort to improve upon the Cartesian solution, propounded a doctrine known as 'Occasionalism'. It said that, since evidently two such discrepant substances could not interact, the evident harmony existing between the two was the result of direct and continual divine participation. When the body needs food, God sees to it that we feel hunger. Descartes, indeed, made possible this view in that while matter and mind were real and distinct substances, yet behind these, standing within the shadows, was the more ultimate reality, God. This theological retreat from actuality could not satisfy in an age of scientific awakening. And, too, this function was hardly worthy of a Deity above the rank of an engineer.

g. As Attributes of Substance

Two other solutions were offered by Spinoza and Leibniz. These theories cannot readily be classified as dualistic. For the former, in close sequence with Descartes and Malebranche, material bodies are but *modes* of extension, as ideas and volitions are *modes* of conscious mind. In turn, extension and thought are not in themselves substances; they are *attributes* of the one and only substance, God. "Mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived now under the attribute of thought, and again under that of extension." Again, "Thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same thing." When Spinoza tells us that body is but the one substance, God, apprehended under its own attribute of extension and that spirit or mind is the same substance seen under its own attribute of thought, he seems to anticipate the two-language theory of body and mind emphasized by early exponents of philosophy of science. In making body and mind attributes of the one substance, God, the matter of causal relation between the two was disposed of. They are as two clock dials, varying concomitantly, neither influencing the other, but both operated by a single mechanism. Just how this one substance, God, can have as attributes extension and nonextension, is not clear. Spinoza, then, strictly speaking, is to be classed not as a metaphysical dualist, but as a promoter, perhaps discoverer, of what is known as the Double-Aspect theory. At the level of attributes, again, where extension and thought are two independent noninterfering causal series, we may regard Spinoza as a psychophysical parallelist.

h. Pre-established Harmony

Leibniz, on the other hand, is less easily classified. In reality, he is

more a pluralist than a dualist. True, he restores things (monads, or elements of reality) as centers of force; yet his Pre-established Harmony is between monads of varying degrees of animation and intelligence, of relative matter or spirit. There are three classes or levels of monads: (1) simple or naked monads, possessing a vague unconscious perception; (2) soul monads, where conscious feeling and memory exist; (3) spirit monads, where self-consciousness and reason obtain. One is reminded here of Aristotle's threefold nature of the soul, and especially when, for Leibniz, in each higher level of development the lower lingers. Pre-established harmony is, in other words, not between spirit and matter, but between monads in each of which spirit and matter reside in different measure. The term matter is variously and unclearly used by Leibniz. Bertrand Russell finds five uses of the term as employed by Leibniz. Body is not really matter; it is a constellation of monads at a low stage of development, at the level of "deep sleep or stupor." These monads are "windowless," each an independent lesser universe, "following its own laws"; yet each is completely adjusted to and "mirrors" the whole universe. The total set-up, with its harmony of the whole, orchestral in quality, is the planned product of creative mind, of God himself. This is pre-established harmony. We can observe in Spinoza and Leibniz a clear tendency to reduce their inherited dualism to an identity. So far we have been dealing in the main with dualistic theories. We come now to what may be called monistic theories.

CHAPTER VII

BODY AND MIND (Continued)

2. MONISTIC THEORIES

a. Neutralism

The Identity hypothesis in its various forms reduces the traditional metaphysical dualism to a monism, either spiritual, physical, or neutral. The doctrine of Neutralism attacks the view that mind and matter are two independent substances or realities, each behind or underneath its own phenomenal manifestations. Fundamental reality is such as may be interpreted now as matter, again as mind. For this theory, all our logical, mathematical, physical, and mental entities are alike compounds of these highly abstract, qualityless neutral entities. In these objects, beyond the neutral entities constituting them, there is no residue of a "substance" character. The intersection point of lines is not the property of any one line more than of another. A crossroads is likewise neutral, even though one is a paved and the other a dirt road. Numbers, relations, propositions, neutral entities all, belong both to mind and to matter. They are what they *are*. Experience makes no difference to them. "The infinite mosaic of being is neither subjective nor objective in substance, but is neutral." Of this "neutral stuff," mind and matter are but two aspects. Any other view of the universe is a "false-bottom" theory. This neutral stuff is strictly monistic, says Holt.¹ To pursue this somewhat recondite theory farther would take us beyond our purpose and problem. Broad finds this theory wanting.²

b. The Double-Aspect Theory

We note, again, the Double-Aspect theory. According to this theory, mind and matter, thought and extension, are but two aspects of the same thing. Already we have seen this view in Spinoza's doctrine of extension and thought as attributes of an underlying substance. As an exponent of this view Warren declares that

conscious and neural phenomena constitute *one single series* of events, and that their different appearance is merely due to different ways of observing them . . . ; con-

¹ Edwin Bissell Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness*, pp. 103, 164 f., 306, *et passim*.

² *Op. cit.*, chap. xiv.

³ H. C. Warren, *Human Psychology*, p. 415.

sciousness "belongs to" the activity of neurons as truly as the intensity or form of neural impulses belongs to this same activity.³

This construction or type of theory, especially in the "two-language" view of logical positivism, is widely prevalent today. In the words of S. Alexander,⁴ "That which as experienced from the inside or enjoyed is a conscious process, is as experienced from the outside or contemplated a neural one," and again, "They are not two but one." C. A. Strong, Durant Drake, and others mentioned shortly are exponents of this view.

c. Epiphenomenalism

Another theory in this group is known as Epiphenomenalism, a term attributed to Huxley. For it, the stream of consciousness is but a luminous accompaniment, a sort of "phosphorescent glow," a non-influential attendant upon certain cerebral activities. The theory is thus kin to parallelism, but more definitely monistic and materialistic. It squints in the direction of evolution, especially mind as an emergent. According to this view, consciousness is not unlike what we saw when as children, on a hot day in springtime, we spoke of "the sun running on the fences," an apparent tenuous sprite disporting itself upon the rails. Epiphenomenalism implies that the physical world, including human bodies and brains, is a closed causal system of matter and energy, and alone really real. It implies, further, that consciousness is something thrown off, a highly refined by-product of brain activity. If consciousness, for this theory, have any reality at all, it is caused by the brain and is ineffectual. It marks no breach in biological evolution. Even mental events are not causally related.⁵

Is consciousness but a "lyric cry" or a "wanton music" (Santayana) in the series of physical processes? That mind is so insubstantial and ineffective is difficult to accept. That our aims and purposes are but a mere irrelevancy in and to bodily activities, that our logic and reasoning, our moral, aesthetic, and religious values are synonymous with brain processes, appears intolerable and impossible of acceptance and belief. It appears, rather, that these give life its significance, and cannot be equated with physical and chemical changes. May it not be that such constructions and interpretations of experience are but fulgurations of *minds* distorted by over-sacrificial devotion to the god of physical science, whose ultimate goal is a single cosmic physical formula? Generously interpreted, epiphenomenalism may be regarded as a tran-

⁴ S. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, 5.

⁵ For criticism of epiphenomenalism, see Broad, *op. cit.*, pp. 470-477.

sitional stage between extreme dualism and physical monism. As above interpreted, it has already, at least implicitly, arrived.

d. Behaviorism

Two other theories, current and mutually friendly, are Behaviorism and Positivism, the former a psychological or, perhaps better, a physiological doctrine, the latter a philosophical one, under the aegis and banner of physical science. Behaviorism is professedly and confessedly scientific. It holds that mind is synonymous with observed and observable behavior, with "what the organism does or says . . . ; saying is doing, i.e., behaving"; it extends to "the whole field of human adjustments"; it differs from physiology in being more inclusive; it aims "to be able, given the stimulus, to predict the response," and vice versa, in human behavior. Consciousness, then, is an assumption, like the old-fashioned soul. As offering unique data, consciousness does not exist; mental life is a fiction. Behaviorism "can get along" without "such terms as sensation, perception, attention, will, image, and the like."⁶ Observation and experiment are its methods; introspection is anathema. What is not observable, is not. Sensation, perception, imagery, feeling, etc., are but medieval concepts, and therefore to be dropped. "To be or have a mind is only to exhibit characteristic neuro-muscular behavior, external or internal. Memory is repeated nervous and muscular behavior, a habit-form." Language consists of movements of the larynx. One is reminded of Plato's view that "thought is the conversation of the soul with itself," though with an entirely different meaning, when behaviorism tells us that thinking is but "talking to ourselves subvocally." Thinking and talking are alike conditioned, mechanical, laryngeal processes. In a word, nerves, muscles, glands, and conditioned responses tell the whole story of mind.

Although it is true that consciousness is inseparably related to organic process, it does not follow that it is *merely* that. To be alive, a going concern as a good animal, is one thing; to be conscious is another matter. The two cannot in fairness to the facts be identified. Drake puts the "automatic sweetheart" as follows:

Suppose a girl who *acts* in every way as your sweetheart acts—smiles, blushes, kisses, caresses, speaks in tender voice, looks at you with melting eyes—yet is absolutely unconscious, in the ordinary sense; she sees nothing, feels nothing, enjoys nothing, knows nothing; she is

⁶ John B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist* (2nd ed.), p. xii.

just cleverly made to act *as if* she felt and thought and cared; would such a sweetheart be wholly satisfactory, or not? At any rate, that is not the case. We may be merely delicately adjusted machines from the physical point of view. But what *matters* is, that we are *conscious* machines. The *only* thing that matters is precisely what the behaviorist ignores, the constant play of color and feeling, the *qualitative* life that accompanies our physical movements.⁷

Consciousness, Drake concludes, is more than just organic behavior. Again, a student, say, as is often the case, has been absent from my class two successive days. He is absent again today. I recall the former absences, connecting them with today's. My neuro-muscular processes may, hypothetically, be the same in the three cases. As a result of my observation, I propose to make inquiry as to the *why* of his absences. By the behaviorist I am asked to believe that the proposed step is but an eventuation, or is wholly explicable as a purely organic resultant. The facts seem to compel me to demur. That purpose is synonymous with neuro-muscular process appears as a rather violent assumption. Behaviorism solves the body-mind problem by denying the reality of mind, a very short cut. Is behaviorism a psychology that has sold out to physical science, a resurrection of Hobbes, an undisguised physicalism?

e. Functionalism

As a revolt against the dualism of mind and body we have what is known as Functionalism, a view of considerable vogue in biology, neurology, psychology, and philosophy today, because of the influence of the natural and physical sciences. The basic assumption is stated by Dewey: "To see the organism *in* nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems which haunt philosophy."⁸ He would have us note that *in* does not mean as marbles in a box "but as events are in history, in a moving, growing, never finished process." *In* means functional organic relationship. "Mind is no longer a part of the latter's own on-going process."⁹ "Minding" is a mode of organic doing; its presence means that action is directed, not haphazard; it is an aspect of the life process in the satisfaction of vital needs. "Minding," furthermore, is not the functioning of a "peculiar stuff"; it is a func-

⁷ *Invitation to Philosophy*, pp. 331 f.

⁸ *Experience and Nature*, p. 295.

⁹ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 291.

tioning of physical events in the status of suggestion, anticipation, or memory. That one's boat founders is a physical event. This event remembered or suggested assumes mental status. Pragmatically considered, mind we may say is functional in a twofold sense: it is a form of organic activity that aids and directs the organism in its adjustments, and again, in terms of a more naturalistic realism, mind is a phase or form of organic behavior not distinct from other organic life processes and events.¹⁰

f. Naturalism

Another interesting theory is that of Professor Sellars.¹¹ For him, body and mind are two distinguishable but inseparable aspects of the "go" of the human organism. The body is *minded*. Mind as we know it is embodied, and so far is a physical category; it is "the organism adequately conceived." "The self is the organism" in its wholeness. "The psychical is the very texture of the functioning brain." It is the brain in its integrating activity. Consciousness is an inner feature, a "qualitative dimension" or form of brain activity; it is a "brain-state." It is a "compresent" feature in cerebral activities, not a product of these activities. Since consciousness is intrinsic, ingredient to these brain activities, we cannot say that it is effected by the brain or vice versa. Consciousness is a "*unique co-emergent* with nervous organization." In consciousness, we have intimate, inside knowledge of brain activity. Scientific knowledge of nervous process is external, "knowledge-about." This view, while reminiscent of earlier logical positivism, differs radically in that the latter disavows metaphysics, whereas Sellars avows a naturalistic empirical metaphysics. In Chapter VIII, we shall refer to this view in discussing the nature of the Self.

g. Emergent Evolution

Emergent Evolution, currently associated with Morgan and Alexander, affirms that in the "orderly sequence of events" levels appear in each of which "something genuinely new" is found, a something, more than the "regrouping of pre-existent events," that cannot be foretold. Life, mind, and consciousness are major instances of these levels, each, while involving the lower, exhibiting qualities not found in the lower. Each level is "super" to the preceding. Water, for example, has properties or qualities other than those of its constituents, hydrogen and oxygen. Sodium chloride, common salt, has qualities unknown to

¹⁰ See C. W. Morris, *Six Theories of Mind*, chap. vi., for a comprehensive treatment of "Mind as Function."

¹¹ See *Philosophical Review* (Sept., 1938).

sodium or chlorine in isolation. Neither could the properties of salt be deduced from knowledge of the properties of its constituents in isolation. Morgan illustrates the evolutionary process by a pyramid. At its base or lowest level is matter, shot through and through with space-time. Space-time, pregnant with possibility, for Alexander is a lower level than matter. It is the matrix of all existence. Space-time, whatever more it means, may be superficially regarded as a time dimension added to space. Space-time is thus a sort of fourth dimension, i.e., every spatial event has a time aspect as well. Life, in Morgan's pyramid, is an emergent from, a higher level than, matter. In turn, mind is an emergent from life, while toward the apex is Deity, an emergent quality in certain persons at the highest level of evolution yet attained. Within this pyramid is a "vast multitude of individual pyramids" in ascending order, atoms, molecules, things, plants, animals, and men, with the higher human beings near the top.¹²

To any who ask, why any emergence? what is the source of the drive? or what makes emergents emerge? Morgan replies, "I *acknowledge* God as the Nisus through whose activity emergents emerge; and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed."¹³ We thus have "guidance," purpose, from the lowest level. This Nisus, urge, or drive, is not an "alien influx into nature." God is "omnipresent" throughout the whole evolutionary advance. God is a constitutive fact—shall we say?—compresent in nature. Emergent evolution is thus a "purely naturalistic" explanation of the order of events. For Morgan, God and a "system of physical events" are assumptions of the same order; they stand or fall together. God, for Morgan, functions in evolution much as the *élan vital* does for Bergson.

What the relationship between God and Deity is, is not clear. Deity we find reiterated as an emerging quality. God is the directing activity. Are they one and the same, now urging, now wooing the order of nature toward themselves? Or, is God emerging toward an ultimate identity with Deity? It is difficult to say. Wheeler¹⁴ modestly but properly asks why "the social" should not be a level next to mind rather than Deity. If emergent evolution is more than a verbal solution of the problem, it appears to render unnecessary the traditionally conflicting metaphysical "isms." The physical and the mental are inseparable aspects or constituents of nature, the one dead and inactive, the other empty and idle, when taken in isolation.

¹² See Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, chap. i.

¹³ *Ibid.*, chap. ii.

¹⁴ William M. Wheeler, *Emergent Evolution and the Development of Societies*, p. 41.

h. Panpsychism

A widely held theory of the relation between mind and body is known as Panpsychism. It denies an ultimate dualism between the two, such as McDougall's animism asserts; it affirms that all nature is ensouled. The once absolutely fixed dividing lines, thanks to evolution, such as between the organic and the inorganic, between genera, between species, and between biology and psychology, are gone. This doctrine is kin to hylozoism, the view that matter is alive, dynamic, and psychic in character, to Leibniz's monadism, and to Spinoza's pantheism in so far as for him all things are animated in varying degrees. Panpsychism, too, points to idealism. For panpsychism mind is a developed "mind-stuff" pervasive, indeed constitutive, of all nature. Fechner, James Ward, Paulsen, and C. A. Strong, among others, are exponents of this view.

i. Idealism

The last significant historic theory that we shall note here is Idealism. The common denominator of the varied forms of idealism is that "mind is the clue to the nature of Reality."¹⁵ The "stuff" of real being is mental or spiritual. This is the opposite of materialism. Materialism is but a phenomenal form of the activity of spirit. The laws of the cosmos exhibit the characteristics of reason. Idealism resolves the mind-body problem by the reduction of dualism to a spiritual monism. We shall note briefly but two forms of this theory, viz., Subjective and Objective Idealism.

George Berkeley is the outstanding exponent of subjective idealism. In his *Principles*¹⁶ we are told that "all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind—that their *being* is to be *perceived or known*." This is his famous doctrine that "to be is to be perceived," *esse est percipi*. To say that the tulip is and is colored is meaningless apart from someone's actual or possible perception of it. The affirmation of the existence of objects, were all human minds blotted out, could have validity only on the assumption that God perceives them. Real existence and perception are one and the same. Yes, things truly exist, but only as language exists for the communication of ideas between persons. Things, then, function as a divine language, whether visual, auditory, or other, between God and man. To the question, do things exist independently of *all* mind, Ber-

¹⁵ R. F. A. Hoernle, *Idealism as a Philosophy*, p. 100.

¹⁶ Cf. A. C. Fraser, *Selections from Berkeley* (5th ed., amended), p. 36.

keley answers *No*. What is the reader's reply to this question? The answer of common sense is *Yes*. For Berkeley things are but aggregates or organizations of qualities. This is all we perceive; we never perceive substance. Mind is; matter is nothing but a divine language.

It is said that Berkeley, although not convincing, is difficult of refutation. Overlooking Berkeley's solipsism, the theory that *I alone am*, to which he is logically driven, the only reality is a community of selves. How these selves or minds are related to the supreme Self or Mind, God, Berkeley does not disclose. Perry, notwithstanding Bertrand Russell's suggestion that one should not be too hard on Berkeley since he was both a Bishop and an Irishman, accuses Berkeley of "exclusive particularity"; i.e., Berkeley assumes that the tulip *seen* can exist in no other relationship. It is as though a man while a husband could not at the same time be a club member, a voter, or even a college professor. True, the tulip *seen* "exists" in a mental context, but may it not "exist" in other relationships? In other words, from existence in a mental context Berkeley passes illogically to a conclusion in a nonmental context. Berkeley's reasoning contains a twofold fallacy, termed by Perry "Definition by Initial Predication," a form of the fallacy of accident, and "The Egocentric Predicament."¹⁷

Objective idealism may properly be regarded as a corrective to subjective idealism. It represents a passage from the subjective, psychological mind to the objective, ontological mind. It concerns itself rather with spirit and nature than with mind and body. For its ultimate reality is essentially mind, or of the nature of mind. Thought is the very stuff of reality. The processes of nature, the constructs of minds, and social institutions—all are unfolding forms of, all embraced within, transcended by, Absolute Spirit or Mind. As he who knows but one language does not truly know that language, as "only the man who once has been in a foreign land knows his home aright," so

the absolute or the logical Idea exists first as a system of antemundane concepts, then it descends into the unconscious sphere of nature, awakens to self-consciousness in man, realizes its content in social institutions, in order, finally, in art, religion, and science to return to itself enriched and completed, i.e., to attain a higher absoluteness than that of the beginning.¹⁸

This is Hegel's famous *Dialectic* of development from *thesis* (Idea or

¹⁷ The student will do well to read Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, chap. vi, for exposition of these fallacies.

¹⁸ Falckenberg, *History of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 489 f., 497.

abstract reason), through *antithesis* (nature, "its own other"), to *synthesis* (self-conscious spirit). Practically expressed in terms of our experience, selves develop only as they meet problems and find a solution for them. The consequent self is a growing, enriching self.

In sense perception, as in hearing sounds, we are both passive and active. There is a "given," at least a stimulus, not self-initiated. Our reaction to this in terms of interpretation yields perception. Kant's "sense manifold" is worked over into objects by the mind's activity. Perception, then, in that "something more" beyond the "given," is so far a mental product. This constitutive activity of mind at the level of sense perception exhibits the creative aspect of mind. The data of sensibility are such as to admit of, or submit to, mental treatment; the two factors are so far akin. Objective idealism is the extension of this fact of our limited experience of mind's creativity to Absolute Mind with its pure activity, no longer confronted by a nature "other" than itself. Nature's orderly processes reveal a rational principle. Nature, history, art, religion, and philosophy are phenomenal forms and stages in the progress of the Idea toward self-conscious spirit. Through these we catch glintings or glimpses of the Absolute. Reduced to terms of our immediate problem, body is a necessary instrument both for the existence of mind and as a mode of communication between minds. It is, also, "a symbol of the individual mind."¹⁰

In these two chapters we have sketched two types of theories as to the relationship between body and mind, called here dualistic and monistic. While the issue is not finally settled, evidence seems to converge towards some monistic interpretation.

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1. Barrett, Clifford. *Philosophy*. Chap. xiii.
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3. Cunningham, G. W. *Problems of Philosophy* (rev. ed.). Chap. x.
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8. Sellars, R. W. *The Principles and Problems of Philosophy*. Chap. xxii.
9. Stout, G. F. *Mind and Matter*. Bk. II, Chaps. i - viii.

¹⁰ Hocking, *Types of Philosophy*, p. 293.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SELF

This chapter may be considered as a continuation of the preceding one. Although we canvass much the same data, there is, however, a difference of emphasis and interest. The problem is as to the nature of that *something* we call a self, of whose being mankind normally, i.e., unreflectively, is certain. This certainty of the self is an unconsidered assumption that has proved individually and socially serviceable and satisfying. From the status of assumption, the self has passed unconsciously to that of a real entity, or, it may be, the two were ever one and the same. Only when reflection sets in does doubt arise. That *I am*, and *am the same* throughout my whole biography, is, for common sense, a universal presupposition.

1. QUESTIONS OFFERING SUGGESTIONS

The type of question that arises at the reflective level is: Is the self a private core of pure being, an entity behind the shifting scene of consciousness, a God-given something united to the embryo which persists throughout all changing experience (Aquinas)? Is it something that *has* experience? Is it a substance directly known (Descartes), or an unknown support of ideas, an "I know not what" (Locke)? Is it but a symbol for experienced change rather than a formless thread upon which psychic states are strung (Bergson)? Is it a spatio-temporal referent? Is it a center of living, a system of meanings (Hocking)? Is it only "a bundle of distinct perceptions" united by resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect (Hume)? Is its essence a "life plan," the gradual attainment of harmony in our desires, purposes, etc., rather than a datum (Royce)? Is it a function of a minded organism (Pragmatism)? Is it "a system of values, a center of purposes, a pursuer of ideals" (Idealism)? Is it a mind-body complex (Realism)? Do the elements of consciousness constitute the self (Actualism)? Is the mind a *capacity* of the soul existing only in its activity (Aristotle)? May the self be thought of as two selves, the "I" and the "me," i.e., the subject-self as knower and the object-self as known, the transcendental and the empirical, these being but two aspects of the real self which is both subject and object? Or, more specifically, in the language of Kant, is the transcendental, the noumenal self or pure ego—the "synthetic unity of apperception," a logical necessity if experience is to be unified—the real timeless self, whereas

the empirical, the phenomenal self is but the temporal manifestation of this transcendental self? Is the self but a phenomenal expression of the Absolute Self (Gentile)? Is it the coherence of mental life within a body of definite and persisting spatial contour, a more or less "organized set of habits of action, thought, and feeling" (Alexander), "an organic and inter-connected complex of ideas, feelings, and volitions" (Windelband)? Is it a spiritual entity active in "perceiving, willing, imagining, remembering," etc. (Berkeley), "the unity of psychic activity" (Paulsen), "a unity of experience" (Laird), "a peculiar systematic structure of experience" (Ogden), a sum of definite capacities for psychical activity and psychophysical interaction (McDougall)? Is it "an organizing principle of character" (Classicism), an "inevitable presupposition of experience" (J. S. Moore)? Is its essence will (Schopenhauer), or thought (Rationalism), or feeling (Sentimentalism)? Is it synonymous with self-consciousness, a fragmentary expression of the Absolute Self (Fichte)? Is a man's self the "sum total of all that he can call his" (James)? Possibly the self is a gradual consolidation or integration of experience accompanied by a unique feeling tone. Or, is it something that develops in the course of experience from an original vague center of feeling into a self-conscious being capable of directing action and of "enjoyment" and "contemplation"?

This battery of interrogation, of suggestion, suffices as to points of view. We shall try to reduce this welter of viewpoints to a few main-line theories in modern philosophy and in current thought. Upon the notion of the self as a pure ego, an immaterial substance behind and *having* experience, we need not dwell. This view stems, mainly, from theological interests. There it was a presupposition and did service as a guarantor of immortality. With the advent of the biological sciences and the employment of scientific method, it has fallen largely into the discard. Few reflective minds stress or capitalize it today.

2. THREE BRITISH THINKERS

a. Locke

The fortune of the self is an interesting story, from certainty in Locke and Berkeley to skepticism in Hume. Locke assumes the reality of minds and things. The mind in the reception of sense data is passive, a sort of theater or stage upon which ideas play. It is, as it were, a wax tablet, an empty cabinet, a sheet of paper to be written upon. Sensation (perception) is "the inlet of all knowledge into our minds." The mind is active in respect to ideas furnished it by the senses; this is thinking. "Thinking is the action and not the essence of the soul."

Since thinking is but one of the soul's operations, the soul may exist in sleep, while thinking abdicates. Consciousness accompanies thought; without consciousness there can be no thought. (Subconscious thinking is a recent concept.) This consciousness accompanying thought "makes everyone to be what he calls 'self,' and distinguishes him from all other thinking things." It is in this, too, and "in this alone that personal identity consists." Self is thus an object of immediate, intuitive knowledge, whereas we know God by demonstration, and we have a sensitive knowledge of some few other things.

For Locke, external objects and minds alike *are*. They differ in that objects have powers resident in them, i.e., qualities, which produce effects in our understandings, i.e., simple ideas. Some qualities, such as "solidity, extension, figure, and mobility," exist in outer objects; these are primary qualities. Other qualities, such as tastes, sounds, colors, and smells, are effects produced *in us* by the "powers" resident in outer objects. Locke calls these, not unambiguously, secondary qualities. The primary qualities exist in the outer world perceived or unperceived, whereas sensations in order to exist depend upon the existence of mind. Ambiguity appears in that secondary qualities are of two kinds; they are both the powers resident in outer objects by reason of their insensible primary qualities and, also, the sensations these powers produce in us. As "powers" sensible qualities exist unperceived; as effects produced in us they, of course, do not exist unperceived. In the latter sense Locke shears off from outer objects the secondary qualities of colors, sounds, tastes, etc., with which the naive consciousness clothes them, but leaves the primary qualities and their powers inherent in outer objects.

Without for the moment pursuing this further, we may observe that with Locke knowledge does not extend beyond data coming to us through the inlet of the senses and the operations of reflection upon those data. Accompanying those data

we cannot but be satisfied that there doth something at that time really exist without us which doth affect our senses, and by them give notice of itself to our apprehensive faculties . . . and we cannot so far distrust their testimony as to doubt that such collections of simple ideas . . . do really exist together.¹

¹ Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. IV, chap. xi, sec. 9; also Bk. II, chap. viii, secs. 10, 23, and 26. Quotations in this and the following chapter are from "New Edition," published by Ward, Lock and Co., London, undated.

The upshot of this is that knowledge of external objects is but "likelihood . . . probability" and not certain knowledge. The orderly nature of the qualities of objects justifies Locke, he thinks, in his assumption of a substrate or substance underlying these orderly groups of qualities. We have no clear and distinct idea of substance, whether of finite spirits (souls) or of matter, "but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what . . . which we take to be the *substratum*, or support of those ideas we know."² In other words, substance is because Locke needed it in his business.

b. Berkeley

I can imagine Berkeley approaching Locke and saying, "Mr. Locke, I like your separation of secondary qualities from objects, *but* for the same reason for which you deny to objects the secondary qualities, I am compelled to deny to them the primary qualities. For what are the qualities of hot and cold, shape and weight, etc., but effects produced in me?" When he had reduced all qualities to effects in the experiencing subject there was, for Berkeley, no longer need of Locke's *substance*. It goes by the board. For Berkeley an "idea of sense" is real, but as an "immediate effect of God," not "as an effect of an outward body" or some "vulgar" matter. God served for Berkeley in accounting for ideas as substance or matter did for Locke. In Berkeley, material substance is gone, but spiritual substance—i.e., God and selves, or spirits—remains. We may observe in passing that there seems to be good reason for accusing Berkeley of theological motivation.

c. Hume

In like fashion we may imagine Hume saying, "Mr. Locke, I appreciate your elimination of *secondary* qualities from substance. Mr. Berkeley, I approve your abolition of a material substratum for the world of objects, but I have difficulty in accepting your certainty of mind or self." In a well-known passage he expresses his difficulty:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I

² *Ibid.*, Bk. I, chap. iv, sec. 18.

insensible of *myself*, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I shou'd be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity.³

His conclusion, then, is, following out the logic of Locke's and Hume's impressions and ideas, since "every idea is derived from preceding impressions, and we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple or individual," we have, therefore, no idea of a self as a containing "subject of inhesion" and, consequently, no justification for the claim. The self is, therefore, nothing more than "the composition" of perceptions in a "*felt connexion*," "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."⁴ The view that simple impressions are distinct events, impingements from a world without upon an inner world of mind largely, if not wholly, passive, is a basic error derived from Locke. It is probable that the self investigated by Hume was the Berkeleian self, a spirit substance; and, not finding any such self substance or "stuff," Hume denies its existence, thus refuting Berkeley. If Hume's refutation of Berkeley is more than an application of logical method, it is the equivalent of one running quickly and quietly around a corner to come upon himself unexpectedly, and thus surprise himself. Whatever the self is, it is not a static entity, a self substrate or "psychical permanent"; it is, at least, a center of activity. Hume's free use of "I" and "myself" in the above extended quotation does not necessarily expose him to the cheap charge of self-contradiction in denying the self while at the same time assuming it. His use of these terms is but the grammatical subject-object habit in language usage. At all events, Hume's frontal attack upon a pure ego or self substance has caused all friendly to theory to take notice and, at least, exercise caution. Yet Kant's *arousal* by Hume did not save him, in his assumption of a transcendental self, from the fallacy of translating a logical necessity or functional concept into an ontological reality.

3. PRAGMATISM: THREE AMERICAN THINKERS

A widely current theory as to the nature of the self is the pragmatic view. It deals rather with the nature of mind than with the

³ Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, I, 534.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 534, 558 f.

self. From the nature of mind, the concept of the self appears or is inferred. Its view is that mind is a functional aspect in and of the world process. Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey were its originators and exponents. Schiller thinks that Protagoras, in his dictum that "man is the measure of all things," was the earliest pragmatist. Mind is a means or form of activity for the satisfaction of organic needs. It serves the organism. This organism, however, is but one event in an unlimited world series. Mind is, therefore, a functional aspect of the order of nature. In Whitehead's phrase, mind is "organic" to nature. In addition to this general view, Peirce stressed the place of signs and symbols in thinking. Thought is carried on by, and consists of, signs and symbols. Signs are pointers to objects, are meanings. A person at any time may be thought of as a set or series of meanings. Words and their ordered arrangement in sentences and propositions are symbols of thought and meaning. In some situations, silence is eloquent of meaning. Symbols are vehicles of meaning. Meanings are not always as explicit as in mathematical symbols; they are often assumed. The motor in an automobile is a symbol of power to the driver until it refuses to function; then most drivers are helpless—the situation is practically meaningless. One of the most valuable contributions of logical positivism is its insistence that propositions shall be meaningful. "The Tyranny of Words" (Chase) is an actual fact.

a. James

James, the expounder and popularizer of pragmatism, began his study of the self with the "Empirical Me."⁵ He finds difficulty in drawing a clear line of distinction between *me* and *mine*. "In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self is the sum total of all that he *can* call his," his body and mind, his family and friends, his property even to his bank account. One is here reminded of Machiavelli's statement, "Men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony." Aristotle thought of property as an extension of personality. Thus employed, the self embraces the material self, the social self, the spiritual self, and the Pure Ego. The first two need no elucidation. By the spiritual self of the Empirical Me, James means "a man's inner or subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions." The "self of all other selves" is primarily a *felt* palpitating center located "between the head and throat." By the Pure Ego, James does not mean "any transcendent non-phenomenal sort of an Arch-Ego." The concept of self-identity arises from the nature of experi-

⁵ *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, chap. x.

ence. Our thoughts hang together. About this unity and continuity of conscious experience there is "a warmth and intimacy" peculiar to this series that differentiates it from all other series of thoughts and feelings. This subjective synthesis, without which thinking could not occur, gives rise to personal identity. "Resemblance among the parts of a continuum of feelings (especially bodily feelings) experienced along with things widely different in all other regards, thus constitutes the real and verifiable 'personal identity' which we feel." Under these conditions, passing thoughts and acts, resembling, felt, and remembered, suffice to account for the "I" without the assumption of a timeless Soul or Pure Ego. James later, however, in his distinction between percepts and concepts, the latter being on a higher and more abstract level, treats mind in more symbolic terms.⁶ Mind, then, is an abstract term for series of relations. It is a contextual form of experience in the objective world. Here he is at one with naturalistic realism.

b. Dewey

In pragmatism, Dewey is *the* instrumentalist. Instrumentalism and humanism (Schiller) may be regarded as species or special emphases of pragmatism. Mind, for Dewey, is a means or instrument by which the organism (the self) manipulates and controls environmental conditions to satisfy its own needs. When these organic activities are confronted by a difficulty irresolvable by habit, tension arises, mind appears. Mind, then, is an organic resource or capacity revealed under situational stress. As such, it is an event in the natural world. Needs, at first practical, become by developed intelligence transformed into "aesthetic, scientific, and moral needs." Art, for Whitehead, "is the fertilization of the soul." For Dewey, "Every thought and meaning has its substratum in some organic act," in some "biological behavior." Mind is "the presence and operation of meaning, ideas" based on "organic and psycho-physical activities." These activities "provide meanings with their existential stuff." Organic life and mind cannot be separated; neither can either be separated from physical nature. "*Soul* when freed from all traces of traditional materialistic animism denotes the qualities of psycho-physical activities as far as these are organized into unity." When the "soul is free, moving and operative, initial as well as terminal, it is spirit." Mind and consciousness differ in that the former.

denotes the whole system of meanings as they are em-

⁶ See C. W. Morris, *Six Theories of Mind*, chap. vi.

bodied in the workings of organic life; consciousness in a being with language denotes awareness or perception of meanings. . . . Mind is contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal and transitive. . . . Mind is a constant luminosity; consciousness intermittent, a series of flashes of varying intensities.⁷

To sum up, mind is not "a spectator beholding the world from without." It is not an angelic essence mirroring an external world, but an aspect of a life process. It "is within the world as part of the latter's own on-going process . . . an active participant in the drama of an on-going world."⁸ There is no more mystery as to the relation of body and mind than "that the soil which grows plants at all should grow those adapted to its own physico-chemical properties and relations."⁹

Mind, we have said, "is the presence and operation of meanings." Meanings appear with language. Signaling gestures in the lower animals become language, ideas, meanings, and symbols in human beings. Symbols "are condensed substitutes of actual things and events";¹⁰ they are vehicles of meaning. Dewey thinks that "the invention or discovery of symbols is doubtless by far the single greatest event in the history of man."¹¹ Totems, the flag, the cross, Christmas, rites, ceremonials, parades, money, etc., are symbols of significant events and meanings to individuals and groups. As concepts save us from the burden of often irrelevant perceptual detail, so symbols serve as shorthand signs pointing to, referring to, and communicating value experiences. They constitute a language. In fact, language is a symbolic device. It is a form of mental economy, an abstraction signifying objects, thoughts, actual events, and possible operations. Apart from minds, signs are but physical events. One might say that signs are pointers; symbols are signs interpreted, i.e., having meaning. In other words, meaning is the relation of the sign to the thing signified. Mind, or better "minding," in the abstract, is advantageous in that through symbols, ideas, and meanings we experimentally "act without acting" and thus avoid the possible embarrassment that *actual* acts often yield. Whether the result be avoidance or an approved plan of action, in either case "minding" is an experimental use of ideas with reference to behavior situations.

⁷ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, pp. 290-303.

⁸ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 291.

⁹ *Experience and Nature*, p. 277.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹¹ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 151.

Mind and soul as used by Dewey are translatable into terms of the self. The self is a "biological-cultural being"; it is a social construct. Through interaction with environment inborn capacities gradually take fashion. The self is thus in continuous process of becoming. It is in no sense a pre-experience entity, nor does it exist apart from relations in experience; it is rather the pattern formed and forming through the growingly seamless web of organized experience.

c. Mead

In much of the foregoing, Peirce, Dewey, and Mead are at one. When Peirce says that thinking is carried on by signs and that the signs constitute the man, he means that signs or words have their being in man as such, that they are intrinsic, integral, and constitutive forms of the being called man, having no other being, and are, therefore, not *for* man in any external sense. Mead and Dewey alike stress the formation of opinion as "that inner conversation imported into the mind from outer conversation"; i.e., language and thought are socially induced and function socially.¹²

For Mead, the self is fundamentally a social product. The individual comes into being with a "socio-physiological endowment," but becomes a self or person through the give and take of social participation. In common with the lower animals, he has a socio-biological background, but he differs in that he is a "more advanced product of evolutionary development." Squirrels co-operate purposely but blindly in the gathering and storing of nuts; the provident man stores grain purposefully and consciously. His picture of what the future is likely to be gives determination to his conduct. This "is the characteristic of human intelligence—the future as present in terms of ideas." The sentinel of the herd or flock gives an alarm; he starts, the others follow as a result of a herding tendency; neither stimulus nor response is that of a self. Their flight results from a "conversation of gestures."

The human being's physiological capacity for developing mind or intelligence is a product of the process of biological evolution, just as is his whole organism; but the actual development of his mind or intelligence itself, given that capacity, must proceed in terms of the social situations wherein it gets its expression and import.

Through social experience and activity, the individual becomes or develops in varying degree into a self. Apart from such experience, there is no self. The structure of the self is a reflection of the social

¹² George H. Mead, *The Philosophy of the Act*, p. 616.

structure "in which the individual is implicated." One becomes a self or person to the degree in which he takes over, organizes, and expresses in his own conduct the attitudes and social forms of his community. "The self is not so much a substance as a process in which the conversation of gestures has been internalized within an organic form."

The lower animals communicate by a conversation of gestures; they have no artificial speech. Primitive man was little above this level. This "conversation" contains no reference of the communicants to one another as itself or themselves. Only in the course of development does this self concept emerge. Only when this conversation of gestures becomes internalized do we have articulate speech, does thinking occur. Thinking employs symbols. "Symbols stand for the meanings of those things or objects which have meanings; they are given portions of experience which point to, indicate, or represent other portions of experience, not directly present or given at the time." A track on the ground or in the snow is seen as that of a bear or other wild animal. The track, we may say, is a sign which when interpreted becomes a symbol meaning a bear, which, in turn, means possible experiences. Dewey would apply the term sign to "natural signs" such as clouds and smoke, and symbol to "artificial signs" such as the flag and the cross.¹³ "Mentality is that relationship of the organism to the situation which is mediated by sets of symbols." Mind comes into being only in a psychophysical social environment. Mind and self differ in respect to their unity. The unity of self is more comprehensive in that it embraces and consists in "the generalized other," i.e., in the total complex "pattern of social behavior and experience" in which he finds himself. Since many elements or features of this complex do not appear in consciousness, the unity of mind is that of a more partial area, "in a sense an abstraction from the more inclusive unity of the self." Mead's theory of mind is functional rather than substantive. The kinship between Dewey and Mead is obvious throughout.¹⁴

4. OTHER VIEWS

a. Laird

Laird in his *Problems of the Self* inquires whether the self can be identified with the body, whether its essence consists of states of feel-

¹³ *Logic*, p. 51.

¹⁴ All the quotations except as otherwise indicated are from Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, Pts. II and III, *passim*. The rest of the paragraph is little more than connective tissue.

ing, of acts of will, or in being subject in knowing. Is conscious experience the ground of the self, or is there "something more," a sort of Pure Ego that perhaps exists apart from, unsullied by, experience? As there is no equine substance, no river substance, neither is there any self substance. The self or soul is "a distinctive kind of unity" of experience. It consists in the unity and continuity of conscious experience. In his discussion of personal identity throughout gradual change, Laird uses the concept of the margin. Sir John Culler's originally black silk stockings through wear and repair became green silk stockings. Between these "end-states," identity seems lost. There may possibly remain a historical experiential identity. Again, the individual was once a youth, is now a mature man; with age his powers wane; dotage is the end-state. On a theory of immortality the author asks, Which of these states of the self is to be immortal? It is probable that man's assumption of a Pure Ego is closely related to his love of life, often insatiate and abnormal, to his will to live without limit. The Pure Ego theory enables one to blink the tragic fact of the universal decline and frequently the utter evacuation of powers in age, while at the same time affording some consolation and hope of continued existence after the sands in the hourglass have run through. A Pure Ego as substance behind experience maintaining its identity whether it have experience or not, or as subject and guarantor of immortality, to reflection appears colorless, impersonal, remote, and glacial, in contrast to the intimate self each of us is as we know ourselves in experience. Changes in the one linear self suggest the problem of plural alternating selves, i.e., multiple personality. We shall refer briefly to this matter in a later paragraph.¹⁵

b. Broad

Broad reduces the "self" to a threefold meaning. It means either (1) the Pure Ego, as "a single long strand of history," apart from its state, (2) the Pure Ego as related to its complex of interrelated states, or (3) the whole complex of states irrespective of any Pure Ego.¹⁶ The first two of these he calls Center Theories; the third is a Noncenter Theory.¹⁷ Noncentral theories of the self "try to dispense with the assumption of an *existent* center." A cross section of mental unity would consist of "a number of contemporary mental events . . . directly interrelated in certain characteristic ways." Such mental events,

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 208, 352, 359.

¹⁶ C. D. Broad, *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, p. 278.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 558.

gnawing into the future, to use a Bergsonian figure, relate themselves to other mental events, and thus yield longitudinal unity of mind.¹⁸ Since Broad's purpose is only to examine these hypotheses, and not to prove or disprove any, he neither accepts nor rejects the Pure Ego theory. He thinks, however,

that it is perfectly possible to state a theory of unity of mind which does not involve a Pure Ego. And, as the latter theory seems better adapted to deal with the facts of abnormal and supernormal psychology than the former, I am inclined slightly to prefer it.¹⁹

c. Sellars

Sellars claims, and it is not an unreasonable claim, a double knowledge of ourselves, external and internal. In the former, we know ourselves as minds through what mind does; in the latter, we have a "self-knowledge in which the knower is internal to himself and for which consciousness in its full range is not merely epistemic but also inseparable from the self, the object known." He asks, "Why may not the enduring self about which we know in self-knowledge be the organism in respect to its complex strivings and operations?" In self-knowledge, we have a kind of knowledge "not reducible to external observation," a knowledge of data ingredient to the self. For him, "the self is the organism" and the "retreat of consciousness, from the external object known, to the self, is but an *existential* location of consciousness." Consciousness is "like a half-open doorway to the self or like the surface of a stream." Not all the processes of organic adjustment rise into consciousness. Consciousness is an intermittent but integral aspect or phase, a "qualitative dimension," of the self's behaviors. The self, thus, while having consciousness, transcends it. Sellars concludes that the self is real, but not as an inexplicable interloper, a mysterious X; "it is the organism which we apprehend, as functioning, *in* and *through* desires, deliberations, choices," etc.²⁰

5. DISTURBANCES OF PERSONALITY

A promised word about disturbances of personality. On the basis of the Pure Ego view of the self, dislocations of the self would have to be regarded as epiphenomenal, as modifications of normal brain processes; or it would have to be assumed that the bodily organism is

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 568.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 606.

²⁰ R. W. Sellars, "The Mind-Body Problem," *The Philosophical Review*, XLVII (Sept., 1938), 461-487.

the dwelling place of more than one empirical self. When the body is injured, the organism has resources which it rallies around the disturbed center. Not so, it would seem, with a *Pure Ego*. Any actual dislocation of a real *Pure Ego* somehow suggests a loss beyond recovery. If, on the other hand, we take the Leibnizian view of the self as a hierarchy of lesser or more obscure selves, then any partial disturbance of a functional character may be but temporary. Or we may take Mead's view that the self is a unity, more or less, of specialized social selves, or forms of social response, not all of which ever get expression in any single situation. In other words, my type of response, the self of mine that responds in any given situation, is determined by that particular situation. Dissociation of personality means the breaking up of the prevailing self into its components, any or some of which may for the time being take the highway to the exclusion of others. Extreme cases of multiple selves are but exaggerated instances of the experience of most normal individuals. The fact is, this matter of personal or self integration is an affair of more or less. We no longer have a clear division line between self and not-self, between saints and sinners, or between sane and insane. It is in each case a matter of more or less. We are more or less saintly, more or less sane. We might say "more or less" is a principle of normality. Carlyle's view that everything is either true or false, right or wrong, white or black is no longer entertained. No one is, or perhaps should be, thoroughly integrated. Wood, iron, and bone probably represent complete integration. Under certain circumstances, we depart from the normal to the degree that we say of such a one, "It is not like him to act in that way." Yes, we are multiple selves, congeries of social selves, professional, domestic, club, church, truthful, fibbing, etc. Pathetic exhibits are those who try to carry into maturity an athletic self of youth, or who endeavor to maintain the appearance of a long-since defunct aristocracy. Single ladies obviously "of lawful age" behaving in kittenish ways provide other instances. This oversteaying of an earlier self is a common form of which multiple personality is a more exaggerated form.

Enough has been suggested in the foregoing to cause the reader to ask: "What am I? What is my origin, nature, and destiny?" These questions are as old as reflection upon the self; they are still urgent and inescapable. Perhaps we can say we are learning what we are. There can be no question that we come into life with an inherited bodily outfit of activities, tendencies, and capacities. In the give-and-take of environmental stimuli, both physical and social, the self gradually takes form. Under the influence of social pressures characteristic habits and traits appear. In increasing degree this incipient self

assumes self-direction. Chosen ends and values guide its conduct. The maturing process implies a growing assumption of responsibility for conduct. So far we are easily within the facts. What we are more than this is difficult to say. As to pre-existence few, any more, are interested. Through social care habits appear, responses become organized. From being treated as an object, we soon become a subject, a center of reference, and a source of increasingly preferential conduct. Translation of outer into inner control is an aspect of moral growth, of personal development. Growing social participations yield interests and self-possibilities. These are the grounds of the several "me's" or selves alike possible in youth. But in the language of Professor James, I soon find myself:

confronted by the necessity of standing by one of my empirical selves and relinquishing the rest. Not that I would not, if I could, be both handsome and fat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, a *bon-vivant*, and a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher; a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as well as a 'tone-poet' and saint. But the thing is simply impossible. The millionaire's work would run counter to the saint's; the *bon-vivant* and the philanthropist would trip each other up; the philosopher and the lady-killer could not well keep house in the same tenement of clay. Such different characters may conceivably at the outset of life be alike *possible* to a man. But to make any one of them actual, the rest must more or less be suppressed.²¹

In the process of finding and becoming a self, under the necessity of nature and need, I select one form or channel of self-expression and self-becoming and "stake my all" on it. Thus, the self becomes gradually a center in which all social experiences are focused and interpreted. The wider the social excursions and their return to this center, the more significance does the self achieve, the richer does the self become.

The self is as wide as its interests; and the individual is narrowest when he stands by himself with no interests outside himself, and widest when he exists and acts as a

²¹ James, *Principles of Psychology*, I, 309 f.

part, identifying himself with the interests of the whole body of which he is a part.²²

These are but suggestions as to the odyssey of a self in its becoming.

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²² Ernest Barker, *Greek Political Theory*, p. 230.

CHAPTER IX

KNOWLEDGE AND ITS OBJECTS

1. KNOWLEDGE AND ITS USE

Plato said that philosophy begins with wonder. A student facetiously declared in class one day that wonder is a masculine capacity. On inquiry as to whether wonder had a corresponding feminine virtue, his reply was—curiosity. Be that as it may, each may lead to philosophic paths. We may add that wonder or reflective thinking begins with conflict. Until conflicting situations arise, life runs on at the level of routine biological adjustment. At this uncritical level knowledge, so-called, is little more than a series of habit responses acquired through experience by the method of absorption. It is, one might say, life at a two-dimensional level. In moments of conflict—i.e., when habit does not suffice for the satisfaction of need—this plane surface of the life stream becomes billowy and humpy; an added dimension appears. This third dimension is the appearance of reflective thought. Even at this stage of development much of our life is carried on at the habit level. A new set of habits, mental in character, overlays our more biological responses. Knowledge is thus basically serviceable to the organism. Although it ranges beyond this immediacy, knowledge rarely outruns its original function. For Plato the “use of arms is really a species of knowledge”;¹ and, again, “the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended them.”² Huxley says, “The great end of life is not knowledge but action.” By this he means that knowledge is a means to intelligent action. Another writer speaks of “knowledge as aptness of the body.”³

2. INITIAL SKEPTICISM

The problem of knowledge is that of the relation between mind and its objects. Most of us before critical thought arises are common-sense realists believing that minds and things exist independently, that things are in no whit different, except in degree of our knowledge, from what they are out of the knowledge relationship, i.e., that knowing makes no difference in the object. However, skepticism as to the reliability of the senses soon appears. Things are not as they seem. The

¹ *Laches*, 182.

² *Republic*, 601.

³ D. W. Prall, *Philosophical Review*, March, 1938.

stake that is seen as bent at the surface of the water is, by the sense of touch, found to be straight. The mirage of the wet pavement ahead of the driver or that of the oasis to the thirsty desert-traveler, and the apparent miracles of the sleight-of-hand performer, are all found to be illusory. The senses are not to be depended upon. Skepticism as to sense data appears in early Greek philosophers. Heraclitus says, "The eyes are bad witnesses for men, so are the ears of those who have barbarous [uninstructed] souls." Parmenides contrasts sense and reason. For Empedocles sense data, although not wholly deceptive, must be carefully scrutinized by thought. Anaxagoras believes that the senses furnish partial knowledge but cannot penetrate to the underlying reality.⁴ This skepticism was capitalized by the Sophists and extended in range.

3. THE SOPHISTS

The Sophists flourished from about the middle of the fifth century B.C. to about the middle of the fourth century B.C. Prominent among them were Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, and later Pyrrho. This group represented a reaction against the cosmological dogmatism of the preceding period. The rising tide of democracy was the broad background which occasioned and encouraged the Sophistic movement, which in turn contributed to democracy. The growth of trade and travel, interest in history, and knowledge of other peoples, all tended to unsettle earlier modes of thought and life. A new world was dawning, offering new opportunities, if not making new demands. Speaking figuratively and without chronological regard, one may say that the Parmenidean fixity gave way to Heraclitic flux. Man became the measure of all things, interpreted by the Sophists as the individual man. Relativism consequently prevailed. Into this vortex of individualism was drawn the whole area of human interests. Against this nothing was immune, whether fact, truth, morality, or religion. This Sophistic and skeptical individualism paraded itself before and imposed itself upon the people much as the radio advertising of today. In the later period purveyors of wisdom and skill for a price flourished. Aristotle regarded the Sophist as "a speculator in sham wisdom." That this group contributed, at least indirectly, to the intellectual life of Greece cannot be doubted. Man's competence to know had hitherto been assumed. The Sophists compelled fundamentalist thought to become self-critical, to rethink its assumptions and conclusions. Philosophy, religion, morality, and all forms of social and political life in their

⁴ See C. Bailey. *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*, chap. i.

traditional forms were challenged, in recent phrase, to clarify their concepts and meanings. The Sophists were provokers and promoters of scientific method that may be said to have begun with Anaximander of Miletus a century earlier. In their anarchistic denial of any objective criteria of truth and morals they aroused a valiant defender in the person of Socrates. This in itself was an enduring contribution. The Sophists may be said to have provided the preliminaries or germs whence later came psychology, rhetoric, logic, ethics, and genuine scientific method. We may observe that skepticism, as method, is of profound importance. It wonders and questions, it reasons and checks, it corrects and clarifies. As conclusion, skepticism that doubts itself is self-contradictory; it is a philosophy of frustration and despair.

4. SENSE PERCEPTION AND KNOWLEDGE

We return now to the problem of sense perception and ask: Do the senses give us knowledge? What are sense data and how are they related to outer objects? Are the senses, as for Locke, gateways to the outer world? Is the mind passive, purely receptive, in sense perception, or are sense data, as such, already "minded"? Does the mind know things immediately as in Naive Realism, or through the intervention of ideas? What is the relation between the object known and the object unknown? These questions suggest our problem. Naive Realism is dualistic; i.e., it assumes the reality of both an outer and an inner world. The fact, already noted, that our senses often deceive us gives reality to the problem of the nature of the knowing process. At this point, too, appears the distinction between appearance and reality.

For the unreflective mind sensing and knowing are one and the same. To see a color, to hear a sound, to taste, to touch, to smell, are for such a mind to apprehend the real. Of course, because of the fact that the senses occasionally prove deceptive, the sense data may need now and then a little touching-up. Notwithstanding this, his original confidence maintains itself. In seeing the light of the sun he sees the sun. But does he? Since it takes about eight minutes for a ray of light from the sun to reach the earth, the sun may have exploded and gone out of existence in the interval. An unconscious touching-up in this and such cases is a carry-over of a habit conviction or belief that has passed without question like a good coin. Again, he sees a red or blue color. That is unquestionable, but does he see the red bird or the blue sky? Reflective thought answers, No. Neither in seeing an area of white does he see snow, not to speak of seeing it cold; for the white may be artificially produced as often in motion picture production. It may, therefore, be assumed that in sensation, as such, we do not

apprehend the real. All that we can say is that in sensation, properly analyzed and interpreted, we get a clue to the real. In order to know, work remains to be done.

What does it mean that, as we say, our senses deceive us occasionally? One could hardly say that a mirror is ever deceived as it reflects objects, not even Bacon's "uneven mirrors"—which might distort, but could not be deceived. Mirrors do not *have* sensations, impressions, or reflections. Their reflections simply *are* for an observing mind. That our senses deceive us means that there is something more in sensation than mirroring or mere reflecting. That "something" is the fact or factor of interpretation or "minding." Common-sense objects are what we might call *sight acceptances*. When one sees John Smith on the street, overtakes him, slaps him on the back familiarly, then finds him to be a stranger, one's embarrassment is due not to a faulty sensation as such, but rather to a misinterpretation or misconstruction of the presented sense data. More directly stated, the view here entertained is that in sense perception mental elements enter, "minding" occurs. In other words a "pure" sensation is but a limiting concept, probably never a fact of experience. The nearest approach to it would be in infancy or in the case of a person just beginning to come out from under anaesthesia, when he sees persons as moving objects with a minimum of meaning. A "pure" sensation would be a "that" without a "what." An utterly qualityless "something," a practically impossible form of experience, is an *Unding*, a nothing, a sensation at the vanishing point. "Pure" existence is a fiction resulting from abstraction; it is never experienced. Where meaning is, mind is present.

5. LOCKE'S SENSATIONALISM

Locke's sensationalism is in point here. He accepted the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter as separate entities. The resultant problem was how these two discrepant realities could be got together in the knowledge relationship. This was achieved by him through the mediation of ideas. We have then three sets of entities: external objects, ideas, and minds. The external world impinges upon the inner world through the senses in the form of ideas. This is reminiscent of Heraclitus, for whom knowledge comes "through the door of the senses," and of Empedocles and Anaxagoras as well. This is the original source of all ideas. Ideas are defined as "that which the mind is applied about, whilst thinking." Again, idea means "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks."⁵ In acquiring these simple ideas

⁵ *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, chap. i, sec. 1; Bk. I, chap. i, sec. 8.

of sensation the mind is passive. He says, "The objects of our senses do many of them obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds, whether we will or no."⁶ Besides these simple ideas "got by sensation" the mind "has the power to repeat, compare, and unite" these simple ideas. Here the mind is active in the forms of "perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing," etc. Reflection upon these mental activities yields "simple ideas of reflection." Sensation and reflection, then, are the sources of all our ideas. In a word, "experience" is the foundation of all our knowledge.

To enter upon a discussion of Locke's ambiguities in his use of ideas as mental existents and again as in things, of objects as now external existents and again as objects of reflection, or of the relations of ideas to things whether as resemblances, copies, identities, or as signs or symbols, would be beside our purpose. In a valuable study Professor Thompson⁷ finds that Locke's mind underwent development in the long years of the preparation of the *Essay* "by incoherent parcels," that he passes from naive realism and common-sense knowledge to an unstable agnostic realism, that later reflection necessitated additions and modifications in his earlier chapters which were not completely articulated, that as to the relation of ideas of sense to the qualities of external things Locke had "three distinct views" rather than a single consistent theory, and that his interests shifted progressively from his earlier dualism and agnostic substantialism (i.e., substance *is*, but "I know not what" it is) toward experience wherein thought and reality are already inseparably related. In support of the increasing importance of inner experience for Locke we noted in the preceding chapter that his concept of an inaccessible and therefore unknowable substance was introduced to account for the orderliness of his experience. In terms of Locke's progressive development, of his dissatisfaction with his original dualism of spiritual and material substances, it is interesting to hear him say that "in the several ranks of beings, it is not easy to discover the bounds betwixt them. . . . It is a hard matter to say where sensible and rational begin, and where insensible and irrational end."⁸

Our contention, then, that in sense perception the mind is active, finds some support even in Locke. Thought is not a screen that sep-

⁶ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, chap. i, sec. 25.

⁷ See S. M. Thompson, *A Study of Locke's Theory of Ideas*.

⁸ Locke, *op.cit.* Bk. IV, chap. xvi, sec. 12.

arates us from the world of objects; it is part and parcel of that world. Kant blasts Locke's conception of the mind as passive. For Kant there is an external world, whence come stimuli that invade our sensibility. Our senses are gateways to the understanding. Whatever enters our senses, by that fact (*ipso facto*), appears in the form of space or time or both. Space and time are forms of sensuous intuition or mental molds which give their form to *all* sense data. They are not things-in-themselves. The data of sensibility, as such, are as yet a largely unorganized and meaningless manifold. Upon this manifold, in order that it be elevated to the rank of knowledge, the understanding with its pure forms or categories operates. It is in this sense that "percepts without concepts are blind." The importance of these modes of mental functioning can be seen were we to imagine ourselves trying to live in a world in which there was no quantity or measure, no concept of quality with its better or worse, no relation of objects or events whether causal, sequential, spatial, or other. It is these and such *a priori* principles or modes of mental activity that we mean by the categories. They do not arise from experience; they are absolutely independent of all experience. Without them experience in any meaningful sense of the term would be impossible. They are forms by which order is introduced into the chaos of sense experience. Thus, for Kant, "although all our knowledge begins *with* experience, it by no means follows that it all originates *from* experience."

The objects of knowledge are not things-in-themselves. They are the manifold of sensibility categorized—i.e., sense data interpreted by the mind. Knowledge is of phenomena only, never of noumena or things-in-themselves. This is Kant's Copernican revolution. The pre-Kantian problem of knowledge was how the mind laid hold of its objects. The naturalistic realism that prevailed assumed that the object of knowledge was the thing *as is*, that knowing made no difference in the status of the object. With Kant the problem was to show how the mind created its objects. In all knowing the mind is active. The data of sensibility become objects of knowledge through the creative activity of the understanding. In other words, upon the sense manifold, the "given," already in some degree "minded," the understanding with its constitutive forms or categories operates, yielding objects of knowledge. In still more Kantian phrase, a known object is the product of the mind's activity, through its forms of intuition and the categories, upon the raw materials of the senses.

We come now to certain historical and current theories of the problem of knowledge known as Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism, Logical Positivism, and Intuitionism.

6. IDEALISM

a. Subjective Idealism

Idealism is the view that reality is of the nature of mind. Idealism we may view, first, under two forms, viz., subjective and objective. Berkeley is the best known exponent of subjective idealism. Although Locke wavered with respect to our knowledge of outer objects, we noted the growing importance of inner experience for him. This concept came to full flower in Berkeley in his denial of an independent outer world. For him *being* and *being perceived* are one and the same. It is repugnant and self-contradictory to think that

houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived. . . . For, what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations?⁹

It is only the frailty of philosophers, tragic victims of "abstract ideas," that causes them to look for a mysterious existence or matrix behind their perceptions. An apple, a table, or a rock is nothing but an orderly collection of qualities or group of perceptions. Sensible things

have an existence exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore some other Mind wherein they exist . . . as . . . they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation.¹⁰

Of course it is self-contradictory, if a thing is the sum of its sense qualities, to say that such a sensed thing could exist unperceived or unsensed. When Berkeley says that sensible things do exist outside his mind it is well to remember that as such they are still sensed things either in other minds or in the mind of God. "To be is to be perceived." Thus ideas are not copies of, do not represent, independent things. Knowing and being are of the same fiber.

When we come to the self, the "I," a difficulty arises. Is it more than "a system of floating ideas?" asks Hylas. One is reminded here of Hume. Berkeley replies, "How often must I repeat that I know or am conscious of my own being; and that I *myself* am not my ideas, but somewhat else—a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows,

⁹ A. C. Fraser, *Selections from Berkeley*, p. 35.

¹⁰ *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, Dialogue III.

wills, and operates about ideas."¹¹ I am a "spiritual substance," a "thing entirely distinct from them [ideas], wherein they exist, whereby they are perceived."¹² We can imagine Hylas saying, "A spiritual substance, ah!" Has Berkeley refuted the suggestion of Hylas that *spiritual substance* should go by the board with *material substance*? Berkeley's wavering use of the term *notion* as an immediate awareness of self as an "agent" in contrast to ideas of perception is not convincing. He has not (by anticipation) answered Hume's view of the self as but a collection of ideas.

b. Objective Idealism

When one comes to study idealism as a theory of knowledge, he finds that it is much more a metaphysical than an epistemological theory. Particularly is this true of objective idealism. Objective idealism is a synthesis of subjective idealism and pure objective naturalism. For Berkeley, as we have seen, *being* and *being perceived* are one and the same. A primary urge toward objective idealism is the traditional distinction, even to separation, between appearance and reality, between phenomena and noumena. Agnosticism resulting from this separation, whether in Locke, Kant, or Spencer, proves unsatisfactory. Spencer's affirmation of the certainty of the Unknowable is its extreme expression. The writer recalls the utterance of a theologian of compartmental views to the effect that science deals with the knowable, philosophy with the unknown, and religion with the unknowable. He apparently was not aware that he was "sapping" his own enterprise. Absolute idealism is the effort to overcome this disjunction of noumena and phenomena by a process of sublimation into an ultimate spiritual whole embodying at once both truth and reality, an altogether difficult concept.

While idealism takes the position that reality is of the nature of mind, objective idealism goes the limit and affirms that ultimately thought is reality. For it the world-mind is within the processes of nature. Nature is Absolute Reason externalized. The world as we know it is objectively, i.e., independently, real; its structural order is rational; its substance is Mind or Reason. Were it otherwise, our minds would be incapable of knowledge. Our minds are part and parcel, facets, or faint glimmerings of the universal Mind on its way to complete self-consciousness. From what a height are we here invited to look down upon the panorama of the world! For Fichte ultimate reality is an absolute all-inclusive *I* manifested in finite con-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Dialogue III.

¹² Fraser, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 103, 163.

sciousness. From another point of view it is a system of finite selves. For Schelling Nature and the Eternal are one and the same. Here we have Spinoza's pantheism reaffirmed. This doctrine of Identity Hegel described as "the night in which all cows are black." For Schopenhauer ultimate reality is a pure self-conscious will. Hegel finds that all finite realities, selves and things, are expressions of an Absolute Self. For him ultimate reality is not an aggregate, nor even a system of externally related parts; it is an all-inclusive individual Self, Spirit, or Person whose members are internally related. The concept of internal relations is fundamental in absolute idealism.¹³ These men undertook to overcome the Kantian dualism of phenomena and noumena, denying the existence of a thing-in-itself independent of and inaccessible to the understanding. Things-in-themselves, so-called, are but hypothetical entities to explain facts of experience and, therefore, inseparable therefrom. In sum, reality is an evolving rational process. Ultimate reality is spirit; it is an absolute One. "The truth is the whole."

c. Theory of Levels

Common to all evolutionary views of reality is the concept of *levels*, whether it be that of matter, life, or mind. There are levels of development within each of these major levels. Not only can we detect this concept in absolute idealism; it is manifest in historic idealism as well. Robinson¹⁴ says, "The essence of the idealistic theory of existence is the levels theory of reality." Although this is probably an overstatement or one-sided statement, it nevertheless is an important emphasis. This theory finds expression in Plato. Knowledge for him ranges from the level of opinion to that of true knowledge, which is the apprehension of Forms or Ideas. Our knowledge of things, if it be knowledge at all, is but opinion; real knowledge is of Forms. Through certain studies such as arithmetic, geometry, astronomy in their philosophical, rather than in their empirical, significance the soul may pass from opinion in the realm of fleeting things to a knowledge of abiding Forms, or true Being. Knowledge pierces through things to their essence, Ideas. This knowledge constitutes virtue, a form of the Good. There are levels, too, in the realm of the beautiful. Speaking of progress in appreciation of beauty from the concrete to the abstract, from

¹³ The doctrine of internal relations states that relations make a difference to their terms. The husband-wife relationship, for instance, affects the nature of the people in it. For idealism, all things are so closely related that they form an absolute whole.

¹⁴ D. S. Robinson, *Introduction to Living Philosophy*, p. 88.

perishing beauties to the permanent, from particulars to the universal, he concludes:

He who from these ascending under the influence of true love, begins to perceive that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is.¹⁵

Again, in perhaps too graphic figure, we may think of the *Idea of the Good* as the capstone of the pyramid of all other ideas, or the keystone of the arch whose twin pillars are the true and the beautiful. Plato leaves the Good undefined. It is higher and more beautiful than science and truth; it is twin sister to beauty; it is the value of values; it is the first principle, the structure and meaning of the real world; it can be approached and in degree attained only by the "longer and more circuitous way" of prolonged, severe, and systematic discipline.

In Chapter VI we have already noted Aristotle's three levels of the soul—the vegetable, the animal, and the rational. This concept of levels pervades the "various philosophies of the Middle Ages—Christian, Jewish and Arabian."¹⁶ It is found in Leibniz' monadic forms—bare or simple monads, sentient but "dull" monads, rational monads, and the supreme monad, God. Throughout, the whole series is ultimately spiritual. These levels vary in degree of development. The levels theory comes to full bloom in modern evolutionary thought. Sellars says that "Nature is insurgent, creative, a domain of synthesis and origination." "Evolution means that there are levels in nature, that the higher is an outgrowth of the lower, that A and B integrated are more than A and B separate," i.e., that "the higher levels cannot be led back to the lower without a remainder."¹⁷ Alexander and Morgan speak of these levels in the universe of being as space-time, matter, life, mind, and Deity.¹⁸ The prevalence of this view is seen in

¹⁵ *Symposium*, 211.

¹⁶ Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

¹⁷ R. W. Sellars, *Principles and Problems of Philosophy*, p. 370; *Evolutionary Naturalism*, pp. 329, 331.

¹⁸ S. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, 335; Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, p. 11.

the titles of many current books, such as Hoernle's *Matter, Life, Mind, and God*; Morgan's *Life, Mind, and Spirit*; Joad's *Matter, Life, and Value*; and Haldane's *Mechanism, Life, and Personality*.

CHAPTER X

KNOWLEDGE AND ITS OBJECTS (Continued)

7. REALISM

It is a commonplace to say that Realism is as old as reflective thinking. Indeed, it antedates reflection; it obtained at that low level when the self was not yet differentiated from things, when the self was an object among other objects. Realism as the acceptance or conviction of the existence of something other than myself is found from the dawn of reflection. The welfare of the self was dependent upon adjustments to that *other*. Out of these life adjustments controls developed, the problem of knowledge arose. Our current philosophies of idealism, realism, naturalism, pragmatism, etc., are reflective efforts to explain the relationship of the self to this *other-than-ourselves*.

a. Platonic Realism

Realism as a philosophical doctrine appears in Western thought in the naturalism of the early Greeks, in the atomism of Democritus and Leucippus. In impressive form we find it in the idealism of Plato. Although an idealist, Plato was also a realist. His heaven of Ideas was a world of reals. He divides his universe into two realms, the one of Ideas, the other of things. The realm of Ideas is that of *real* being; the world of things is of appearances, changing copies of the ultimate reals, the Ideas. He combines the "permanent" of Parmenides and the "flux" of Heraclitus. One is here reminded of Anaximander's "apeiron" (the boundless) within which things appear and disappear. Things "participate" in Ideas. The reality in the variety of desks and beds is the underlying *idea* in each. A desk represents one idea or purpose, a table another; their difference is a difference of ideas, of meanings, of Forms. Were there no idea or need of writing or of sleeping there could be neither desk nor bed. Yes, Plato was at once an idealist and a realist; he was a realist in that his Ideas were *reals* independent of knowing minds. True knowledge is apprehension by our minds of those Ideas or Forms by way of "recollection."

Recollection, somewhat in the Platonic sense, we have all experienced. To illustrate: we may have tried to recall a name. Several suggest themselves, to each of which we say, "No, that is not the name." Finally the correct name appears and we recognize it at once. Why, we ask, do we know it and at the same time not know it? The Socratic method explains this. Socrates spoke of his function as that of a mid-

wife; i.e., it was not that of creating but rather that of assisting in bringing to birth something that already exists. This becoming aware of what we already know is what Plato meant by "recollection." His theory is that the soul in some former existence, uncluttered with things, had ready access to, was at home in, the realm of Ideas.

In leaving the matter I may be pardoned for remarking that all good teaching is of the Socratic type, the stimulation of the pupil to creative thought activity rather than the vice in so much current teaching of handing down predigested knowledge via the lecture method. It is easy to lecture, but difficult to teach. The Socratic method respects pupil ability, develops mental activity and capacity; the lecture method makes for mental passivity and docility; the one yields mastery, the other slavery.

b. Scholastic Realism

Scholastic realism stems from Plato and Aristotle. Plato had his world of constant, abiding concepts or Forms, a world apparently apart. Besides this there was a realm of immaterial matter, of formless stuff, a vague and undefined concept, a "realm of possibility," of "eternal objects," in Whitehead's phrase. Things, the world of perpetual flux, arise as the result of the participation or "ingression" of eternal forms in the realm of matter; i.e., concrete objects are matter assuming form. How and why the Platonic Ideas became possessed of a *Wanderlust* and went forth into matter is not apparent. At this point Aristotle, the master of those who know, differed from his teacher. Being more "tough-minded" and empirical, he prefers to begin with the particulars of experience and to arrive at the universal if the facts demand it. It is an all too prevalent habit to try to explain data of experience in terms of a purely theoretical transempirical reality. "Dear is Plato," he said, "but dearer still is truth." On the assumption that Ideas existed apart, whether as facts or purposes, we could not even know that they are, to say nothing of employing them as interpretive principles. In a word, Aristotle denied the separation between Forms and things. He bridged the gulf by denying the validity of the two worlds. Forms are indwelling principles revealed in the common denominators of things. Universals exist in particulars and have neither being nor meaning apart.

There is no doubt that medieval scholasticism was motivated by theological interest. Philosophy was primarily a handmaid of the Church. The form the problem took was the relation of particulars to universals. Do universals exist in or outside the particulars of experience? is the question. Are they sheer mental constructs having no

other reality? Who is right, Plato or Aristotle? The verbal strife among the scholastics assumed three forms known as Realism, Nominalism, and Conceptualism. *Realism* affirmed the reality of universals independent of the human mind, and also that particulars are but variant and imperfect copies of them. Their status is that of the young man characterized to his bride by another as "a model husband." Being uncertain of the word "model" she resorted to the dictionary and found the term defined as a small edition or copy of the real thing. For realism humanity or man has a reality beyond that of any individual person. Men die but humanity lives. The universal Church has a reality and authority beyond that of members or of churches. Anselm was the leading representative and defender of this view.

Nominalism declared that universals are but names, abstractions derived from the data of experience, that particulars alone are existent reals. Individual men are concrete reals. Humanity is an abstraction from individuals, a concept devised for convenience in social communication, having no independent being. The Church is a name for the organization of religious interests and activities, but with no existence beyond the participating groups. Likewise the State is an abstract idea that is without any being beyond the group of operations so named. "*L'état c'est moi*" (I am the State). We are the State. The true real is the individual. Duns Scotus and William of Occam were leading nominalists.

Conceptualism occupied a middle ground between these extreme positions. Its view is that universals are more than mere names and less than independent beings, that they are real, and that they exist only in particulars. This is of the Aristotelian type of realism stated previously. For Abelard, a major exponent of conceptualism, universals are structural principles common to groups of particulars, without or apart from which knowledge would be impossible. As a son of the Church, however, he hastens to add that these universals existed first as archetypes in the mind of God, then in His creative activity they became resident in and gave fashion to things, and finally they were used as concepts in the human understanding in its acquisition of knowledge of real being. Thus he bestrides and reconciles the differences in the great controversy. Universals are at once before (*ante rem*), after (*post rem*), and in (*in re*) things. Metaphysically speaking, realism tends toward pantheism, nominalism toward pluralism, and conceptualism toward a tempered realism.

c. Modern Realism

NAIVE REALISM. In modern philosophy realism falls mainly into

three classes: Naive, Neo- (New), and Critical Realism. Human beings untaught by philosophy are natural realists. Their success in manipulating things in a direct way gives assurance that they are dealing at first hand with things as they are. The outcome of this satisfactory dealing with things begets confidence, which, in turn, readily translates itself into a direct knowledge of things. Things are thus known immediately. The senses are the gateways to the real. At this practical level there is no question, problem, or theory of knowledge. Hume and Kant are far distant, not to mention Hegel. Life goes on at a two-dimensional level of dealing directly with facts. Facts are facts with no mental monkeying. Things *are*, independent of whether or not I get around to them, i.e., have need or use for them. Slowly in the course of time experience begins to yield sophistication. Things are not always what they seem. All is not gold that glitters. A distinction, compelled by practical consequences, between the "given," the data of perception, and the real object occurs. "At sight" acceptances of sensory experience when followed out in practice sometimes prove deceptive. Breakfast pancakes on April first have proved so. What appears as an attractive book turns out to be a box of candy or cigars. Thus the distinction of *appearance* and *reality*, of *seeming* and *being*, arises. A third dimension appears. Our perceptions are no longer simple transcripts, immediate apprehensions, of outer objects; they are partial and complex. The "given" of sense perception has unconsciously undergone supplementation, interpretation has entered in, error becomes possible. We are thus started on the way of reflection, we are forced forward, all steps are outward, there can be no return to the comfortable simplicities of prereflective common-sense realism. Physics, neurology, physiology, and psychology have played a large part in making naive realism no longer tenable.

NEO-REALISM. Realism, of whatever sort, at the reflective level is a protest against the extravagances of idealism, whether subjective or objective. Its basic assumption is that in the knowledge relationship the object known exists independently of the knowing process, i.e., of the *person* knowing. It knows nothing about the transcendent knower of absolute idealism. The problem now is, just what is the relation between the knowing subject and the object known, between the act of "minding" and the object "minded." At this point, diverging theories appear. We have two main views known as Neo-Realism and Critical Realism. Neo-realism is close kin to common-sense realism. In the experience of knowing, the outer object is apprehended directly, immediately, without the intervention of any screen of ideas as for Locke. Knowledge is of the real object, not of phenomena as for Kant.

The desk upon which I write is an immediate object of perception. It exists externally; knowing makes no difference; the desk known is an external object that just happens for the time being to be in this relationship. At that same time it is related to the radiator, and to other pieces of furniture in the room. Realism thus stresses the fact that real objects exist in external relations in direct contrast to the doctrine of internal relations embodied in Berkeleian and other forms of idealism. So much is this so that relations themselves are objective. Iowa City is east of Des Moines. Not only is each of these cities real, but the spatial relationship *east of* is also real. Consciousness, so to speak, does not go out to objects and relate them, neither do objects come into consciousness unrelated; rather consciousness is of the presence of related objects. Neo-realism's theory of knowledge might be called Presentationalism.

In concluding this brief sketch of neo-realism an unresolved perplexity may be noted. That there is a difference between the content of consciousness in the act of perceiving and that of remembering is obvious. Take for example a past event, say, the experience that was mine on Armistice Day, 1918—a thrillingly real experience. If the content of my consciousness at the time of that experience was one with the medley of events and their meanings, what of the content of my consciousness as I remember it now? Do I obliterate the time interval, or reverse "time's arrow" and re-experience the original event? May it be that the event leaps forward and reinstates the original consciousness? Or, does the event have the quality of timelessness such that, in remembering, the original event is relived? Such credulity is possible to rampant idealism, but not to neo-realism. In the fact that in remembering, the content of consciousness differs from that of the original perceptual experience, neo-realism seems inadequate as a theory of knowledge. In so far as the two consciousnesses differ in content, realism squints in the direction either of representationalism or of critical realism.¹

Representationalism is the name given to Locke's theory of knowledge. Neo-realism is a two-point theory of knowledge. Locke's representationalism is a three-point theory. There is (1) the outer world of objects, there is (2) the mind as a stage upon which ideas act, and there are (3) the ideas themselves produced by the impingement of the outer world upon the mind through the "gateway of the senses."

¹ For American neo-realists, see *The New Realism*, 1912, with chapters by W. T. Marvin, R. B. Perry, E. G. Spaulding, W. P. Montague, E. B. Holt, and W. B. Pitkin. Prominent among English neo-realists are G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, John Laird, and S. Alexander.

The result of this is that ideas intervene between the mind and outer things; indeed ideas are the objects of mind. Ideas in the mind are representations of, or represent, outer objects. Since we have already discussed Locke's theory in the two preceding chapters, we need not dwell upon it here.

CRITICAL REALISM. It might be better to speak of critical realists than of critical realism because of their diversity of views. All realists agree as to the pre-existence of objects. Critical realists agree in discriminating between the existence of an object and that object as known. In this respect they are at the opposite pole from subjective idealism. In this discrimination between the content of knowledge and the object known critical realism puts itself in opposition to neo-realism with its identity of knowledge and its object in the knowledge relationship. Between the subjectivity of idealism, especially that of Berkeley, for whom being and being known are one and the same, and the objectivity of neo-realism with its immediacy of access to the object in cognition, critical realism occupies some sort of middle ground. On the other hand, in so far as, for critical realism, the datum is the only thing immediately known, this theory is one with representationalism. Against this charge the critical realist insists that reference to an external world is of the very substance or essence of perception; the datum must "manifest the characteristics of physical things."

Like representationalism, critical realism is a three-point theory. Between the knowing subject and the object known there is a third something called the *datum*, *sensum*, or *essence*. The problem is as to the nature of this datum. Is it physical, or mental, or neither? Is it an existent or a subsistent—the difference being that concrete objects exist while qualities, numbers, values, etc., are real but have a status other than that of existents, and therefore are designated as subsistents? Or, is the datum an essence, a sort of pure entity constituted of the mathematical and logical structure of the outer object abstracted from all its material aspects, after the manner in which the artist sees a tree in terms of line and color? Drake,² after enunciating six different possible explanations or interpretations of *sensa*, using the term as a synonym for data and essences, concludes that *sensa* are "purely suppositious existents."³ They are projections of brain-states. They are of the nature of "after-images." We look at the sun, then on turning to a screen or wall we see there a disk of complementary color. This is the projection outward of the pattern of brain activity produced by

² Durant Drake, *Invitation to Philosophy*, chap. x.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

looking at the sun. The image on the wall has no real status in the outer world. To that degree the sensum is fictional in character; yet there is a "one-to-one correspondence" between it and the outer object that stimulated the given pattern of brain activity. In this way the sensum, datum, or essence is that which links us in the knowledge relationship to the outer world. Criticism of this "one-to-one correspondence" view might well begin with the fact that conditions within the organism give determination to the sensa, i.e., that the object is not the single cause of sensa. This we have seen in our analysis of perception in Chapter IX.

That the concept of "essence" is not yet clear or satisfactory is evident in the controversy among critical realists themselves. It is surely a subtle and elusive thing. To one it is real, to another fictional. It is now particular, again universal. For some, sense data are timeless and speechless, for others not so. The essence is both mental and non-mental. Again, it may be just a set of logical entities, or psychic events without metaphysical portfolio. Now you have it, only at the next moment to find you haven't. We ask, Is this *essence* the material object with its materiality thinned down, a sort of immaterial materiality? Or, is it the experiencing subject thickened up and so rendered more competent and confident? How this thinning down and thickening up process occurs remains a mystery. Probably the best solution is that of Professor Sellars, who makes mind a physical category, i.e., not material, but a qualitative aspect within the order of nature, that is, a form of brain activity, the brain within the body, the body a part of nature. This view is reminiscent of Dewey. Consciousness is a qualitative dimension, an event within the brain-organism in its responses to needs and environmental pressures. This at-homeness of consciousness with brain activities gives us inside, immediate, intuitive knowledge, knowledge by participation, in contrast to knowledge by external observation. For Professor Sellars it appears that essences are the concepts involved in the supplementation of sense data resulting in perceptual judgments with their claimed reference to external objects.*

The problem of knowledge is that of the relation of the knowing mind to the object known. In terms of utter dualism of mind and body the question is how the mind can go out to the object or how the concrete object can enter the mind. To the problem of knowledge

* For American critical realists see *Essays in Critical Realism*, 1920, with chapters by D. Drake, A. O. Lovejoy, J. B. Pratt, A. K. Rogers, G. Santayana, R. W. Sellars, and C. A. Strong. Although there is no school of critical realism in England, A. C. Ewing, H. A. Prichard, and C. D. Broad may properly be classified as critical realists.

so formulated there is no answer. In contrast to this chance convergence of mind and object, realism affirms that the object of knowledge is expressly or implicitly present in the data of sense perception, and that knowledge is this immediacy of relationship.

8. PRAGMATISM

a. Peirce

So far knowledge appears as an achievement or status, a satisfactory possession, perhaps. In pragmatism we are in another area, the atmosphere has another quality or fragrance. We pass from possession to mastery, from status to function. Intelligence is immersed in conduct. James credits Peirce as the prime mover in pragmatism. For Peirce,

The whole function of thought is to produce habits of action. . . . What a thing means is simply what habits [of action] it involves. . . . Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects. . . . Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.⁵

The descent from absolute idealism with its rarified reals to the "hurly-burly" operationalism of pragmatism, as indicated by Peirce, is precipitous. It affects one's intellectual breathing.

b. James

The subtitle of *Pragmatism*, by William James, is "A new name for some old ways of thinking." By this James means that pragmatism is as old as Socrates and Aristotle, that it has been a form of thinking, without benefit of title, up to the time of its naming and christening about the beginning of the present century. Before that time James and Schiller for years were pragmatists "without knowing it." Early in his *Pragmatism* we are told that pragmatism is "a method only," a method of settling otherwise interminable, and frequently empty, disputes.

The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one.⁶

⁵ Charles S. Peirce, *Chance, Love, and Logic*, ed. Morris Cohen, pp. 43 - 45.

⁶ *Pragmatism*, p. 50.

In controversies such as whether the world is one or many, spiritual or material, whether God is finite or infinite, pragmatism asks what difference would result were one or the other of these alternatives to prevail. In the event that on either hypothesis no concrete difference appears, pragmatism declares that the issue is meaningless, no reality is involved. Indeed, pragmatism is much more a program than a solution. Thoughts are intermediaries by which we are enabled to pass from where we are to where we wish to be. The meaning of any idea is the "conduct it is fitted to produce." Knowledge is the ability to pass from one experience to another which is predictable; i.e., the latter experience is the necessary meaning or consequence of the former. Ideas by their nature are guides or leaders to further experience. Thought is an aspect or form of conduct. Thus the pragmatist

turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad *a priori* reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power.⁷

Although pragmatism for James at first is a method only, it soon becomes a theory of truth, and finally leads to a pluralistic metaphysic.⁸

c. Dewey

Dewey approaches the problem of knowledge more from the biological side, a functional point of view. Animals have their problems, plants have theirs. The solution of their problems differs, because of nature. Animals go out after their food, plants root down and reach up for theirs. As already noted, animals are mobile, plants are immobile. Their operational methods, their digestive processes, differ. Our solutions of our problems differ from theirs. Ours are more consciously intelligent and scientific. Thought is an adventurous form of human life; it is a refinement of the methods that obtain at the lower levels. The three types differ in their solutions, mainly, in degree of awareness and control. Thought at the human level appears as a response of the organism to a situation wherein the normally satisfying processes have been temporarily checked, where habit is helpless. Through it the process takes up again, well-being is enhanced. Knowledge is not a mere *product* resulting from an analysis of the structure and elements of ideas and objects which ends there; it is, rather, a con-

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁸ *Ibid.*, chaps. ii, iv.

tinuous *process* that carries on to new needs and new adjustments yielding newer and ever more significant experience. This is Dewey's well-known type of pragmatism called *Instrumentalism*. Bergson says man is a manufacturer (*faber*), a user of instruments, and not primarily a thinker. Thought, for Dewey, is a situation-solving instrument or means; it proceeds by self-adjustment to, and by reshaping of, the situation. Adjustment implies reshaping. Children during a rain damming up a tiny rivulet with mud or sand causing it to modify its course illustrate, at the inorganic level, thought process in meeting a novel situation. The validity of thought processes is tested by their results.⁹

d. Schiller

The humanistic strain that pervades pragmatism comes to full expression in the English pragmatist, F. C. S. Schiller. For him pragmatism is but humanism applied to knowledge. The Protagorean dictum that "man is the measure of all things," Schiller says, "is the truest and most important thing that any thinker ever has propounded." Humanism he defines as

the philosophical attitude which . . . is content to take human experience as the clue to the world of human experience, content to take Man on his merits, just as he is to start with, without insisting that he must first be disembowelled of his interests and have his individuality evaporated and translated into technical jargon, before he can be deemed deserving of scientific notice.¹⁰

Humanism takes "man for granted as he stands, and the world of man's experience as it has come to seem to him." Man is the creator of our sciences and arts, of our religion and morals; and any high-flown philosophy that minimizes or analyzes him away is self-defeating and suicidal. With man and his experience we must start and always return from our wider excursions. Immediate experience though real is "woefully discordant and inadequate." Because of this, immediate experience needs retouching; we conceptualize it, reinterpret and reconstruct it into a world of a higher order of reality that more satisfactorily meets our various needs and purposes. In this more real world we live and move and have our being. Whatever our supplementations of primary experience may be, they cannot, in order to

⁹ See George H. Mead, *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Merritt H. Moore, chap. xv.

¹⁰ F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism*, pp. xix f. In this definition he has idealism in mind as the contrast to humanism. See particularly pp. ix, xvii-xxi; also chap. xi.

be serviceable, constitute a universe by themselves. Since this *secondary* reality arose out of the primary for the express purpose of giving order and meaning to that immediate experience, it must ever keep in close touch with that primary experience. A Jacob's ladder is necessitated on which the angels of philosophy may meet in perpetual ascent and descent. In a word the will-to-live is basic; it is the center around which all experience revolves. To this end immediate experience ever undergoes reflective reconstruction, and thus reality is ever in the making.

9. LOGICAL POSITIVISM

The philosophy originally called Logical Positivism, but now preferably known as Logical or Scientific Empiricism, is no Minervan miracle. It is an emergent from, or convergence of, three philosophical movements, viz., Continental positivism, English empiricism, and American pragmatism. Prominent in the first group, among others, are Comte, Mach, Poincaré, and Helmholtz. This group was motivated by a reaction against Kant's formalism especially in his theory of knowledge. As prime movers in English empiricism we may name Bacon, Locke, Hume, Mill, and Spencer. Chief among American pragmatists are Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey. Pragmatism as a theory of meaning was pioneered by Peirce, promoted and publicized by James, socialized by Mead, and instrumentalized by Dewey. Its interests, primarily practical, are polar to those of traditional rationalism and absolutism. More specific emphases are found in Section 8 of this Chapter. This, then, in the large is the background against which logical positivism appears. As such it centered in the Viennese Circle headed by Schlick (now deceased) and Carnap. Russell and Wittgenstein were strongly influential in the thinking of Schlick and Carnap.

Scientific empiricism is a science-centered enterprise in spirit and method. As such it is critical and objective in character. Its findings are co-operative and publicly verified. Its products are intersubjectively achieved and accepted. Its major interest is the problem of meaning with its train of implications. Meanings are socially engendered and used. Language (or signs) is the instrument of communication and therefore intersubjective. Bridgman tied up language with scientific method in his theory of Operationalism—the theory that the meaning of a term is found by a series or set of operations. A colleague illustrates the operational definition of a concept by saying that the definition of "pie" is a description of the operations when actually performed according to the recipe therefor. In this view meanings are

always pointers to concrete processes. Sentences, propositions, composed of terms operationally meaningful, and grammatically correct, which themselves stand the operational test are called *factual* or *empirical*; those that come short of the operational reference are *formal*. Of the latter class are the propositions of symbolic logic, mathematics, and syntax. Many formal propositions, however, parade themselves as factual. That "a thing cannot occupy two places at the same time," or that a podiatrist is a foot-doctor, are examples. The former proposition, the less obviously empty as to factual information, appears to state a principle about objects in the physical world. "*Two places* at the same time" requires definition. Since places are discriminable by the relationships of objects, and not otherwise, the proposition reduces itself to the statement that a thing cannot be two things at once—a tautology. The empirical impressiveness of such propositions is due to a conventional habit in the use of language. In other words the proposition is linguistic, not empirical; verbal, not factual.

For scientific empiricism philosophy is concerned with propositions, not with empirical data. Its sole function is the clarification of the meaning of propositions and their terms. In doing this three types of relationship must be considered: first, that of the symbols employed to one another and to other symbols of the language; second, that of the symbols to objects indicated; and, third, that of the symbols to persons who use them in the activity of communication. These linguistic aspects are known respectively as *syntactics*, *semantics*, and *pragmatics*. Taken together they constitute the science called *semiotic*. This logical analysis reveals propositions as factual or formal. In formal propositions, such as those of logic and mathematics, there is clearly no existential reference. Or, again, in the proposition: All podiatrists are foot-doctors, there is no difference between subject and predicate, the predicate being but a synonym for, a translation of, the subject term. In a factual sentence subject and predicate terms are not equivalent. Factual sentences are thus synthetic; formal sentences are analytic. For Carnap a factual proposition or sentence must refer to some fact and be expressed in meaningful terms.

Many formal propositions, we have said, masquerade as factual. When deflated they are seen as verbal. To repeat, their validity is but that of their fidelity to the conventional rules of language structure. James's illustration of the squirrel "going round the tree" (Chapter II of this text) is in point here. It exhibits the need for definition of the meaning of terms. The criterion by which this analysis is achieved is their reducibility to propositions about objects of experience. If not directly verifiable they must, by a route of translation or substitution,

by a chain of reduction, be reducible to experiential verification. Propositions capable of such reduction are factual; all others are verbal. By this technique most, if not all, of the propositions of traditional philosophy are emptied of their claimed reality content, are shown to be but pseudo-sentences. Scientific empiricism is thus anti-metaphysical.

There is another type of proposition such as many of those in literature, religion, and the arts, which, though not falling under the above twofold classification, do express states of the speaker and hence play a prominent part in social communication. To illustrate: someone says, "I am very happy." Such statement, behavioristically interpreted, is personally and socially significant and cognitive. "God is in his heaven and all is well with the world," expresses an equivalent fact about the speaker and is functionally significant though not cognitive in the above sense. The rationale employed by the experient is not that of scientific empiricism. Scientific empiricism does not deny the givenness and social significance of such evaluative experience. However, with sentences expressing these forms of experience scientific empiricism has not yet directly concerned itself.¹¹

It cannot be doubted that logical positivism offers a wholesome corrective to free-ranging assumptions and baseless mental constructions. Builders of metaphysical systems cannot proceed with their enterprise indifferent to the challenge of logical positivism.

10. INTUITIONISM

Immediacy, directness of access to truth and reality, is the common denominator in all uses of the term *intuition*. By it we are said to apprehend the real in degree beyond that of any other method of approach or of all methods combined. Pascal indicated the way in saying that "the heart hath its reasons which reason knoweth not." It is sometimes applied to skill in a certain area, which skill on slight reflection is revealed as nothing but capitalized experience; sometimes it refers to "up-rushes" from the subconscious, which is but a name for experience not in consciousness at the moment; it is frequently used as a synonym for mysticism wherein subject and object are blended into unity. The term is also applied to our knowledge of organic sensations such as those of movement and hunger, to knowledge of

¹¹ These paragraphs are based mainly on C. W. Morris, *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Scientific Empiricism*, *passim*. See also: A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic*, chap. ii; A. G. Ramsperger, *Philosophies of Science*, chap. viii; and topical references in *The Dictionary of Philosophy*, edited by D. D. Runes.

right and wrong, to aesthetic and religious experience. Direct access to the real is gained through the senses, called by Kant sensuous intuition. Then there is conceptual or rational intuition seen in the acceptance of axiomatic truth, so-called. Spinoza presents another type of intuition theory. For him there is but one substance—God. Things are “either attributes of God or affections” thereof. The more clearly we understand things “the more we understand God.” Intuitive knowledge is gained not by rare ecstatic experience, but by reflective penetration through appearances to substance or essence; to have it is to see things or actual existence “under the form of eternity” (*sub specie aeternitatis*).

Intuitions, be it observed, usually occur to the experient in his own specialized area. The “intuitions” of the physician in diagnosis, of an opponent in meeting a new type of attack, of the orator, or poet, are of this specialized type. The intuitions of the saint are not those of the scientist, nor are those of the artist those of the nonlover of form.

Poetic inspirations come, in anything like finished form, only to persons who have read poetry, studied it, and attempted to produce it; mathematical inspirations come to mathematicians only; musical inspirations come to musicians only.¹²

The experience of the religious mystic, furthermore, runs true to the tenets of his faith whether Protestant, Catholic, Jew, or Mohammedan. In other words, we qualify intuitions so far as they occur; they are not a new or preferred method of knowledge.

Passing over the wide prevalence of this idea in the history of philosophy we shall note briefly the view of Henri Bergson. He opposes instinct to intelligence; they face in opposite directions, the former inward toward life, the latter outward toward matter; and yet the two are complementary. For him the vegetative, the instinctive, and the rational are not three successive stages in the development of a tendency; they are rather “three divergent directions of an activity that split up as it grew.”¹³ Intellect is at home in the realm of solids, quantity. About these it has developed. Intellectual knowledge is of externals, is partial and fragmentary. Reality eludes the grasp of concepts and propositions. Instinct, on the other hand, is sympathy which enables one to enter absolutely into the flux of reality. Instinct “become disinterested, self-conscious” is intuition. He defines intuition of the discontinuous, of mechanics, of tool-making, and of matter and

¹² George A. Coe, *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 273.

¹³ *Creative Evolution*, p. 135.

as "the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."¹⁴ Intellect analyzes the immobile; intuition enables us to *enter into* mobility,¹⁵ into flux, into continuous change and novelty, which are of the essence of the real. Intellect fashions its concepts on the model of the lifeless, intuition is molded on life; the one is remote and formal, the other inward and intimate. Intellect can measure the breadth, depth, rate of flow, etc., of the river, but it cannot deal with flowing; intuition by sympathy *enters in* and feels the river essence, which is *rivering*. Intellect is the robot lover, whereas intuition enjoys by sympathetic participation the actual experience of loving. The miracle-working power of intuition Bergson expresses in the conviction that "intuition, if it could be prolonged beyond a few instants, would not only make the philosopher agree with his own thought, but also all philosophers with each other."¹⁶ *Mirabile dictu!*

11. MYSTICISM

Bergson with his doctrine of intuition appears to have stolen the whole show from the opponents of rational method in knowledge. Many authors in discussing mysticism illustrate their meaning with passages from Bergson. Perhaps mysticism is a glorified intuitionism. It may be that intuitionism is a method of knowledge, whereas mysticism is, in addition, a metaphysical theory. It may be, too, that intuition is more profane, whereas mysticism is more religious. Perhaps they differ in that mysticism in its "high experience" fuses subject and object, whereas intuition is less feelingful with the result that fusion of subject and object does not occur. It has been suggested that intuition is more active, mysticism in the main more passive; and again that the mystic way of attainment has a moral emphasis, whereas that of intuition is more strictly theoretical. Whatever their differences, they agree that knowledge is not exhausted by the routine processes of perception and reason.

Because of its close relationship to intuitionism little need be added concerning mysticism. That the term has been employed in different senses does not render it unique. The more philosophic use of the word differs in Plato, Spinoza, Kant, and Bergson. We shall pass over aspects of mysticism such as rational and practical, positive and nega-

¹⁴ *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 7.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

¹⁶ *Creative Evolution*, p. 238.

tive, etc., and note three forms—speculative, nature, and religious. The first is metaphysical. For Spinoza God is the abstract and ultimate unity. Nature mysticism finds expression in the poetry of Wordsworth, Shelley, and others. This type prevails in much Hindu thought where the ultimate goal is to be “one with the All,” or to be

Inarmed of Mother Nature.

Religious mysticism has a long history, from Plotinus to Meister Eckhart, St. Theresa, St. Francis, George Fox, and Rufus Jones. So closely has mysticism been associated with religion that for many people mysticism means religious mysticism. Mysticism is a common trait. Hard-boiled, logic-chopping minds without mystic taint are rare. There are signs that the next incoming tide may be a resurgence of the mystical. If so, it will be welcomed especially by souls easily overcome by intellectual fatigue, by those under control of an emotionalized will to peace, weary of struggle and the call to duty. In other words, it will mean individualism and isolationism.

For mysticism, then, knowledge is not “knowledge about,” it is “knowledge by participation,” by identification of self and its object. It is knowledge by insight into the actually real; it is inside knowledge. To have insight is to be inside. One wonders whether a state or condition, such as “unison with the Divine” in religious mysticism, i.e., complete fusion of self and God, should be called knowledge, to say nothing of its certainty. Knowledge as we know it must submit to verification, must undergo the test of truth. Such appears impossible to the “seventh heaven” experience of the mystic since his experience is so utterly different, so unutterable, indescribable, and incommunicable. Where differences have vanished and rational process is in utter abeyance nothing can be said, for *there* nothing is; all is a sublime blur or supreme blank. Even immediacy and directness are emasculated of meaning. This means that knowledge is not private, that it has a continuing characteristic which we call social or public. Were it not for this public character, verification could have no meaning.

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CHAPTER XI

TRUTH AND ERROR

A neighborhood merchant, named Sam, acquired his use of the English language somewhat late in life. As a consequence, in recommending his goods to a prospective purchaser he would say, "I tell you *de true*." By this Sam meant, "What I am saying is true." He was a better philosopher than he knew. For most of us the adjective *true* has a concreteness of meaning beyond that of the noun *truth*. *True* is specific, situational, and verifiable, whereas *truth* is general, remote, and abstract. As such, truth is a distillation of *true*s. An American humorist said, "It is better to know a few things that are so than a great many that are not so." This raises the question of the relation of knowledge and truth. To speak of true knowledge appears redundant. Yet it is not wholly so. The bulk of our knowledge is operational, functional; i.e., we live by it at another level than the intellectually critical. At the level of ordinary life our knowledge must stand the test or criticism of practical experience. When the question is raised as to whether our knowledge is really true, ours is then the intellectually critical, evaluating mind.

1. INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS

As truth is not identical with knowledge, neither is it identical with the object of knowledge, even though the concept *truth* is without meaning apart from some referent or object. Truth embraces an object, an interpretation, and a conviction that the interpretation is adequate to, explanatory of, the object or situation. What is it to explain? Suppose an event occurs about which there is mystery. A detective enters the case. His problem is to build up from all available data the actual setting within which the event occurred as an integral part. The case is explained in the degree to which the developing hypothesis or emergent meaning in the detective's mind is adequate to, grounded in, and supported by, the discovered actualities of the situation. This explanation is scientific and also true. "The Perfect Crime" of radio fame is imperfect in that some fact in the case contradicts the defense story at some point, thus proving the testimony to be false. Truth means fittingness, belongingness of the content of judgment, or belief expressed, to the whole situation involved. Truth is meaningless when predicated either of the content of belief or of the object of reference taken in isolation.

Logicians distinguish between truth and validity, or true and valid. *True* refers to content, *valid* to process. Take for an exaggerated example as premises the two propositions: "All men are quadrupeds" and "No men are rational"—each of which is false. The conclusion, that some quadrupeds are not rational, is both valid and true. Or, more accurately stated, the process or method by which the conclusion is gained is valid, while the content of the conclusion is true; i.e., it fits into, takes its place as a member in, the system of reality involved. The false, an outlaw masquerading as a member of the system, becomes, when discovered, an outcast. Error is less a logical concept than is validity. Validity means fidelity to certain laws in thought procedure. Were I to infer from "All men are vertebrate" and "All dogs are vertebrate" any relationship between men and dogs, such as "Some men are dogs," my procedure would be invalid. The fallacy involved would be known technically as "undistributed middle." Error occurs when the "given" in sense perception is misinterpreted. Frequently have I found myself in error when, attracted to professionally familiar words heading a newspaper column, I found on sampling the paragraph that they were used in an entirely different sense. Like falsehood, error is revealed when the content of belief fails to fit into the experience system. Truth and error, true and false, are the positive and negative aspects, respectively, of the adequacy or inadequacy of the meaning, as expressed in the proposition, to the situation in question. I see on the sideboard what is obviously an attractive pear. I take it, bite into it, and find a piece of shaped and painted wax. My judgment was in error; my experience did not fit into my immediate interest in the pear universe. Error is discovered when a conflict arises between a specific propositional content and the larger whole of one's experience.

Before taking up the typical criteria of truth, such as Correspondence, Coherence, the Pragmatic, and the Intuitional, we may note briefly one that until recently cut a large figure, viz., Authority. Authority shortened the careers of many adventurers into new realms of truth. It "got" Giordano Bruno and many others; it cramped the activities of Galileo. A medieval philosopher on being invited to look at the sunspots through a telescope declined, saying, "I have read Aristotle many times and assure you that there is nothing of the kind mentioned by him; be certain therefore that the spots which you have seen are in your eyes and not in the sun."¹ Authoritarianism, whether

¹ Quoted by Ralph M. Eaton, *Symbolism and Truth*, p. 173. See also A. D. White, *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom*, I, 13.

that of a church or a book, has had its day. The modern mind with its insistence on *being shown* is intolerant of any doctrine pedigreed upon prestige, numbers of its exponents, or its antiquity. We are intolerant of miracles except in science. All "truth" candidates for our acceptance and respect must undergo the laboratory test. The modern mind is neither docile nor submissive. What the fortunes of political authoritarianism are remains to be seen. It is not unlikely that it is destined to go the way of other forms of authority.²

2. CRITERIA OF TRUTH

a. Correspondence Theory

We come now to the Correspondence theory of truth. This theory has to do with the relation between a proposition and its referent. In expressing this relationship the proposition is said to copy, to parallel, to be in agreement with, to correspond to, to accord with, or to represent the external object or event in question. In such varied use we discover a vagueness of meaning of the relationship. How a mental existent, whether idea, belief, or judgment, can conform to or represent a physical object is not at all clear. Bertrand Russell's latest solution in brief is that truth is concerned with *statements*, whether in speech or writing. A statement is a publicised judgment. As such it is socially shared and its truth becomes publicly verifiable. He says:

A form of words is true if a person who knows the language is led to that form of words when he finds himself in an environment which contains features that are the meanings of those words, and these features produce reactions in him sufficiently strong for him to use words which mean them. Thus "a train leaves King's Cross at 10 A.M." is true if a person can be led to say, "It is now 10 A.M., this is King's Cross, and I see a train starting." The environment causes words, and words directly caused by the environment (if they are statements) are "true." What is called "verification" in science consists in putting oneself in a situation where words previously used for other reasons result directly from the environment.³

That there are difficulties with correspondence as the criterion of truth is rather obvious. What it means to say that truth is the agree-

² For an excellent chapter on authority, see Durant Drake, *Invitation to Philosophy*, chap. i, and bibliography at close.

³ Bertrand Russell, *An Outline of Philosophy*, p. 273.

ment of thought with reality is certainly not evident. I believe that Wellington won over Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815. The truth of my belief can be demonstrated only by contemporary evidence. This confirmation of belief by earlier belief offers no difficulty until we inquire as to the relation of the contemporary belief to the declared fact. Then the problem reappears. We can understand a map or aerial photograph as a "copy" of a certain area, or we can understand the agreement of one judgment with another, but in the dualism of thought and thing to say the mental content is a copy of, that it corresponds to, or agrees with, the external thing is not convincingly clear. Professor Patrick suggests that we substitute for *correspondence* the term *fidelity*.⁴ Truth he would then define as "fidelity to objective reality." At first blush this term seems to "reduce" the dislocation. Later one wonders whether its virtue consists in its soothing quality. Again, two English thinkers⁵ have substituted *accordance* for correspondence. The former (Ewing) thinks that accordance avoids the notion of "a set of discrete entities in the judging mind" which somehow corresponds to the external object, that it brings into focus the activity of judging rather than a propositional content. In this way we can say "our judging accords with reality." Truth is thus the accordance of our judging activity with the reality in question. For the latter (Wisdom) the act of judging is not identical with the facts, for the self is an element in the judging activity and is not in the fact, nor does it include the fact. His view is that the elements of the objective situation "are identical with the objective constituents in my judgment," and that "the order of the elements in the judgment reflects the order of the elements in the fact" or objective situation.

A criticism of the correspondence theory frequently made may be presented as follows: This theory in substance assumes a dualism of mental events and external objects, of inner and outer. Correspondence says that truth means the conformity of the mental process of judging to the outer fact. The question arises as to how we know when this concord obtains. To achieve this there must be some unmediated, direct apprehension of the outer object. In such direct grasp of the real evidently there is no occasion for the correspondence theory. The knowledge gained by immediacy that our judgments do or do not represent or correspond to the fact transcends the theory itself. Ewing⁶ questions the validity of this criticism. It applies to corre-

⁴ G. T. W. Patrick, *Introduction to Philosophy* (rev. ed.), p. 374.

⁵ A. C. Ewing, *Idealism: A Critical Survey*, pp. 207 f., and John Wisdom, *Problems of Mind and Matter*, pp. 194 ff.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 198.

spondence as "the criterion of truth," but not to its usual use as constitutive of "the nature of truth." This whole problem is a carry-over from Locke's representationalism. To say nothing of his ideas as the objects of knowledge, there may well lurk a fallacy in conceiving of the external object as an in-itself entity wholly nonmental in character. To define truth as "correspondence of thought with something outside thought"⁷ is to deny the possibility of truth. Any direct apprehension of an outer object for purposes of finding correspondence between it and judgmental activity implies some degree of common denominator of a cognitive character. Truth determination, then, is no longer a matter of finding correspondence between two incommensurables. For the pragmatist the relation in question would be interpreted as functional.

What about the nature of a perceived object or observed fact? Is our perception a replica of a wholly objective independent fact? Are we in perception confronted by facts, or do our perceived objects contain large elements of constructive imagination? That our perceived objects or facts are not wholly "given" has been clearly illustrated by John McMurray in *The Boundaries of Science*. On entering a room he approaches a table on which a blue vase stands near the edge. He admires it and on turning around he hears a crash. On turning again he sees the vase shattered on the floor. When asked what happened, he replies, "I knocked the blue vase off the table and broke it." This is the fact in the case for him. This "fact" was not a "given," it was a constructed fact; imagination played a part. His direct sensory experience consisted of two visual sensations, a slight sense of touch on his elbow as he turned from the table, and a sensation of sound. Briefly, out of his unrelated sensations of sight, touch, and sound, by filling in the intervals between these direct sense experiences, he constructed through the use of his imagination the declared fact, "I broke the blue vase." So-called facts without imaginative construction are fictions. On this basis the correspondence theory of truth appears wholly inadequate.

b. Coherence Theory

The kinship of correspondence theory to realism is perfectly obvious. That a like kinship obtains between Coherence theory and idealism needs no elaboration. Again, the correspondence theory of truth is more or less explicitly dualistic; i.e., thinking is one thing, the object in question is another. On the other hand the coherence theory is, in

⁷ Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 190.

tendency at least and ultimately, monistic; i.e., thought and reality are one and the same. Coherence as a criterion of truth means that an idea in order to be true must fit into the system of ideas in connection with which the idea in question appears. When such idea fails to enter as a harmonious element of the system it is usually rejected as false. The adventitious idea is sacrificed to the system. Occasionally, however, this does not occur. The backers or promoters of the idea sometimes resist and win against the system when experimental or other data support their conviction. For thirteen hundred years the Ptolemaic view that the earth was the center of the universe prevailed. A counteridea of long incubation finally gained expression in Copernicus. Not the earth, but the sun was the center. Supported by Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and others, the "dreadful heresy" finally triumphed. The authority of verifiable facts displaced that of sacred texts. Among others who staggered traditional truth were Darwin and Einstein.

There are two types of coherence, logical and metaphysical. Logical coherency is formal; it obtains in logic and mathematics. The laws of thought⁸ are formal. They declare that if A is A (Identity), A cannot at the same time and in the same sense be not-A (Noncontradiction) and that between two contradictory propositions there is no middle ground, i.e., that an object of thought must be either A or not-A (Excluded Middle). In propositional form, the sheet of paper on which I write is either ruled or not-ruled; it cannot be both, it must be one or the other. Logical coherence is an implicatory system; it is of the *if . . . then* type. If it is true that "All X is Y," it is true that some X is Y, that some X is not not-Y, that no X is not-Y, that some Y is X, that some not-Y is not-X, etc. All these propositions are consistent: they are of equal validity and truth. For like reasons if it is true that "All X is Y," such propositions as some X is not Y, no X is Y, or some not-Y is X are false. Again, in Euclidean geometry we began with definitions, postulates, and axioms. On this set-up the whole system of propositions was developed with maximum consistency and inner harmony. To attempt to make $2+2=5$ is to threaten the temple of arithmetic and invite self-confusion, if not destruction. To add 2 and 2 as equalling 5 is, when detected, error on my part. It does not cohere with or fit into the system; the result is false. In logical coherency truth and error depend respectively upon our fidelity or faithlessness to the basic principles involved.

⁸ See Chapter III.

The logical theory of coherence is a "one-way consistency."⁹ All consistency is that of conclusions with premises, but what of the premises themselves? Self-evidence is the only answer. Metaphysical coherence meets the difficulty by interpreting reality as a self-sustaining system in which there are no preferred claims. Every constituent of the system is interdependent and interdeterminative. The elements are mutually involved even as to their several being; they have meaning as interdependent members of a larger whole of meaning, which whole is constituted of these members and depends upon nothing outside. The multitudinous activities in the preparation for, and execution of, an R.A.F. dash over enemy industrial cities are interrelated; they constitute a system of meaning within which each finds meaning. Such mutuality of non-indifference, of interpropositional dependence, is what objective idealism means by truth. What lacks this capacity for sharing, for entering in, is of the nature of error or falsehood.

In the matter of truth, however, there are two points of view, the partial and the whole, *our* truth and *absolute* truth. Our view is partial because of preoccupation; that of the Absolute is whole. Our units are lesser wholes; the absolute whole is single, unique. Our little systems have their day; the experience of the Absolute is one and timeless. Doolittle's flight over Tokyo and Byrd's polar expedition are two of our lesser wholes. We, as it were, cut these out of the context of experience and set them up as units by themselves, forgetful of their long antecedents and significant consequences. Wolfe's victory over Montcalm at Quebec had a setting within which the historic event occurred and had its meaning. To these it was internally related. Because we segment our experience we think of events as externally related. For us they have calendar dates; for the Absolute they are elements in an Eternal Now. It is a difference of perspective, of the time-span of consciousness.¹⁰ Because of our finitude and fragmentary point of view our truths are partial and incomplete. Our more vehement affirmations of truth as absolute, we forget, are in reference to a limited universe of discourse, or selected area of interest. Under wider perspective our absolute truths of an earlier level need retouching. Failure to remember this yields error. Our truths are relative, they suffer the limitations of our perspective; truth is a matter of degree.

⁹ See D. S. Robinson, *Introduction to Living Philosophy*, p. 104 and throughout chap. iv, Pt. II. Although I have used coherence and consistency largely as synonyms, yet a distinction might be made in that consistency means an inner logical sequence in a series, whereas coherence might apply rather externally to elements not in immediate sequence in a series, or to elements in two different series within the same field.

¹⁰ See Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, Lecture III.

In modern phrase, "we are on our way" to wholeness of truth. In our progress toward absolute truth all imperfection of perspective will gradually disappear until knower and known shall be one, the rational and the real will be identical, or, continuing Hegel's thought, "The truth is the whole," the inner systematic coherence of the All.

Coherence as logical consistency is unsatisfactory as a criterion of truth. Within a limited area falsehood may cohere. An innocent man may be "framed" and sent to prison or to death. Different geometries may each be self-consistent and so far true, yet conceivably be without other than logical significance. We can imagine two violently opposed philosophies, say absolute idealism and pragmatism, each self-consistent but neither necessarily true. Kant's antinomies are offered as "Exhibit A" of the bankruptcy of reason, where each of two contradictory propositions is thought to be consistently demonstrated.

May not so vasty a concept as the "systematic coherence of the All," or of "experience as a whole," be but a species of self-deception, a subtle substitution of emotion for thought? At least such totality of experience is possible only to the Absolute. And yet, to speak of an all-inclusive Being, outside whom nothing is, in whom truth and reality, mind and its objects, are merged—all this seems a retreat from, an utter abandonment of, experience. Then, to save us from futility and despair there are degrees of truth. Likewise the objects of our knowledge severed from the All lack real reality—they are but partially real. Our deprivation is compensated for by an excess, a glut of truth and reality in the Absolute. Truth and reality are then for us relative. Since our perspectives are partial, our concepts fragmentary, one wonders as to the real status and fortune of the self in the unity of the all-embracing Absolute. What of the reality of error and evil? Do they exist in the timeless experience of the Absolute? Is it possible that in resisting evil we are fighting straw men? Possibly Christian Science is correct. Acceptance of absolute idealism's doctrine of truth and reality is possible to souls of a certain heroic mold. It may be, however, that some less ultimate and abstract, some more concrete and verifiable view of truth can satisfy our theoretical and practical needs. Such quest leads to pragmatism.

c. Pragmatic Theory

In a very well-known statement James says, "True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we can not."¹¹ Again, an idea "makes itself true, gets itself

¹¹ *Pragmatism*, p. 201.

classed as true, by the way it works."¹² Once more, "The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events."¹³ While Hendrik Hudson's three vessels were still at anchor in the lower bay of the river that now bears his name, he had an idea, we are told, that by sailing up the river he would find an opening on the left that would lead him out to the Pacific. We may observe parenthetically as a very early Eastern idea that there is little, if anything, to be reckoned with west of the Palisades. Was this idea true or false when first entertained? is the question. The absolutist would pronounce it false. The logical positivist would declare it a nonsensical or *pseudo*-problem. To affirm or deny the truth of an idea before its truth status is empirically determined is a very doubtful indulgence. Pragmatism would say that this idea until verified by experience, by consequences, was neither true nor false; its status may be described by saying that it just *was*; only as its adequacy was in process of empirical determination did it enter the truth relationship and thereby become false. To verify an idea is to follow its leading and see if it satisfies the need or meets the purpose that called it into being. On this empirical basis the claimed truth of an idea is adjudged as true or false. "Trial and error," or "trial and success," is pragmatism's method. In the preceding chapter some distinctions were drawn between the views of James, Dewey, and Schiller. For our present purpose we may say the three agree that the truth of an idea is determined not by its fidelity to, its consistency with, or its duplication of, some already existing closed system of absolute truth, but by the simple practical test of its adequacy to the situation which generated the hypothetical idea or judgment in question.

Much criticism has been heaped upon the concept of "satisfactory working." In substance this criticism claims that the test of "satisfactory working" is subjective and short-range, i.e., is individual and temporary. Neither of the following two statements justifies this criticism: first, "Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of experience's demands, nothing being omitted."¹⁴ Again, "Pragmatism, so far from keeping her eyes bent on the immediate practical foreground, as she is accused of doing, dwells just as much upon the world's remotest perspectives."¹⁵ The test of "satisfactory working" is neither instantaneous nor individual; it implies the

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 64.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

long look and public laboratory confirmation. Of this, Dewey says, speaking of James, "His real doctrine, I think, is that a belief is true when it satisfies *both* personal needs *and* the requirements of objective things."¹⁶ Insistence upon experimental verification, Sheldon thinks, is

the one great contribution of pragmatism . . . and it would seem petty and mean to overlook its value and to confine ourselves only to the somewhat one-sided metaphysics which accompanies the gift . . . ; but we do say that verification of a principle by its concrete effects in the particulars is a *sine qua non* of any proper philosophy.¹⁷

Pragmatism brought philosophy, the indulgence of the few, from the empyrean and the ivory tower to the streets and haunts of men; it redirected reflective thought from the pursuit of truth for truth's sake to truth, as apprehension of the actual, for the sake of improving man's condition. Pragmatism is a wholesome antidote to the rampant and extravagant idealistic metaphysics that prevailed at the beginning of this century. In its emphasis upon human participation in the making of reality it urges men to share in the creation of a better social and moral order. This is the keynote in that admirable little book, Dewey's *A Common Faith*. In pragmatism's emphasis upon the future rather than on the past, man is no longer a wilderness wanderer exiled from home; he dwells in and is the builder of a better city; his pride is in posterity rather than in ancestry. In its method pragmatism is in step with the spirit of the time.

Probably the greatest storm of protest centers about pragmatism's doctrine of truth. It is not at all evident that the nature of truth is one with the criterion by which it is determined. James, in speaking of the truth of an idea, says, "Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its *verification*. Its validity is the process of its *valid-ation*." And again, "Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification-processes."¹⁸ One can say, at least, that the identification of verity, verification, and validity is not conducive to clearness. Someone's age is uncertain, let us say. That he is of some age is certain. Now the problem is to make certain his uncertain age. This finally is accomplished by means of records, testimony, events, etc. The validated "true" age is now identical with the originally uncertain age. In this its truth consists. The real or actual age is not constituted

¹⁶ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, V (Jan. - Dec., 1908), 96.

¹⁷ W. H. Sheldon, *Strife of Systems and Productive Duality*, pp. 284 f.

¹⁸ *Pragmatism*, pp. 201, 218.

by the validating process; it is confirmed thereby. In so far as the process of verification implies the possibility of a truth arrival, to that degree verity and verification are not the same. Verity is an aspect of the conclusion gained by valid verification processes and therefore the two are not synonymous. To limit truth to the "verifying process" is to indulge in an abstraction condemned by pragmatism itself.

A further difficulty is encountered by many in the use of the word truth as "satisfaction." Suppose some civic problem is assigned to a committee for solution. They agree upon and execute a plan satisfactory to the citizens. Does it not seem an undue extension of the term to speak of the plan as true? Good or adequate would seem to be more fitting descriptives. Montague says with respect to this problem that satisfactions "are either cognitive or non-cognitive." To say that what satisfies thought needs is true is but uttering the obvious and to speak of what satisfies noncognitive needs as true is "palpably false."¹⁹ In contrast to high idealism, is pragmatism a sightless burrowing in the ground? In its stress upon truth as satisfaction is it little more than a "pig philosophy"? In consequences as a criterion of truth does pragmatism provide for knowledge of the past? Has its prevailingly biological emphasis caused it to neglect or reduce to by-products the formative ideals of religion, morality, and art? As to the justice of these suggested criticisms, among others, the careful student will ponder for himself.

d. Intuition Theory

This is the theory of the self-evidence of truth. It belongs to the class of "non-propositional truth" later referred to. Starbuck presents a view that appears to belong here.²⁰ He speaks of the "intimate senses as sources of wisdom." There are five of these—pain, temperature, equilibrium, kinaesthetic, and organic, all of equal pedigree with the traditional five, making ten in all. The kinaesthetic and organic are among the oldest of these, biologically speaking. They condition our basic types of behavior—fighting, pursuit of wealth, love, worship, etc. "The organic sense is almost purely of the intimate type." As an intimate sense it reports to consciousness immediately inner conditions and "qualities of objects together with cues of right response." That I am hungry or thirsty, that foods are palatable, and that the temperature pleases, "are immediate verities." This immediacy is intuitional in character; it is not unrelated to mystical experience. May it not be

¹⁹ W. P. Montague, *The Ways of Knowing*, p. 157.

²⁰ E. D. Starbuck, "The Intimate Senses as Sources of Wisdom," *The Journal of Religion*, Vol. I, No. 2 (March, 1921).

that mysticism has large biological and organic factors?

We may note here what Reid calls "Non-Propositional Truth."²¹ By this he means that we sometimes experience realities accompanied by a "feeling of wholes," which feeling cannot be expressed in propositions. This occurs in aesthetic experience, in religion and poetry, in art creation of whatever kind, in the kinaesthetics of the dance and swimming. There is in these forms an immediacy and fulfillment of experience comparable to any more purely intellectual form and, though inexpressible in propositional form, as worthy to be called true. In fact, this feeling of wholes antedates our explicit judgments concerning the qualities of these wholes. Propositions are pointers to things. Propositional truth is partial; aesthetic experience is immediate and full, is of a harmonious whole, and therefore true. Thus for Reid knowledge is a more comprehensive concept than intellectual truth. One can but think of Bergson as he follows Reid's thinking here.

Somewhat to the same effect, though more metaphysical and mystical, is a quotation from Fritz Kreisler:

Some of the loftiest aspirations of the human soul are reserved to those who have the great gift of musical expression, for they thereby lift themselves out of a material world and enter a spiritual one. In holding communion with the great composers, who were surely instruments in the hands of a divine power, we are enabled to express something of the infinite. Whether I play in public in the midst of thousands or in the privacy of my own room, I forget everything except my music. Whenever I am lifted out of the material plane and come in touch with another, a holier world, it is as if some hand other than mine were directing the bow over the strings.²²

One is here reminded of Browning's "Abt Vogler" when he says:

But God has a few of us whom he whispers in the ear;
The rest may reason and welcome: 'Tis we musicians
know.

By way of summary we may say: Truth for modern authoritarianism means verifiable experience, no longer agreement with traditional authority, whether of person, institution, or book; for the correspondence theory it means accordance with objective fact; for coherence it is a self-sustaining system of inner relations; for prag-

²¹ L. A. Reid, *Knowledge and Truth*, chap. ix.

²² Robinson, *Introduction to Living Philosophy*, p. 130.

matism it means guidance to desired and satisfying consequences; for intuitionism it is immediacy, self-verifying in character.

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CHAPTER XII

FREEDOM OF THE SELF

1. CHANGE IN THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

Our problem here in its older form was the Freedom of the Will. Moritz Schlick, the parent of logical positivism, thinks that the time and energy spent on the "freedom of the will" is "one of the greatest scandals of philosophy." He would "be ashamed to write a chapter on freedom." To avoid this he writes a chapter entitled "When Is a Man Responsible?"¹ Since psychology no longer thinks of the will as a special faculty, but rather as an aspect of the whole self, seeking to satisfy desire and need, the more substantial problem of the freedom of the self has taken the place formerly occupied by the freedom of the will. For Hobbes it is "the liberty of the man," not that "of the will, desire, or inclination."² For Locke the question, "whether man's will be free or no" is insignificant, and unintelligible; the proper question is "whether a man be free."³ "My will of this moment is my total conscious self with all of its predispositions, habits, feelings, desires, aims, and ideals expressing itself here and now in concrete effort."⁴ Otherwise stated, my acts are free when they are *mine*.

2. THE FACT OF EVIL

Not that the freedom of the will was not significant according to the prevailing psychology. It was very much so. That issue was centered in the Christian era about the problem of evil. To the actuality or reality of moral evil no unprejudiced mind takes exception. Witness world conditions today. International confidence and good will are practically gone. The Rome-Berlin-Tokyo accord was a means to an end and was not an end in itself; i.e., it was not an expression of good will, it was a "build-up" based upon situational need and self-interest. For us evil is a monster fact of experience. To attempt to discount its reality by attributing it, as some absolute idealists have done, to our fragmentary point of view, to our lack of perspective, is not only an offense to intelligence; it cuts the taproot of the moral problem. The fact of evil on the one hand and the assumption of an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God on the other seem to require expla-

¹ See his *Problems of Ethics*, chap. vii.

² Hobbes, *Selections*, ed. F. J. E. Woodbridge, p. 370.

³ *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, chap. xxi, secs. 14, 21.

⁴ W. G. Everett, *Moral Values*, p. 353.

nation. In other words we have (1) a good and all-powerful, all-knowing Deity, and (2) a causally related universe within which free-willed man is, and where evil obtains. To free Deity from responsibility for evil is a historic theological problem. From another angle, we have a world wherein causation reigns and within it man, a moral being assuming responsibility for his own conduct. How reconcile or overcome this disharmony within the whole, that of free will, whose essence is responsibility, within a causal series? Planck states it thus: "How can the independence of human volition be harmonized with the fact that we are integral parts of a universe which is subject to the rigid order of Nature's laws?"⁵ With this we are concerned in the present chapter.

3. FREEDOM AND CAUSALITY

We have already observed⁶ that cause is no longer to be interpreted as an agency or compelling force. Causal laws mean and express man's discovery of regularity or uniformity in groups or areas of natural events. Bertrand Russell says, "By a 'causal law' I mean any general proposition in virtue of which it is possible to infer the existence of one thing or event from the existence of another or of a number of others."⁷ For instance, aberrations in the orbit of the planet Uranus demanded as explanation the presence of some interfering or attracting body operating from a definite angle. Thus Neptune was discovered. For Eddington, "the common regular association of cause and effect is a matter of experience; the law of causality is an extreme generalization suggested by this experience." And, he adds, "Such generalizations are always risky."⁸ We have also observed that events are laterally as well as linearly related. By this we mean that while we single out an element in a setting and call it an effect its cause may be a complex of associated factors, not a single factor. The meaning of causality, then, is that events, mental as well as physical, are conditioned, i.e., determined. So far, for free will, so-called, there is no place.

Recent concepts in physics leave the door ajar; "a chink of daylight appears sufficient to justify a reorientation of our attitude to the problem."⁹ Among these is the concept that laws are statistical rather than exact, no longer known as constitutive or operative, that they are generalizations from experience and, as such, "always risky." One feels like inquiring whether the satisfactory working of statistical laws may not imply or suggest a basis not unlike that hitherto expressed as

⁵ *Where Is Science Going?*, p. 107.

⁶ Chapter IV.

⁷ *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, p. 213.

⁸ *New Pathways in Science*, p. 74.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

causal relationship. In this passage from the *certainty* of exact deterministic laws to the *probability* of statistical laws we find the possibility that human behavior is not "completely predetermined." Compton¹⁰ and Eddington come near interpreting the uncertainty of physical nature's behavior as the certainty of human freedom. The logician might caution us about the risk of inferring from uncertainty in the microscopic world to certainty in the macroscopic. What has just been said implies two other recent modifying concepts in physics, viz., Planck's Quantum Theory and Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy. If, as Eddington says, "the law of causality does not exist in science today,"¹¹ then our problem no longer exists. If this law still obtains, as Planck and Einstein believe, then our problem remains and demands further reflection.

Freedom is a term of varied use and therefore of obscure meaning. We are familiar with freedom ethical, psychological, metaphysical, and political. If we refer only to the Greeks, Socrates represents the ethical. The wise man alone is free. He who is controlled by desire is wicked and enslaved. Plato is more psychological in his stress upon freedom as ability to choose between alternatives. This capacity to choose is for Aristotle the basis of ethical responsibility. Epicurus denied universal causation and found place for "uncaused occurrence" in nature. In this area of the "uncaused," man enjoyed freedom. The immediacy and urgency of political freedom scarce require illustration.¹² Coming to more recent thought we may note that for Hobbes, on account of his materialistic psychology, freedom meant the absence of external opposition or hindrance to a man in doing what he wills to do. In other words, it meant the absence of external restraint or impediment to motion in a man's effort to accomplish his will. Freedom applies only to bodies subject to motion. It is the man, therefore, who is free, not his will. "A freeman is he, who in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to."¹³ Descartes affirmed that the physical world was completely determined, whereas the will was, mysteriously yet intuitively, absolutely free. For Locke men's estate by nature, the original of political power, is that of equality and "perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man."¹⁴ In this emphasis Locke approaches

¹⁰ *The Freedom of Man*.

¹¹ *New Pathways in Science*, p. 300.

¹² See W. A. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, tr. J. H. Tufts, pp. 190-195.

¹³ Hobbes, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

¹⁴ *Of Civil Government*, Bk. II, chap. ii.

the presocial atomism of Hobbes. That "all men are born free and equal" has a familiar sound to Americans. Rousseau begins Chapter I of *The Social Contract* with the well-known words, "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains." His *Émile* begins with "Everything is good as it comes from the hand of the Creator; everything degenerates in the hand of man." Taking these two sentences together Rousseau means that "man is born for freedom" in contrast to the sorry conditions of his day and, we might add, of today. For Kant there were two worlds, the sensuous and the supersensuous—the world of phenomena or appearances, and the world of noumena or things-in-themselves. Man is a citizen of both worlds. Throughout the former, causal law reigns; in the latter, which transcends the causal order, man is free. Freedom is a postulate of morality, of the practical reason. Our use of freedom is in the main ethical and psychological.

I shall not attempt a definition of freedom here, but shall hope that its meaning may become evident in the progress of the exposition. Whatever freedom as an ethical concept is, it is not synonymous with lawless, capricious conduct. In a virtuous act, according to Aristotle, the doer must not only know what he is doing, and choose to do it, but his act must, in addition, be "an instance of a settled and immutable moral state." It is this last requirement that is important here. A single event or happening, a cross section of a process or stream, could not reveal law or uniformity. Aristotle says, "As one swallow or one day does not make a spring, so one day or a short time does not make a fortunate or happy man."¹⁵ Plurality of events, of cross sections, of swallows and days is essential to the concept of law. Continuity also is implied, in freedom or slavery, in lawfulness or even in lawlessness. Freedom is meaningless in respect to an isolated sporadic act. In fact, it is persons who are free; acts probably never are. If an act is the expression of a person, it is *his* expression and is therefore caused.

4. FREEDOM AND LAW

Whatever freedom is, it is not necessarily antagonistic to a lawful order. Even doubting physicists live in the macrocosm *as if* causality obtained there. The fact appears to be that freedom must square itself with a causally determined world. In other words, freedom is within the realm of law and is possible through law. My freedom is not hampered or impeded by my being in a lawful world. In being what I am, I am that being in and by virtue of the ordered universe within which my being and becoming are found. When, on a third floor, I


¹⁵ *The Nicomachean Ethics*, tr. Welldon, Bk. II, chap. iii, and Bk. I, chap. vi.

wish to go to the ground floor, the law of gravity not only does not hinder my freedom; it guarantees it in that through knowledge of gravity I do not step out of the window but descend either by stairway or elevator. While we are making slow progress in controlling gravity, we shall probably never overcome it. To rebel against *my* world is *self*-rebellion, whose logic may well be suicide. My freedom is always within some area, and always with respect to some aspect of it. In the sphere of arithmetic my freedom is not limited by the fact that, to suit my convenience, I cannot make $2 + 2 = 5$ in striking my credit balance at the bank. The fact that, given $A > B$ and $B > C$, I am not at liberty to conclude that $C > A$, is no limitation of my intellectual freedom. Rather, that I cannot so conclude is the best guarantee of that freedom. That I am not at liberty to go through a stop light gives assurance of further freedom in the world of automobile driving. My freedom is within my citizenship obligations. That I hunger and need food, that I cannot fly, are not limitations of my freedom since they are constitutive modes of my behavior as a physiological and motor being. No, freedom, I repeat, is within the system in which I am, of which I am a part, and within which my problems appear.

5. FREEDOM, CHOICE, AND CHANCE

Freedom is not a synonym for chance; neither is determinism synonymous with compulsion. Freedom, rather, is opposed to compulsion and fatalism, whereas the opposite of determinism is chance. Compulsion means constraint. A bandit offers me a choice between my money and my life. This restricted range of choice with its specious freedom is between two evils, neither of which would be chosen apart from the coercive circumstances. Were one in such a situation rash enough to refuse to make a choice or to choose to keep his money he would probably lose both alternatives. Here coercion approaches fatalism. Fatalism asserts that the cosmos in every phase of its being and behavior exhibits an irrevocably fixed order. In such a system there neither is nor can be any freedom. There man is but a pawn on the chessboard of fate. On the other hand, freedom in an altogether undetermined universe is equally unthinkable. A world where events occurred by chance would be a chaos; there could be no freedom there. Where freedom is, there is choice between alternatives, with consequences attending either choice. In an utterly undetermined world there could be no such thing as consequences. Choice without consequences, subjective or objective, would be meaningless. In choosing between alternatives one expresses the kind of self he is and in his choice gives determination to the self he shall be. Choice and chance

are at opposite poles; the former is deterministic, the latter is lawless and chaotic. In a chance world, if such were possible, there could be no unity, no certainty, no regularity or order, no dependence on anything, and, therefore, no expectation. To speak of freedom in such a chaotic atomism of discrete happenings is to use the term without reflective meaning, is to play fast and loose with words. In his choices a man is both determined and free. His choices and conduct are determined by what he is; he is free in that his choices and acts are *his*. The following illustration may prove helpful.



Let A—B represent my life span. I am at the point B. I find myself confronted with two alternatives C and D, between which I must make choice. It is not a dramatic conflict of two objective ideas or desires of which I am a mere observer. The conflict is mine; it focuses in me. C and D are projections, in a given situation in which I must act, of possible alternative courses of action. How shall the choice be finally made after, or in the course of, due reflection? During the time A—B something has been happening to me. At B I am weighted; I am like the loaded die preferentially disposed in my action. Bergson would say that at B all my past is gathered up and active, that the real self at B is total, spherical perhaps, rather than linear. The solution is accomplished much like the choice of a new hat. I try one on and view the effect, then another. In the above figure I imaginatively project myself to C and then view the situation, then to D, and because of what "has been happening to me," because of the kind of person I have become and am, the more fitting one is chosen. "Superficially, the deliberation which terminates in choice is concerned with weighing the values of particular ends. Below the surface, it is a process of discovering what sort of being a person most wants to become."¹⁶ And, one might add, the discovery of what one wishes to be reveals the kind of person one is. I am free, to make my choice within the limits of what I am; I am the free cause of my choice. My freedom in choosing D rather than C, and the impossibility under the circumstances of my choosing C, consist in the fact that the choice is *mine*, that I choose, and choose in accord with what I am. Later

¹⁶ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics* (new ed.), p. 317; see whole chap. xv. Also, Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 303-313.

inquiry often asks whether I might have chosen C rather than D. This is not an irrelevant matter. The answer is, No. Looking back over the interval of time I forget the circumstances under which the self I then was acted as I did and am apt to reply, "Yes, I might probably have chosen C." I forget that the self I now am is not the self that I then was, that I was *self*-constrained to act as I did, and that in loyalty to that self as a moral being I could not have done other.

Time's wheel spins on, twisting from nature's distaff
The threads upon her spindle.
These strands, in turn, in life's great loom
Yield changing personal patterns.

These we are. 'Tis interesting at times
To view the fashion of the weaving
And see whereto we tend.

Such survey of the self doth profit oft
While yet the loom weaves on.
The weavers we, the woven too,
Designers of our destiny.

Perhaps a negative note should be sounded here. Possibly our moral idealism leads us too far beyond the facts. It is true that our action follows upon and in line with our choice, but what of the choice itself? Does it unquestionably and completely represent myself? Are my choice and action backed one hundred per cent by desire? The whole problem of conduct is not so simple. The psychic order is not (1) alternative desires between which a judgment must be made, (2) an evaluating process yielding a cold judgment that overcomes and eliminates all conflict of desires, where desires submissively are reduced to an intellectually approved desire, which (3) finds completely satisfying expression in action. Not so; desire is insatiate, it does not die at sunset. It is not unlike one long absent on ending a visit in the old home, his life recentered far, who, turning lingeringly away, finds farewell with pain and pleasure mingled. A completely free and integrated self is an ideal, not an actuality. The life of the actual self is more or less a compromise. We enjoy degrees of freedom.

6. FREEDOM AN ACHIEVEMENT

Freedom then is not a datum, not an endowment; it is something to be achieved. It is not an external fact; it is an internal condition. It is not freedom *from* external conditions; it is freedom *within* such conditions to become the kind of self I wish to be. The free man is

he who not only is unhampered by environment but who remakes conditions, when necessary, into steppingstones to freedom. Freedom is more than a subjective emotional state, it has objective determinants; it means congruity between inner desire and need and outer circumstance. This congruity is achieved through the reciprocal influence of the self that is, and is becoming, and objective circumstance. In the thought of Dewey, we must think and act our way into freedom. It is won not by way of withdrawal or of isolation from the world, but through reflective grappling with its problems. The engineer moves freely in the machinery maze about him because of his creative understanding. There is a maximum of congruity between him and his environment. In this his freedom consists. Freedom is won in the stream of the world's life (*in dem Strom der Welt*) and must ever be won anew. The youth venturing forth into a wider and untried world seeks a new freedom. His response to an inner urge expresses a will to freedom beyond the attained. In the processes of adjustment to new situations through the exercise of intelligent action he becomes a self other than he was. Freedom for him is by way of advance and inclusion, not of retreat and exclusion. He would win his freedom by living dangerously rather than safely. Freedom is not *from* but *to*, or, possibly, it is *to* and therefore *from*. We grow into freedom, we become free.

7. FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY

Responsibility implies freedom. These concepts are inseparable. Self-reproach and remorse over conduct imply responsibility. "If a man's action did not represent his character but an arbitrary freak of some unaccountable power of unmotivated willing, why should he be ashamed of it or reproach himself with it?"¹⁷ Criminal law assumes responsibility. It, theoretically at least, expresses the approvals and disapprovals of the constituents within its jurisdiction. Punishment is determined according to the degree of responsibility. Babies, imbeciles, and insane are not punished for misdemeanors, because they lack responsibility. Their actions are fitful, impulsive. There is in them no continuing, abiding, or controlling self whose the actions are. Babies as yet have no selves. Selfhood is an attainment; it gets under way at first through the interplay of hereditary factors and socially selected environmental pressures. Gradually outer selection and control are taken over; selfhood and responsibility are in process of emergence. Imbeciles and insane persons are properly called "defectives"; they

¹⁷ T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics* (2nd ed.), p. 113.

lack the rational tissues connecting their acts which would make them persons, i.e., calculable and responsible in conduct. A responsible person may by disease or accident become irresponsible. By this we mean that his continuity of selfhood or character has been interfered with, that his conduct is no longer in line with the dependable self we knew him to be, that his character does not mark, is not expressed in, his acts. Responsibility implies that my actions are planned, thought out in advance, and therefore mine. Our automatic acts are habitual and therefore expressive of the self. My freedom and responsibility are at a maximum when acts express purposes and plans deliberately thought out by me.

Apart from the assumption of freedom, of accountability, of responsibility, reward is without meaning, punishment is but a species of brutality. Although reward refers to present and past conduct, it also has important future bearings. It doubtless will, in the first place, establish in the person rewarded more firmly the meritorious type of conduct and, further, may inspire in others the will to live on such deserving level. Punishment was once retributive in character; it was administered because of deeds done. It was of the type—an eye for an eye. Kant was an exponent of the view that judicial punishment is retributive, not reformatory. Punishment is meted out neither as a means of reforming the transgressor nor as a deterrent to possible violators, but because the offender “has committed murder and so must die.” A rigid system of ethical balance, this. He goes so far as to say that if a civic group mutually agreed to dissolve and disperse, “the last murderer lying in prison should be executed before the resolution was carried into effect.”¹⁸ Even as retributive, punishment had *Philosophy of Law*, tr. Hastie, pp. 195 ff.

for many people an admonitory or hortatory flavor; it was not wholly retrospective. Today punishment, except to the victim of capital punishment, is for social intelligence prospective and admonitory in character. Theoretically, at least, the doer of antisocial deeds is temporarily restrained until such time as he has demonstrated fitness to share anew in social processes. Multiplying reports from penal institutions are not encouraging as to the success of such schools in their work of social rehabilitation. Whatever the status of reward and punishment at present we cannot fail to note the basic assumption of individual responsibility. The transgressor could and should have done differently. Even in cases where defense attorneys try to shift responsibility from the defendant to society, responsibility for crime is not denied; it is simply located elsewhere than in the individual.

¹⁸ “Die Metaphysik der Sitten,” *Werke*, ed. Cassirer, VII, 140 f. Also Kant,

The modern theory of punishment assumes the possibility of reforming or reshaping character. Punishment is not only a deterrent to crime, it is a stimulus to lawful conduct. In other words, character which stamps or marks the self in its uniqueness is not a fixed constant. To say that it is in the making, not made, is neither to affirm utter fluidity and novelty nor to deny an identifiable strain or quality of character in the self. In Bergsonian phrase its "future is not altogether determined at the present moment." In the fact that the story of the self is not yet ended is found the possibility of growth and development. Formation is *reformation*. Here, too, we come to the limit of predictability. The whole self never finds complete expression in its response to any situation, perhaps not in the aggregate of its responses. Character, not in the moral sense alone, but as characteristic, may be thought of as the common denominator of the several expressions of the partial selves of each of us, or as the prevailing tendency discoverable in each or all the systems of behavior belonging to each self. Such reflection might logically compel the conclusion that each of us is a congeries of characters, a sort of pluralization of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. In each of us there are undiscovered capacities as well as reserve forces that may appear spontaneously at critical moments. Subconscious factors, glands, nerves, and a whole complex of intra-organic conditions may prove modifiers of habitual behaviors. On this basis predictability with certainty is not only hazardous but practically impossible. Such facts and factors yield a margin of flexibility. By this margin of flexibility we do not mean an unentered area wherein a constant self may disport itself. No, we mean, rather, that the self is a condensation of our past, with each successive instant's experience a modifier of the preceding. The past, individual and ancestral, exists in each of us in the form of organic urges, drives, and tendencies, few of which operate consciously (Bergson). They are the content and meaning of our impulses. In terms of religion, the phenomenon known as conversion testifies to the modifiability of a person's character.

8. A RELATIVE PERMANENT AMID THE FLUX

Were all mere flux, neither persons nor their characteristics could be. Without some sort of concretion, or relative permanent, flux itself could not be. This relative permanent is what gives form or character to the self. This is but another way of saying that action becomes characteristic of self and selves. Upon this socially-known characteristic we trade; it is our coin of exchange, a language of communication. We bank upon it. It guides and determines our conduct. Its significance in modern life is seen in its breach whether in the individual or

the nation. Let us suppose that some person of character dependable and admirable in all relations public and private finds in some obscure place a purse containing considerable money. The "find" is known only to himself. In the purse the card of the loser is found. What will the finder do? Were I to know of it and say emphatically that he will look up the owner, I do him no discredit in this prediction of his conduct. It would be altogether complimentary to say, "I expect him to return it to the owner." Expectation implies dependability. My confidence in his integrity of character does not reduce him to a mechanism. His action expresses a dependable self-determinism or established preferentialism resulting from ideals of conduct projected and practiced through the years. On the other hand, to say of another in like situation that his action is uncertain is highly derogatory of his character. Such uncertainty is in no sense to be taken as the sign of a free self. To the degree to which his vacillation gives no ground of confidence as to his action he falls short of a free self as that concept is here entertained. If tossed between "to find the owner" and "not to find the owner," he is not free. If so low in the moral scale as to keep his find without question, he is a determined self but not free; the social-moral order is against him; he is the victim of his self-determination. In that the way of the transgressor is hard, there appears to be something about the social order in the large that favors moral integrity, which in turn means freedom. One might say that he who wills the social will is free. This does not mean mere submission, a selling-out on his part, since in practically any community there is more that is acceptable than unacceptable. Who of any significance in any community accepts one hundred per cent its will as expressed in its institutional values and conventional modes of procedure? He who wills the social will accepts problems in whose solution he can work more freely from the inside. It is not unlike St. Augustine's "Love God and do as you please." In such activity he remakes himself and his environment, and grows into freedom.

9. THE SELF AND TIME

So far we have spoken of the self in what he is as a cumulative product of his past choices and behaviors. Of equal importance in any adequate assessment or analysis is the future. Comparatively few processes fulfill their meaning in the present. Our aims extend into and include the future. The reality and meaning of our present purposes and plans, rooted in the past, reach forward into and levy upon the future. Apart from their future aspect they remain abortive, truncated. Aims and purposes link past, present, and future into a

unity. In fact, by their presence and dominance we transcend time, we live so far timelessly. Our present ideals are projections of the present self toward a desired and more desirable self; they are, through the imagination, anticipated as already present. Through them as immanent impulsions of the self we are urged; as goals to be attained we are drawn. Each interpretation implies self-determination.

Professor W. E. Hocking speaks of "the threshold of consent."¹⁹ The mind has an idea and is aware of accompanying organic disturbances. Whether to nurture the idea or not, to express or restrain these emotional accompaniments, is the problem. The threshold of consent includes the processes of determination and finally of acceptance or rejection. In the interval the self is the determinant of its course and is thus free. All acts other than habitual and impulsive must pass through this threshold of consent. In this way they get the stamp of the self's mintage upon them.

10. SUMMARY

By way of summary we may say that determinism is not incompatible with freedom. Neither is freedom synonymous with indeterminism. Freedom means *self*-determination. My action is free in so far as it is *mine*, in so far as it expresses *my* purpose and will. Determinism as here used differs from the causal concept as applied to physical nature. Our freedom is within, not opposed to, nature. While members of the natural order and, speaking popularly, subject to her laws, we are at the same time conscious of guidance by self-chosen and self-projected ends. Acts freely chosen are thus determined. Consequently we do not need to take advantage of the denial of causality in the microscopic world in order to predicate freedom of the self in the macroscopic world. Nor need we wait to find freedom's opening in the gap between certainty and probability. To say of a man "You may count on him" neither discounts him nor makes of him a mechanism. Of such is the kingdom of heaven. That predictability of human conduct cannot get beyond likelihood or probability does not place us at a disadvantage when compared to events in the physical world. Complete knowledge of the factors determining human behaviors is more impossible than in the nonhuman world. Were such knowledge possible it would neither constrain the other's act nor justify us in regarding him as a mechanism. Without motivation choice would be chance. The determinant of choice is the self that is and is becoming other than it was through its choices and acts. For-

¹⁹ *The Self—Its Body and Freedom*, pp. 64 f., 108 f., 148 f.

getting the difference in the self over an interval of time we deceive ourselves in thinking that we could in a given situation have chosen differently. Our moral integrity at the time demanded just that choice even though the choice later turned out to be wrong. Here intelligence and knowledge prove an important asset. Were complete insight and moral integrity possible, they would yield in each self the freedom that is God's. The self is free when in its action it is determined by nothing other than its own character, when its action is the result of habit and deliberation rather than momentary impulse.

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■

PART THREE

HUMAN VALUES

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CHAPTER XIII

THE CONCEPT OF VALUE

The world for each of us at the unreflective level is a world of things. This is true whether it be the content of a ten-year-old boy's pocket, the gold of the miser, or perhaps in less degree the increasing acreage of the large landowner. The immature mind dwells in an objective world, a world of objects and things. History was once taught as a series of events in time, geography as a complex of space locations. More mature mentality, one might say, is more subjective in character; it lives rather in terms of more conscious meanings and values. Life takes on new dimensions, richness, and significance as objects and happenings are interpreted in those terms. At the higher level we may truly say that we live in a world of values rather than a world of things. An aspect of our educational problem is to raise the level of life by the introduction of the concept of values at earlier stages or lower levels of development. Mental maturity may be measured by one's value participations and appreciations.

1. QUESTIONS AS TO VALUES

In entering upon an inquiry as to values (Axiology) one is confronted with such questions as: What do we mean by the term *value*? Is there not a plurality of values, and among them is there a common denominators? Are values subjective or objective? i.e., are they but our human appraisals of a world of objects by themselves without value, or do values exist in objects and events, whether as qualities, essences, or universals, irrespective of our participation? How did the concept of value arise in human beings? Is it biological, psychological, social in origin, or is it unique, indefinable, and irreducible to any other form? What is the relation between value and desire or interest? Is value a quality of an object that possesses an interest for one? Are values limited to existing objects, or may nonexistent desired objects or conditions, such as community health, improved economic conditions, or international co-operation, have value? Are values constant or changing, absolute or relative? i.e., do they vary with the individual's development? Do they depend upon the culture status of the person in question? Do facts have a status higher than, and independent of, values, or is there a much more intimate relationship such that all facts have a value aspect or at least a value potential? The meaning of a nonvalue fact is not readily apprehensible. Or, again, is

value a comparative estimate of objects of experience in terms of better and worse? These are some aspects of the problems of values.

In its simplest terms, value or valuable is a predicate or quality which we attribute to any object or process that satisfies a desire or need. This concept of value is widely entertained. Höffding defines value as "the property possessed by a thing either of conferring immediate satisfaction or serving as a means to procuring it."¹ From this definition values then may be mediate or immediate. Food is an immediate value in that it satisfies organic hunger; it is also a mediate value in contributing to health and strength. Of this distinction more later.

2. LAIRD'S NATURAL ELECTION THEORY

The term value is thought by some to be appropriately applied at a still lower level, viz., to plants. John Laird presents what he calls a Natural Election theory of value.² By this he means that whatever conditions are necessary to the maintenance of any entity is a value. A plant, for example, in order to maintain its growth needs good soil, moisture, and sunlight. These conditions are of value to the plant; to them the plant is not indifferent. "Natural Election is the principle of Non-indifference in nature." This principle of non-indifference prevails universally in nature. Every natural entity takes account either positively or negatively of certain other contextual entities. Satisfaction and enjoyment at the psychological level exhibit kinship not only with satisfactions at the organic level but also with the laws of attraction and repulsion in physics and of valency in chemistry.

In elaboration of this view Laird makes use of a passage from Francis Bacon's *Silva Silvarum*. The following is a selection from that quotation:

It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, yet they have perception; for when one body is applied to another, there is a kind of election to embrace that which is agreeable, and to exclude or expel that which is ingrate. . . . Sometimes this perception, in some kind of bodies is far more subtle than sense; so that sense is but a dull thing in comparison of it: we see a weather glass will find the least difference of the weather in heat or cold when we find it not.

By perception Bacon means that natural entities *take account* of each

¹ *The Philosophy of Religion* (1906 ed.), p. 12.

² *The Idea of Value*, chap. iii. pp. 92 f., 99.

other at levels below consciousness. According to this principle of natural election "a thing sustains itself by taking account of other things, assimilating some, neutralizing some, assuming amicable or defensive relations with others—and all non-mentally (as Bacon showed) as well as (sometimes) mentally." This principle of non-indifference, of natural election, as taking account of, may be expressed as selection and response, perhaps as liking and interest as by Prall and Perry. Non-indifference is a value principle that ranges from the magnet and iron filings, from crystal formation, to the higher psychic levels as in morality, art, and religion. In our further study in this chapter we shall use value in its psychological meaning.

3. VALUE AND INTEREST

a. Perry's Theory

R. B. Perry in his *General Theory of Value* defines value as "the peculiar relation between any interest and its object; or that special character of an object which consists in the fact that interest is taken in it." For him value is a matter of the "motor-affective life" in its many forms such as "instinct, desire, feeling, will and all their family of states, acts and attitudes." He finds *interest* to be the term that is most acceptable, the most generic term for this wide tract of life. Interest best expresses, or is, the common denominator in all the varied value forms of experience. In this broad sense of the term any object or idea of interest is thereby an object of value. "That which is an object of interest is *eo ipso* invested with value." In this generic sense interest means an attitude or disposition *toward* or *away from*, *for* or *against*, of *favor* or *disfavor*, of *liking* or *disliking* in relation to any object, whatever its ontological status may be. Perry stresses the active aspect of interest rather than the affective as the more significant factor in value. Special areas of value, whether science, politics, health, economics, play, aesthetics, morality, or religion, are but species of the genus *value* or *interest*.³ Perry's theory of value does not reach lower than the biological. Laird's theory is cosmic in character. The scope of application of the former extends from plant heliotropism to a Kant enamored of the starry heavens above and of the moral law within. Laird does not stop with life, but includes the inorganic as well.

b. Prall's Theory

D. W. Prall's⁴ views are closely sympathetic with those of Perry. For

³ *Op. cit.*, 27, 115, 124.

⁴ *A Study in the Theory of Value*, University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. III, No. 2, (Sept., 1921), pp. 179-290.

him objects have value in so far as they fulfill interests. "Value is fulfillment of interest." This statement, he adds, "sounds very much like saying that good is the desirable." The following quotation might very well be attributed to Perry.

My definition makes value subjective in the sense that anything is properly said to have value in case, and only in case, it is the object of the affective-motor response which we call in general liking or disliking, or which we call being *interested* in, positively or negatively.

The value of an object consists in, is constituted by, its being liked or disliked. Again, "value, being a certain relation, namely, the interest relation, exists where that relation exists, is constituted by that relation." Dewey is quoted as to the confusion between "the *experience* of a good and the *judgment* that something is a value." To an elucidation of the difference between these two concepts Prall devotes some paragraphs. The experience, as such, is motor-affective, while the judgment is cognitive. That I *enjoy* sunshine in early springtime or autumn is one thing. The sheer enjoyment is in itself a value. Any judgmental supplementation in terms of vitamin value is other than, and not to be identified with, the enjoyed experience. One is here reminded of the Baconian distinction between "perception" and "sense." "Perception" for Bacon is a sort of dumb organic feeling—shall we say?—of satisfaction or enjoyment.

Although the enjoyment or interesting experience and judgment concerning it are not to be identified, yet the two have a changing relation of intimacy—i.e., the interest may provoke a judgment or a judgment may promote an interest. For example: one may be mildly interested in the writing on the Rosetta stone in the British Museum. When he learns the linguistic significance of these characters his interest is deepened. One may pay his sales tax with pennies that have no particular interest for him other than that. However, he learns that a certain issue of that monetary unit is extremely rare, therefore, very valuable. A new interest immediately appears, or his former interest is heightened by virtue of the new fact disclosed. In each and every such instance the experience of value or of liking is one thing; any judgment concerning that value or liking is another. In the words of Perry, "Values do not have to be *evaluated* in order to be values."⁵ For Prall values as such are intuitional rather than perceptual, are felt rather than cognized. Intuitions, however, are conditioned by one's whole past experience.

⁵ *General Theory of Value*, p. 595.

4. PLATO: VALUES AS GOODS

Interest, then, is the generic form of values. In the matter of the classification of values it is interesting to note that Plato in the beginning of Book II of the *Republic* speaks of them as goods. Of these there are three major forms: (1) Those that we value for their own sakes, good in themselves irrespective of consequences. Such are "harmless pleasures and enjoyments," (2) Those "which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results." Instances of such are knowledge, sight, and health. Then (3) those goods "such as gymnastic, the care of the sick, and the physician's art" which are not chosen for their own sake, but because of the results which flow from them. He rates the second class as the highest. Here justice, his primary concern in the *Republic*, is found. Here goods or values, in more modern phrase, are divided into intrinsic, instrumental, and a combination of the two. Plato's conception of the good as value is geared to the interest theory of Perry and Prall by Spinoza when he says that "we neither strive for, wish, seek, nor desire anything because we think it to be good, but, on the contrary we adjudge a thing to be good because we strive for, wish, seek, or desire it."⁶

5. VALUES AS INTRINSIC AND INSTRUMENTAL

By intrinsic values we mean forms of experience that are ends or good in themselves. Spinoza's substance was that which could be conceived through itself; i.e., it could not be reduced to any other conceptual form. So intrinsic values are irreducible; they need no justification or reason for their being. Of such are a Mediterranean sunset, the thrill of a storm at sea, pure parental love, and the sublimity of tragedy or of moral triumph in the face of well-nigh irresistible odds. A cultured mind, a highly significant life, may approach intrinsic values.

Instrumental values are means to the production of values rather than values themselves. Economic values probably are the nearest approximation to pure utility. They are basically concerned with the securing and satisfaction of vital needs. Wealth may yield in the possessor a feeling of satisfaction, yet in the last analysis it is a means to power, security, or some other end. Sleep and food are means to recuperation of energies, not ends in themselves. While Dewey throughout his writings distinguishes between means and ends, yet he admonishes us that this intellectual distinction must not be pushed to the point of separation. What is a means to more remote values is to that

⁶ *Ethics*, Book III, Schol. Prop. IX. Selections, ed. John Wild, p. 217.

degree itself a value. Most of our ends are temporary and when achieved become means to further ends. A college education crowned with a degree is to those still "on the way" a desired goal. As it is approached, it is found to be but a steppingstone to some other end. With the exception for the time being of certain value experiences more or less of a moral, aesthetic, or religious nature which are called intrinsic, the probability is that instrumental and intrinsic values are largely intertranslatable, are but momentary cross sections of a process, just as means and ends are temporary, and therefore partial aspects of a continuously developing experience. That values change their status is seen in some modern homes cluttered up with antiques such as glassware, candlesticks, chairs no longer capable of sustaining weight, rugs transferred from floors to walls, etc.—unusables all. Values once instrumental here become "terminal."

For Dewey values, formerly called ends, arise within practical experience. That our methods, aims, ideals, and standards of criticism arise within experience is familiar doctrine to students of Dewey. Words and their meanings represent uses of the objects indicated. "Language is primarily a mode of social action." Values do not belong in a realm transcendent of experience. To talk of the value of rain in laying the dust, utterly apart from any practical situation wherein the laying of dust is preferable to the counter condition, is sheer meaningless nonsense. The concept of value arises not only within experience but as a result of the necessity of selecting between competing alternative modes of response in terms of satisfying consequences. It is in such evaluation or any questioning whatever of alternatives that value appears upon the stage. Until the need for such criticism, whatever it just is; value has not yet appeared. Value belongs in the comparative and superlative degrees rather than in the positive. Value enters the scene via criticism. When one lingers even momentarily over an idea or object, whether in welcome or in protest, value or disvalue is present. By criticism is not meant formal logical procedure, but rather any hesitant delayed response, even any shadow of question as to the merit of the proposed procedure. Any such thought transcendence of immediacy is criticism. It is an adumbration of philosophy itself, which is a consciously pursued and methodical "criticism of criticisms." Casual goods at the unreflective level become critically evaluated goods at the philosophic level. Value is cognitive, is judgmental in character. Values are "fugitive and precarious," they "are as unstable as the forms of clouds." Time takes its toll of values as of persons. Our values of yesterday are not necessarily those of today, for we ourselves have changed. Natural objects change. We react upon

nature. These modifications necessitate further adaptations. The automobile necessitated good roads and good roads made for speedier cars. Subsequent changes have left scarcely any phase of our life unmodified. In view of the flux of things and man's will to security and certainty idealistic minds propounded the theory of a realm of "eternal values" shining in splendor above the mutations and tossings of terrestrial things. In the midst of nature's inconsistencies man brings to bear in terms of intelligence his accumulated experience and, in his acceptances and rejections of possible alternatives of action, becomes an evaluator, a determiner, of the values of means to the satisfaction of his desires. Changing conditions demand changing criteria. Although the judgment as to the means to be employed in any situation is arrived at on the basis of the situation and past experience, yet the value of the means in any case depends upon the results of the action still to be taken. Situation and experience point toward the best means; the result of the act proves the value of the means.⁷

6. VALUES AND FACTS

a. Dewey

What, then, we may ask, is the status of values with respect to facts? Are facts objective whereas values are subjective? Speaking broadly, we reply that our experience is shot through and through with values. We actually live by and for values. We have already said that in the process of maturing, of growing up mentally, things are increasingly translated into values, they become pointers to or indices of values. In terms of the social status of an individual, of his social esteem, psychologists tell us that his standards of value probably rate higher than any other personality trait. While this sounds on the surface as though personal development means the making over of our objective factual world into less factual and more subjective form, yet, on the other hand, the forms of our institutional life may be seen as objectifications of subjective values, so-called. Our churches, courts of law, and educational activities are instances of such objectifications. Our world then, Dewey holds, does not consist of two separate sets of reals, i.e., of pure objective facts on the one hand, and of less real subjective feelings and values on the other. Values properly deserve the status of facts.

⁷ For references see primarily Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, chap. x; also, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, chap. xiv. For an interesting comparison of the views of Dewey, Perry, and Prall see Orlic A. H. Pell, *Value-Theory and Criticism*, especially chap. v.

b. Schiller

Schiller strenuously resists the separation of facts and values. A fact is not an atomic self-existent. All our facts have a past, a history; they were not always as they are known to be. Facts are creations rather than pure confrontations. Their present status, as facts, is an achievement; they have won out over rivals. From their first appearance in our experience their reality claims have undergone the fire of criticism, of experimental testing. Facts have come up through much tribulation. Like the old gray mare, they are not what they used to be; their vicissitudes have left their refining mark. Even today the number of undisputed "closed" facts is smaller than ordinarily assumed. *Up to the present and so far as we now know* represent the atmosphere that surrounds and conditions most of the "assured" facts of science today. This is what James means when he says, "We have to live today by what truth we can get today and be ready tomorrow to call it falsehood." In view of all this weighing and evaluation Schiller says that "no fact can possibly plead that it has had no truck with values." Furthermore, our attention is called to the point that when we appraise a fact as real, that appraisal is also a fact. Nor can its factual status be annulled by terming it psychological. Wherein in this respect does this fact differ from any other fact? Facts and values then do not differ in kind; neither are they incommensurable. Again, "Values are not to be regarded as gratuitous additions to reality . . . but as its highest qualities and the culminating points of its significance for us."⁸

c. Urban

For Urban value and reality though not identical are inseparable.⁹ He offers three classes of elements or objects of experience. Redness, magnitude, solidity, etc., constitute a group of facts. Beauty, goodness, utility, and truth are a group of values. Then again there are such forms of experience as order, consistency, harmony, necessity, etc. How shall these be classified? Urban says that the members of this third group are both facts and values and cannot properly be classified in either to the exclusion of the other. He concludes that "values are so deeply woven into the very texture of reality, that value and existence cannot be separated without leading ultimately to unintelligible discourse."

⁸ F. C. S. Schiller, "Fact and Value," *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* (Harvard University, Sept., 1926), pp. 296-300; also *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, XII, 584 ff.

⁹ Wilbur M. Urban, "Value, Logic, and Reality." See volume of *Proceedings* indicated in preceding footnote, pp. 285-295.

We find it difficult, if not impossible, to separate values and facts. We may be interested in collecting facts, as too often in the typical Master's thesis, utterly indifferent to and innocent of their value potential. Even in so barren a performance as that, the study is motivated by the expectation of some end or value to be achieved after the passage of the dry and dreary desert sands has been consummated. Such practice is not unknown in "educational" institutions. Dewey would characterize such separation of means and end as the most abject intellectual enslavement. Moreover one might declare with confidence that, morally speaking, the later condition of all such unenvisioned treadmill performers, to say nothing of their intelligence status, is worse than before. They strut in feathers not their own. Their skin (or sheepskin) is the skin of intellectual attainment, but their spirit does not comport therewith; the voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau. In such reflection we note that the presence or absence of values in so-called objective facts depends upon the interest of the participant, his habits, needs, dispositions, prevailing desires, etc., and upon the culture in which he has been fashioned. In terms of culture John Stuart Mill's well-known passage may be referred to. He tells us that man has higher faculties than animal appetites and that happiness consists in the satisfaction of these higher capacities. Even though full satisfaction is more possible to a lower-levelled life, to the beast than the man, to the ignoramus than the instructed, yet few human beings would consent to step down to the lower level for the sake of its fuller measure of enjoyment. "It is better," he says,

to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.¹⁰

7. VALUES AS:

a. Subjective and Objective

The question whether values are subjective or objective is but another aspect of the relation of values and facts. What do we mean by subjective? The most extreme form of subjective value is probably that agreeableness experienced in individual perversity, in the free use of the imagination, in reverie, or in dreams. Any state individually pleasing irrespective of reference is subjective. Again, any conscious state having the quality of pleasantness whose valuableness in addition

¹⁰ *Utilitarianism* (Everyman's Library), chap. ii, p. 9.

refers to some object or desired state beyond itself is subjective or, at least, has a subjective aspect. At this point subjectivity passes into or discloses objectivity. Here a pragmatic phase of value appears in that action toward the achievement of the desired value is implied. That persons may differ widely in their judgments of value is said to be due to their personal character. Objective value in its extreme form is that wherein value is predicated of an object in independence of any personal relation. Laird's principle of non-indifference in objects is an example of this. Where values are socially recognized and are determiners of conduct within the group they are objective. Prophets of social righteousness have always felt and declared that "what ought to be" in contrast to "what is" is objective. In this their power consists. Such ideals as human brotherhood, honor, and peace between peoples have a nontemporal, qualitatively external objectivity. In science objectivity is fundamentally public in character; i.e., its theories must be verifiable by other competent workers in the field. The principles of logic and mathematics are objective. In an ordered world two plus two will equal four tomorrow as today, a quantitative whole will be greater than any of its parts.

Locke's division of qualities into primary and secondary may aid in illustrating the relation of subjective and objective. The secondary qualities, we have said, such as color, taste, and sound, are effects produced in us by outer objects; they do not exist in the objects themselves. Sweet and bitter, red and green, loud and low, are psychical events which as such do not exist in nature. Such states are subjective. On the other hand the primary qualities of form, impenetrability, etc., exist in natural objects, says Locke; their existence in no sense depends upon us; they are capacities or powers in the objects which produce effects in us. A thermometer hung outside a window of a living room of constant temperature is seen to record a drop of twenty degrees. The judgment that there is a drop of twenty degrees in temperature is objective. The apparent convergence of lines or rails known to be parallel exhibits a closeness of relation between subjective and objective.

Value, we have substantially said, is a relation between a subject with interests, dispositions, desires, needs, and an object capable of satisfying these appetencies. To *be* and to have desires in a world utterly incapable of their satisfaction is biologically, psychologically, and rationally impossible. Likewise inconceivable is an object having no significance for its co-objects. Equally meaningless would be the assumption of an object possessing value in complete isolation from any other object as possible subject. We may say with the idealist that

the utterly unrelated does not, nor can it, exist. Value is a predicate, estimate, or appraisal of the commerce between a desiring subject and an object's capacity to satisfy the subject's need. Values are objects assessed by a subject in terms of the object's ability to yield satisfaction. Values vary from zero to completeness according to the capacity of an object to meet the need of a subject. Subjective and objective are emphases resulting from analysis of a vital process, and too frequently pushed to the point of separation. In speaking of values as estimates, predicates, etc., in this paragraph I do not mean to limit the term to judged or consciously evaluated values. While I was eating my lunch today, my organic need was satisfied without any appraisal of the process or content. How far the assumption, based on habit, that such would be the case, rendered such evaluation unnecessary only the psychologist, perhaps, can say. Even granting that, the value factor still obtained.

b. Relative or Absolute

Are values relative or absolute? Values are relative in so far as they are dependent whether upon desire and interest on the part of the subject or upon the capacity of the object to satisfy desire, i.e., in so far as the actuality of value is a functional relationship between subject and object. This relation may be conceived as holding even at the inorganic level. Further, values may be relative to the stage of a person's development, to the type of his culture. For Bosanquet values are relative to feeling. Were there no feeling, there could be no value. This feeling, however, is not in opposition to cognition; it is feeling already criticized. By this he means that feelings of value are relative to a standard beyond them. On the other hand that which satisfies a need has to that degree the quality of absoluteness even though at a later time it should fail of such satisfaction. If poison or some other strong stimulant carries the patient through the crisis, it is an absolute value, though either under other circumstances is capable of producing harm. As event its absoluteness is qualitative and factual, though never repeated; it takes its place in the time series and in this sense is eternal.

c. Constant or Changing

A question may properly be raised as to the constancy or changelessness of value. Is that which is once a value always a value? To this we may answer, Yes—in the sense that what was once highly valued by me, or is now valued, as an event in my biography will always be a historic fact. On the other hand, we must answer, No—since the

shores of personal and social experiences are strewn with outgrown values. One value or set of values is in the course of time and development succeeded by another. This is so for two reasons. First, values are specific and situational; i.e., there are no values in general. Second, our desires, dispositions, and interests change as we develop, and with them our values change. Familiarity breeds contempt. Heraclitus said we cannot step down into the same stream twice. Neither can we psychologically repeat an experience. Each repetition is a new psychic event. Though outwardly it may be called a repetition, inwardly it is a changed experience whether by the gain of a new meaning or the loss of earlier novelty. But surely someone asks, Are not the intrinsic values of art, morality, and religion constant? Perhaps. Schiller suggests that the apparent constancy of values is due to the persistency and stability of words. The form remains while the substance or meaning changes. Let him who revolts at the suggestion that intrinsic may not be synonymous with ultimate but look into his own experience from childhood to mental maturity and survey the changes in his value-concept of God, truth, justice, love, heaven, hell—yes, the good life itself. We are finding new meaning and value in these terms. May not the concept of "the perfect," even of Descartes' "idea of a perfect being," be relative to one's stage of development? Logical positivism is rendering a much-needed service in its emphasis upon the demand for clarification of the meaning of terms and propositions. If intrinsic means absolute, unchanging, and eternal, it is a much less frequent experience than popularly believed. Continuity rather than constancy of values appears more in accord with the facts of experience.

8. BROGAN'S THEORY

A. P. Brogan has offered a theory of value worthy of careful consideration. For him all values are pluralistic and fundamentally relational. It is the relation of "betterness" or "worseness," of better or worse. Experience justifies *better than* and *worse than* but not *best*, unless *best* be limited to a class of objects where, in comparison with all members, one stands out as superior, as best. This best, be it remembered, is in respect to a certain interest or use; it is no general or absolute best; neither is it an ultimate best in the series or class within which for the time being in its limited use it is best. A horse may be the best in a race but that best does not make him an absolutely best horse. As in Cartesian geometry we have an "origin" as point of reference, to the right of which all points or positions on the horizontal line are plus and all points to the left are minus, so Brogan has as a starting point for comparison a neutral point called the "in-

different" or class of indifferents "whose existence is neither better nor worse than their non-existence." On this value-scale good is that which has a plus, that is, better than indifferent, and bad that which is minus, that is, worse than indifferent. Such procedure suffices and neither needs nor discovers any *summum bonum* or absolute value.¹¹ In the following three chapters we shall consider moral, aesthetic, and religious values.

References in addition to those in footnotes

1. Barrett, Clifford. *Philosophy*. Chap. xvi.
2. Dewey, John. *The Quest for Certainty*. Chap. x. Also articles in the *Journal of Philosophy*, XX (1923); and *Philosophical Review*, XXXI (1922).
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5. Sorley, W. R. "Value and Reality." *Contemporary British Philosophy*. Second Series. Pp. 245-267.
6. Urban, W. M. *The Intelligible World*. Chap. iv.

¹¹ *International Journal of Ethics*, XLI, 287-295. Also, among others, *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* (1926), pp. 308-314.

CHAPTER XIV

MORAL VALUES

1. TWO CLASSIFICATIONS OF VALUES

That we live in a world of values, as already affirmed, rather than in a world of things, reflection readily reveals. Functions and values have a pre-eminence once enjoyed by things. The spread of this concept is seen in current classifications of values. Everett in his *Moral Values* names eight groups of values: economic, bodily, recreation, association, character, aesthetic, intellectual, and religious. To those one might wish to add natural and political values. Natural values would include the products of our mines, quarries, seas, etc. These potential values Everett might include under economic, bodily, and aesthetic. Political values he would doubtless regard as forms of association. Urban¹ gathers all these into two groups, the organic and the hyperorganic. The organic includes the first three of Everett's list, economic, bodily, and recreational. The hyperorganic he divides into the social and the spiritual, the social embracing four and five of the above—association and character values, and the spiritual composed of the last three—aesthetic, intellectual, and religious. The point of interest here is not so much the completeness of the classification as the fact that practically the whole range of human interests is interpreted in terms of value. These values, Everett would have us observe, are interdependent, are but different aspects of a unitary life. It is interesting, too, to note that he formulated his list as an ascending scale of values. We are concerned in this chapter with moral values.

2. EVALUATING VALUES

That there are judgments of value none will deny. Such judgments assume the actuality of values in human experience, or that experience is susceptible to evaluation. John Stuart Mill has eloquently expressed this in a well-known passage when he says:

Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they

¹ *Fundamentals of Ethics*, pp. 164, 169.

should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him.²

Like confidence was expressed by Aristotle when he said, "Nobody would choose to live all his life with the mind of a child, although he should enjoy the pleasures of childhood to the utmost, or to delight in doing what is utterly shameful, although he were never to suffer pain for doing it."³ Some forms of behavior are widely approved, while others are as widely disapproved; some are pronounced good, others bad. Good are those ways of behaving that yield enrichment of life; bad are those that tend to its impoverishment. That love is better than hate, peace than war, friendship than enmity, co-operation than cut-throat competition—these are affirmations of value based upon experience. That the values of the cultural life are superior to those at the sensuous level need not and perhaps cannot be argued. The fact is self-evident to him who has had experience of both. The sensualist has poignant moments when he rues his choice of the animal level over the human. It is the presence of cultural values, insights, and appreciation that differentiates the human from the animal.

3. SOURCE AND SANCTIONS OF MORAL VALUES

A question that arises early in a study of moral values concerns their source and sanctions. These in the large may be reduced to two—revelation and experience, or the supernatural and the natural. Through the centuries man has feared change and the changing. About change there is uncertainty. Man's quest is for certainty. The permanent is preferred to the changing; it is steady, more certain and secure; to deal with the fixed and changeless is less disturbing; the abiding is the *real*; the changing, if not wholly illusory, is at best inferior, less real. We are predisposed toward, are sons and daughters of, rest. In the changeless and abiding alone are found certainty, security, and peace. The validity of values rests in an underlying, unchanging spiritual background, behind the changing world of sense experience, disclosed to us by revelation. This antecedent stable reality is the ground, source, and guarantor of moral values which consequently are the same yesterday, today, and forever. Likewise in the field of knowledge. According to this view the sole function of knowledge is to apprehend and disclose this reality existing prior to and independent

² *Utilitarianism* (Everyman's Library), chap. ii, p. 8.

³ *The Nicomachean Ethics*, tr. Welldon, Bk. x, chap. ii, p. 322.

of the knowing process. (Against this view Dewey fulminates in *The Quest for Certainty*. For him knowledge that is not geared up with circumstances, that is mere disclosure to an outside spectator of pre-existent reality, that does not function in respect to practical situations, is without significance. Knowledge arises within experience; it is a form of profiting from experience; it operates in terms of choice between alternatives and of means to the realization of desired ends.)

4. THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH

So far we have presented mainly the theological or idealistic point of view of moral values. We consider now the naturalistic or empirical approach. This point of view declares that experience is the source of our moral evaluations, of our approvals and disapprovals of conduct, that it alone is intrinsically authoritative, and that it is the adequate ground and explanation of the principles and standards that regulate conduct. This view is practical, whereas supernatural sanctions are theoretical. It invites reflection and inquiry whereas revelation sourced outside experience requires submission; they differ psychologically in that the one offers a program of discovery, the other obedience to commandment; the one is positive, the other negative; the one makes social progress a moral obligation, the other tends primarily towards restraint and the preservation of a preordained code; the one looks to the future, assumes creative responsibility in the individual enabling him to anticipate and adjust to changing conditions with steadiness and control, the other looks to the past, interpreting the complexities and contradictions of our modern world as due to departures from a once for all divinely fixed pattern of procedure. The latter fails to see that we are on our moral way trying to work out by trial and error and all the resources of intelligence at our command modes of practice, social and international, that will yield a quality of life more deservedly to be called human. This is the meaning and objective of empirical effort, of empirical approach and method. For it the Ten Commandments are products and profitings of experience, the high points of their time and of our time in so far as they meet conditions of our day. When new and unforeseen problems arise supplementation is our moral obligation.

Morality is sourced in biological need. Its rudimentary forms are seen in the lower animals in instinctive courage in defense, in the industry of the ant and the bee, and in the prudence of the fox. Life is thus conserved. From the satisfaction of hunger and thirst through food and drink to hungering and thirsting after righteousness, as yet an ideal, is a long and continuous way. This evolution is marked and

made possible by the application of growing intelligence to materials of experience, yielding direction and control. The sanctions of custom have been displaced by those of experience critically analyzed and evaluated.

The story of man's long and ceaseless struggle with nature in order to satisfy organic needs has never been written, nor can it be; it cannot even be imagined. In looking back over the uneven path of his ascent our traditional clear-cut distinction between him and the animal world thins out or, in current phrase, becomes a "blackout." Our prehuman ancestors exhibited rudimentary parallels to our morality in their courage, co-operation, industry, parental care, etc. These were and are life-conserving qualities in the higher animals and man alike. For us such qualities are essentially moral. Morality thus in its biological beginnings is not a peculiarly human characteristic. Its beginnings are found at a lower level. Moral qualities arose among and grew out of activities designed to continue, satisfy, and promote life. Moral values are emergents, resultants of the will to live in its struggles to maintain life. Instinctive in the lower animals, these qualities become conscious and reflective in man. The way of moral development is from instinct to intelligence.

As we begin with our knowledge of human conduct, its motives and organization, and retrace its development towards its earliest forms, we soon find ourselves enveloped in uncertainty, lost in gathering darkness. Students of mankind testify to the insurgency of life, to man's will to live. This persistence in living is subconscious, original, and constitutive of man. Life has an inherent will to live. To maintain life the organism has definite needs. In man's dim beginnings efforts to satisfy hunger were somewhat blind and blundering. Yet there was some measure of fitness between the urge of the organism and its responses to the environment within which the need or drive occurred. We speak of these adaptations as instinctive. When satisfactory and unsatisfactory adaptations began to be registered in the organism, we have the first glintings of intelligence. With these, pleasures and pains appeared, the originals of approval and disapproval. Recurrent needs and repeated satisfactions yield custom, a primitive dictator, in the group, and habit in the individual. This customary behavior, called *folkways*, is an unplanned product of organic response, except in so far as the satisfactions of the will to live have an inherent, instinctive, and therefore unconscious basis. Instinct may be consciousness at a lower level. When these customary ways of acting become approved, i.e., seen as of value, promotive of well-being for the individual and the group, they are called *mores*. "The mores,"

says Sumner, "are the folkways, including the philosophical and ethical generalizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by them, and inherent in them, as they grow."⁴ In the mores we find a moral quality beyond that at the level of custom where morality is implicit rather than explicit or conscious. At the lower level we have biological values; at the higher, in addition, moral values. The concept of moral values may properly be said to appear only at the level of consciousness. Moral behaviors and values are those directed to known, appreciated, and selected ends.

5. METHODS OF TRANSMITTING VALUE FORMS

These approved ways of acting are passed on from the adult to the youth generation. Various means are employed. In any stable group there are fixed patterns of conduct. These are as the atmosphere a person breathes; to them he is constantly exposed; by them he is unconsciously fashioned. Adult approval of conformity to these established patterns and disapproval of departures therefrom are powerful determinants of conduct. Professor Faris⁵ says that after having carefully observed the Bantus of the Upper Congo, among whom he lived for several years, he failed to find a single case of corporal punishment of a child. "Vocal disapproval, reproach, and scorn" expressed by the elders of the group suffice to yield conformity. He further observes that corporal punishment is unknown among Eskimos and Japanese.

Among other means of enforcing tribal patterns, such as fear of the "evil eye," regard for ancestors, and taboo, we may note ritual and induction ceremonies into the life of the group. Ritual is a matter of form rather than content, of action rather than thought. It is punctilious observance of a pattern of action. In primitive life it is a method or aspect of the process by which group customs are perpetuated. Through repetition, habit, and associated feeling, ritual becomes invested with value. Ceremonial rites cut large figure not only in primitive therapy and religion but in activities for the satisfaction of daily needs, such as hunting, fishing, sowing, and reaping. Birth, marriage, and death are occasions for important rites. War ceremonials are intensely emotional in character. Success depends here, and in general, upon the fidelity with which the ritual is observed. Ceremonials make for group solidarity. Plays, dances, and festivals—regular activities in normal group life—with their emotional accompaniments contribute to the entrenchment of group values in the lives of youth. In addition to all this it is probable that the initiation ceremonies which

⁴ William G. Sumner, *Folkways*, sec. 34.

⁵ "The Origin of Punishment," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXV, 54-67.

are specially designed to prepare the young for membership in the group are more lastingly impressive. These occur at stated intervals beginning at ten or twelve, and continuing for weeks at a time until full initiation at about twenty-five years of age. The participation of the whole group in these dramatic induction ceremonies makes for group unity which remains in the initiate a permanent possession. Silence, separation, bouncing, blood-letting, circumcision, and, in certain tribes, the knocking out of teeth, are some of the solemnities and severities that heighten and deepen the significance of tribal membership. These are aspects of primitive education.

6. STATIC AND DYNAMIC MORALITY

It is readily seen that all this makes for a static tribal morality. Customary morality is low-levelled morality. Truly moral conduct, according to Aristotle, is that which is based on knowledge, is chosen from among alternative forms, and is the expression of a steadiness of character in the agent. The question arises how escape the straight-jacket of tribal morality, how pass from syndicate to personal morality, how grow into genuine moral stature. To accomplish a break with tradition is not easy. To this the fate of Hebrew prophet, of Socrates, of Jesus, and of a long line of pathfinders in science testifies. We slay the nonconformist today; tomorrow we build him temple and tomb. Such is the price of progress in the struggle between tradition and intelligence.

A psychological factor usually overlooked in accounting for the break with tradition deserves attention. It is the fact of an inherent tangential tendency in personal development. The fact of taboo in group life and the "thou shalt nots" of the Decalogue testify to a tendency on the part of at least some members to depart from tradition. Without this, conformity would be without meaning, one would not be a person. In one's early conformity to custom something is going on within. With increasing experience inner registrations occur, a self is in process, a will is taking shape. This self gradually becomes more self-determining, more unique. Outward compliance with convention is accompanied by reservations. His acquiescence may be described as a resisting nonresistance. Individual development means that the self becomes a center of evaluation of habitual modes of response, especially in new situations. A few such selves in a group gain in significance and, backed by the practical value of slightly modified behaviors in certain situations, become a force to be reckoned with, thus making progress possible. The peculiar merit of democracy is that it encourages and invites individuality, whereas in the

totalitarian state individuality is repressed and submerged. This uniqueness of personality, expressed and nurtured in democracy, makes for social evolution, and its repression in the undemocratic state ultimately yields revolution. It is through this inherent and at first unconscious will to uniqueness, this tendency to self-emergence, that great personalities arise—our statesmen, reformers, martyrs, and all suffering servants of mankind.

In a crucial situation a chance adjustment may prove efficacious. This, observed, becomes a modifier of custom. The individualism of the tribe, so to speak, in its contests with other tribes is that of the individual member "writ large." This competition may well be operative, occasionally at least, between individuals of the group. Conspicuously successful conduct by an individual in an emergency makes him a marked man. His heroism gives him a prestige and its accompanying privileges. This freedom of prestige means, in modern phrase, extending to him "the keys of the city." Prestige in inter-tribal action overflows with its privileges into intra-tribal life. As in current life desire for esteem makes the hero on the athletic field an object of imitation to a flock of youth, so in tribal life heroism was not without its followers. These and other factors, psychological, social, economic, and scientific, combine to make possible the transition from customary to reflective morality.

7. LEVELS IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT

There are four types of action—mechanical, instinctive, conventional, and reflective. In terms of our interest here we may rule out the mechanical, i.e., the play of physical forces. Physical nature, as such, is outside the sphere of morals. The remaining three, in order, represent levels of moral growth. Action becomes conduct. Though distinguishable, these levels are not temporally separable in personal development. They represent emphases or periodically prevailing aspects of conduct. Instinctive behaviors are biological, life-conserving. In themselves they are not moral but they have the possibility of morality in them. Social pressures and reflection shape them into moral forms. Looking backward, the instinctive responses of the lower animals are kin to, possibly evolved forms of, plant processes in the maintenance of life. In satisfying the instinctive needs of the organism are found the germs of mature morality. Here courage, industry, prudence, sympathy, co-operation, and endurance are at a premium. Such behaviors, however, in the lower animals are not consciously estimated and chosen; they exist in the raw and consequently are not moral as we use the concept. In like fashion do they exist in primitive man and

in the child of today. The child of today is born into a setup of social pressures that directs and controls the expression of his impulses. It may be that not many millennia distant our methods of socializing the child will be seen as not unlike those of primitive man.

What of the morality of custom and convention? Although this level is an advance upon unregulated impulse, it falls short of the highest morality. The moral status of many adults today has not risen above customary patterns of conduct. They subscribe to the customary; they conform to convention whether it be in morality, religion, politics, or other forms of our institutional life. War has long been the mode of handling difficult problems between peoples; therefore it is the only method and must continue to be, they reason. Whatever was is right irrespective of changed insights, times, and conditions. Custom often blinds to the distinction between the trivial and the significant. Card playing, dancing, disbelief in one personal devil are still, to many, major sins; they neutralize eminent social virtues. The worshiper at the shrine of custom becomes encrusted thereby and disqualified for personal growth through productive participation in advancing social life. His success in adjustment to custom is moral failure. Moral development is attained when, confronted by actual conditions, reflection is turned upon the adequacy of custom, when value principles based on experience are substituted for customary procedures.

In saying all this, however, it must not be inferred that custom is only of negative value. As a body of procedural method it gives steadiness and continuity to conduct. Custom, like the surveyor's stakes, may give forward direction. When customs or social habits grow out of actual experience of events and situations reflected upon, analyzed, evaluated, and organized into modes of procedure they assume moral significance. Customs as moral will not be inflexible; they will provide for change as new knowledge and unexpected conditions arise. Such flexibility will characterize custom, will be an aspect of, or custom within, customary procedure.

In the satisfaction of organic needs, we have observed, primitive morality appears. Nature is frequently "stepmotherly," to use a Kantian phrase. Nature does not bring us food, clothing, and shelter without effort on our part. These must be wrested from her. The struggle was probably greater in primitive than in modern life. The will to live favored unceasing industry and gave rise to foresight, prudence, and perseverance, while sluggardliness suffered the death penalty. The survival of the fittest thus found primitive expression. "Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways, and be wise." Upon his recognition of this inescapable law Paul said, "If any will not work,

neither let him eat."

Of his own sowing and reaping must he eat bread;

Of grapes grown and trodden by him must he drink wine.

Only very recently was this law abrogated.

This seminal morality at the instinctive level became codified in custom and enriched by occasional glintings of reflection. In the slow transition from "custom to conscience" (Dewey and Tufts) morality is on its upward way toward consciously purposeful personal and social morality. The term "conscience" is not to be understood as some extra-experiential authoritative determiner of, and urge to, right conduct, but rather as the voice of funded social experience in the individual and society expressing the highest known values and urging the individual to fidelity thereto in his conduct. Conscience as monitor is the felt obligation to do what on the basis of reflective experience one judges to be right. In academic days an instructor in ethics, of theological predilections, frequently said, "Follow your conscience and you *may* go to perdition. Fail to follow your conscience and you *must* go to perdition"—not a bright prospect. The former alternative is probable if, in Ruskin's familiar phrase, your conscience is that of an ass; the latter is certain when your own conscience condemns you. There is no severer condemnation than self-condemnation. It is interesting to ask a class of students as to who deserves the greater merit, the one who does good from habit, or he who does good under the consultation and guidance of conscience. The question is, may not conscientious conduct become habitual? If so, is conscience thereby evacuated and its function taken over by habit? St. Augustine pointed this way when he said, as already quoted, "Love God and do as you please."

At the reflective level morality has passed from obedience to external commandment to inner personal conviction, based on experience, as to the meaning and ends of life and the best means to the realization of these highest values. From this angle moral growth is the gradual internalization of the external, the assumption by the individual of responsibility for his own conduct. Personal morality means the control of impulse by reflection, the submission of the immediate to the more remote, i.e., of the desired to the more desirable. The moral man is not indifferent to the social consequences of his act. As a member of the social group what he does that helps or hurts the whole group helps or hurts himself. Plato⁶ tells us that "States are made out of the human natures which are in them," that "governments vary

⁶ *Republic*, 544, 557.

as the dispositions of men vary," and that the state in turn influences the individuals constituting it, or, "as the government is, such will be the man." This fact of mutuality the moral person, the socio-individual, will appreciate, and he will act in accordance with it. Aristotle⁷ declares that the state, the city-community, is a mutual undertaking of friends, that friendship is the bond of social communities, and that the "state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only," i.e., it exists for the sake of virtue or excellence. The social community, then, is a moral order. Moral man will seek to discover, on the basis of his and his fellows' profoundest insights into the nature of man, goals worth living for, and to devise, practice, and promote ways and means by which the noblest potentialities of man may be achieved.

8. RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM

In view of current disesteem for conventional moral standards a question arises as to whether moral values are absolute or relative, whether they are subjective or objective; i.e., are moral values relative to one's desires, needs, and their satisfactions, dependent upon and changing with them, and thus subjective, or are they independently and permanently real outside our shifting desires and the modes of their fulfillment, and thus objective? True, group values have a definite coercive status beyond the individual, but the question of objectivity is whether they have such status beyond all individuals. Human tempers figure here. Some temperaments are "tender-minded," others are "tough-minded"; the sensitivity of the thin-skinned demands an absolute unchanging source and criterion for morality, the other more thick-skinned person is content on a day-to-day moral regimen. The one must have a world of moral values apart from, independent of, and indifferent to, our human world; the other has no need for such a world of Platonic reals, but rather feels himself morally obligated to scrutinize and check experience, believing that experience reflected upon is adequate for setting up moral signposts along the way and for the discovery and definition of unattained goals as moral progress is achieved. Taking our cue from James we give some contrasting characteristics of the two theories as follows:

<i>Rationalism</i>	<i>Empiricism</i>
Abstract (principles)	Concrete (facts)
Supernatural (God)	Natural (Man)
Absolute	Relative
Certain	Probable

⁷ *Ethics*, Bk. VIII; *Politics*, Bk. III.

Peaceful	Restless
Authoritative (given)	Reflective (inquiry)
Eternal	Temporal
Religious	Scientific

It is interesting to note that each class or group disesteems the other. The rationalist's principles, his obedience to eternal God-given commandments, his certainty, and his peace that passeth understanding, seem in the very nature of the case superior, if comparable at all, to the restlessness, the feverish uncertainty of the natural man groping effortfully to find his uncertain way through a multitude of bewildering facts. The man of empiristic temper, on the other hand, with his feet firmly based on fact, proceeding scientifically by way of the linkage of facts of experience, looks pityingly upon the other's efforts to erect and substantiate a moral order out of unverified assumptions, out of the airy material of which dreams are made.

9. ARE MORAL VALUES SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE?

This whole problem as to whether moral values are subjective or objective, relative or absolute, is fictitious, a pseudo-problem, due to an unwarranted separation of two aspects of experience, the subjective and the objective. These may be distinguished but not separated. Moral values are both *of* and *for*, *of* some object and *for* some subject. Neither can exist in abstraction from the other. We attribute values to a known object, i.e., to an object already "minded" or *for* some subject. This is peculiarly true of the values of truth, beauty, and goodness. They are predicates declared by a mind in the presence of objects; they are subject-object evaluations. S. Alexander reiterates that "values belong to the object as it is possessed by the mind and not outside that relation."⁸

Moral values, we have said, are products of human experience; i.e., they are resultants of man's responses to his environment in seeking to satisfy his will to live more significantly. He is part and parcel of nature and cannot be isolated therefrom.

A sacred kinship I would not forego
 Binds me to all that breathes. . . .
 I am the child of earth and air and sea.
 My lullaby by hoarse Silurian storms
 Was chanted. . . .
 The toiling ages wrought to fashion me.

⁸ *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 243; also Bk. III, chap. ix.

... I grow and blossom as the tree,
 And ever feel deep-delving earthy roots
 Binding me daily to the common clay:
 Yet with its airy impulse upward shoots
 My soul into the realms of light and day.
 And thou, O sea, stern mother of my soul,
 Thy tempests ring in me, thy billows roll.

—H. H. BOYSEN, *Man's Place in Nature*

Our value responses are within nature, are nature's responses. The highest refinements of our moral values do not transcend nature, do not draw us off into a world apart from nature; they are flowerings of nature's potentials. In view of these facts to ask whether moral values are subjective or objective is little more than a verbal indulgence deceiving even the elect in its guise of a real problem because of an illegitimate separation of subject and object as independent, self-existing entities.

That the Greeks did not separate man from nature is well known. So intimate was this relationship that man's morality was nature's morality. That nature is moral was stressed in the sixth century B.C. by Anaximander. For him this cosmic morality is constitutive of the world order. Hesiod, nearly two centuries earlier, said that the gods make the oaks of the just

To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the middle;
 And the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their fleeces.

In the *Oedipus Rex* Sophocles declares that nature is paralyzed by man's offenses and refuses to him her increase.

Earth's buds are nipped, withering the germs within;
 Our cattle lose their increase, and our wives have
 fruitless travail.

But we need not labor the issue. Our conviction is that moral values are neither subjective nor objective; they are both; they have arisen as approved forms of conduct out of man's commerce with nature and his fellows. To set the individual over against his fellows or over against nature and, in so doing, to create an impassable gulf between the two, is to do violence to the facts of experience.

10. VIRTUES AND VALUES

Much has been said and written concerning *the Virtues*, such as wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, etc. For Aristotle virtue is a particular moral state, a mean between excess and deficiency. Courage

is a mean between foolhardiness and cowardice.⁹ A moral state is man's estate or status as a moral being; it is a characteristic of the moral man or person. This moral state is a resultant of habitual activities in meeting one's obligations. Virtues then, as moral states, are consequents of purposeful activities. Virtues are functions or functional products, not entities apart from activities. Virtues are verbs, not nouns. Virtues are approved ways of behaving. As such they are values. What courage, chastity, justice, and temperance are other than modes of behavior is hard to imagine. Virtues are individual registrations or habits of conduct socially approved and promoted. They are the resultants of impulsive tendencies to action ordered and controlled in behalf of personal and social well-being.

Although virtues are approved forms of conduct, something more definitive is needed without which the behavior of a robot might be called virtuous. Virtuous activity must be informed and purposeful; it must express an attitude and disposition. This inwardness of virtuous conduct has found its clearest expression in the Sermon on the Mount. The virtues, then, are modes of conduct motivated from within by a spirit at once informed, kindly, and well-intentioned. More externally, they are acts adequately executed which win wide social approval among the best.

11. THE MORAL PERSON

Moral concepts and ideas have not only a past and a present but also a future; they point forward: The moral person is not content with the attained. Moral progress is from the mere preservation of life onward toward ever-advancing ideal aims and purposes. Any of these goals, whether perfection of function, pleasure, power, virtue, or self-realization, whatever their merits, must be regarded as partial and temporary. Man is on his moral way; he is creating and discovering what he is. As new insights and meanings appear new perspectives of self and nature arise, new values are achieved, new and compelling distances are presented. Moral values are gained through the inter-stimulation and co-operation of selves. The means for the attainment of "the good," as for Plato, is through an ordered society or, as for Aristotle, through membership in a community of citizens. The moral person is considerate and reverent of human beings. His fine sensitivity will not permit him, whether Republican or Democrat, in the heat of an election contest to berate the other party regardless of the views of the person to whom he is speaking. Numerous instances

⁹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. II; also Bks. III, IV for treatment of the virtues. See Paulsen, *A System of Ethics*, Bk. III, *passim*.

of this discourtesy could be cited in recent political campaigns. The moral person's life is organized around some central principles; his conduct is steadily promotive of social values. He is marked by insight and outlook, by understanding and sympathy, by personal and social perspective. Shelley says that "a man to be greatly good must imagine intensively and comprehensively." Such a one is too proud to stoop to any betrayal of self or others; he submits his most cherished ideals and values to criticism as the best means to social moral advance. He lives in the present, yet with a far horizon; he seeks to create conditions ever more favorable to the nature and practice of the worthiest human aims.

The aim of this chapter has been to sketch some of the broader aspects of morality. Any attempt at completeness would require a treatise on ethics. Furthermore, moral values adequately presented would include a philosophy of life.

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CHAPTER XV

AESTHETIC VALUES

1. RELATION BETWEEN AESTHETIC AND MORAL VALUES

A controversy, new and old, centers about the relation between aesthetic and moral values. For Plato the two are practically synonymous. Indeed, the beautiful and the morally excellent are one and the same. He, the eye of whose soul is fixed upon absolute beauty, beauty "unclogged with the pollutions of mortality," is a producer and nurturer of true virtue, thus becoming the friend of God and gaining immortality.¹ Socrates accepts Damon's view "that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the State always change with them."² In a sentence at the close of the *Phaedrus* he prays: "Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one." To Ruskin taste is the only morality. Tolstoy believed that aesthetic values are rooted in moral values. At the other extreme are those who deny that aesthetics has any inherent relation to morality. This is the view of the "art for art's sake" group. Among those we may fairly name Marshall, Carritt, and Croce.

While these extreme views find occasional supporters it is fair to say that current thinking, though recognizing an intimate relationship, denies their identity. Santayana distinguishes aesthetic from moral judgments in that the former are mainly positive, intrinsic, and immediate, and are of the nature of play, whereas the latter are mainly negative, extrinsic (i.e., consideration of consequences enters), and are of the nature of work.³ In no sense however do such distinctions mean that aesthetic must be separated from moral values. Miss Calkins thinks that the two are often fused because of their common ideality. Both are valued and desired, both involve subordination of the part to the whole. The good is personal, the beautiful is impersonal; the good is an object related, the beautiful an object isolated; the good is an object of will, the beautiful an object of emotion.⁴ For Perry⁵ the moral is inclusive of the aesthetic.

Art is subject to moral criticism, because morality is noth-

¹ *Symposium*, 212.

² *Republic*, 424.

³ *The Sense of Beauty*, pp. 23 ff.

⁴ *The Good Man and the Good*, pp. 165 ff.

⁵ *The Moral Economy*, p. 174.

ing more nor less than the law which determines the whole order of interests, within which art and every other good thing is possible. . . . It is as absurd to speak of art for art's sake, as it is to speak of drinking for drinking's sake, if you mean that this interest is entitled to entirely free play. Art, like all other instances, can flourish only in a sound and whole society, and the law of soundness and wholeness in life is morality.

2. DEFINITION OF TERMS

A preliminary definition of some terms is necessary. Aesthetic value, be it observed, is a kind of value. *Valuable* expresses an assessment of an object by a subject in so far as that object meets some actual or may meet some potential need on the part of the subject. The object in this functional relation is said to be or to have a value. Value so defined may be economic, moral, religious, intellectual, aesthetic, or other. The Greek word, whence comes *aesthetic* means as a verb to perceive, to feel, or as an adjective perceptive especially by feeling. Aesthetic value or experience is primarily perceptual not conceptual, felt rather than cognitive, intuitive not reflective. To have this pleasurable-felt apprehension in its immediacy and wholeness is to enjoy aesthetic experience. What is so experienced has aesthetic value. Aesthetic value may be distinguished from aesthetic experience as a judgment of taste or evaluation as a pleasurable sensory presentation. It is understood that aesthetic value may be negative as well as positive.

There are three uses of the word *art*. In terms of the Fine Arts, i.e., painting, sculpture, architecture, etc.—the traditional arts—it is used in the sense of *products* of artistic capacity. In this sense art is synonymous with works of art produced by persons too frequently regarded as of different stuff from the ordinary run of mankind. In the second use of the term, art means skill, knack, technique, dexterity in action. Among several definitions of this type Webster's *New International Dictionary* presents it as "a system of rules or of organized modes of operation serving to facilitate the performance of certain actions; as the *art* of building or engraving; the *art* of war; the *art* of navigation." In the third sense art is a strain, a flavor, a qualitative ingredient in the human make-up that comes to clear expression in artistic production. Somewhat in this use of the term Ducasse says, "Art is not a quality of things but an activity of man." A "work of art means nothing whatever but *product of art*." "To describe anything as a work of art is merely to say something as to the *sort of process* through which it came into being."⁶ Any adequate definition

⁶ *Philosophy of Art*, pp. 15-20.

of art must include all three of these aspects. A work of art, then, is an expression of the spirit or soul of the artist, its success depending upon his skill or competence in giving appropriate form to this expression.

When in the presence of an object, whether in nature or in art, we are seized with a profound and pleasurable emotion, we exclaim, "How beautiful!" or, "What beauty!" The term *beauty* ranges in use all the way from the beauty of the "Beauty Shoppe" and "bathing beauty" to beauty absolute as for Plato, or from an indefinite, indiscriminating use through mere sense appeal, up to beauty as a harmoniously felt whole. At the artistic level we have formal and expressive beauty. The former, as in the *Hermes* of Praxiteles, is marked by smoothness, grace, and harmony or fitness of parts; the latter, careless of pure form, as in Rodin's *Thinker*, stimulates the imagination, gives the impression of massiveness, thrust, and strength, and is thus artistically expressive. Art as form, and possibly as expression, may include the ugly.⁷ *Beauty* and *beautiful* usually point toward an object. This, in terms of philosophic tradition, implies a subject whose the aesthetic experience is. This pleasurable experience we describe as beautiful. This experience, in turn, we attribute to the object as its cause, and this object becomes an object of beauty. In other words, on the historic assumption of a severance between subject and object, we project our enjoyed experience into the object with the result that the object is itself an embodiment of beauty. A tendency is to regard beauty as a distinct entity at least temporarily captured by the object. *Beautiful*, then, for the time being, we may say expresses a judgment as to the quality of an experience in which two components appear—the object and the subject. The former is marked by order, harmony, and proportion, already mental assessments, be it observed, which qualities in their wholeness yield in the subject an emotional response, an aesthetic seizure, in terms of pleasure and delight.

3. IS BEAUTY SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE?

The question whether beauty is subjective or objective is implied in the foregoing paragraph. A few definitions and explanatory statements may yield clarity. S. Alexander⁸ says, "The beauty of the beautiful object lies in the congruence or coherence of its parts. . . . In beauty external reality and mind penetrate each other, and the external thing receives its character of coherence from its connection

⁷ See L. W. Flaccus, *The Spirit and Substance of Art*, pp. 9 f.

⁸ *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, 293.

with mind." This penetration is deeper than in the case of truth and goodness where "mind and the external still sit loosely to each other." For Miss Puffer,⁹ "The Beautiful object . . . should create for the subject the moment of self-completeness," i.e., a sort of total organic *rapprochment*. "The beauty of an object lies in its permanent possibility of creating the perfect moment," the "state of unity and self-completeness." This harmonious state is marked by "physiological equilibrium," by "psychological equilibrium," and by "quietude of will." Santayana¹⁰ defines beauty as "pleasure regarded as the quality of a thing," or, in more cryptic and technical form, as "value *positive, intrinsic, and objectified*." Bowman¹¹ says that beauty is "an attribute of form and may be quite compatible with much that is ugly and revolting in the matter." Again, aesthetic values

do not depend upon the pleasurable exciting character of individual sensory presentations, but upon the power of an ordered composition to provoke the mind to admiration. The secret of beauty is the way in which the sensory contents are organized together into a structure which satisfies because of its harmonious relations, its proportions and its completeness. . . . Finally it should be noted that beauty, like charm and utility, has its locus in the object but is subjectively conditioned.

Patrick¹² states it succinctly: "Beauty is a name that we give to certain qualities of objects by virtue of which they give rise to certain pleasures which we call aesthetic." Beauty or the beautiful is not a quality independently resident in a perceived object, but rather a power or capacity in such object to arouse pleasurable feelings and so satisfy an impulse of mind. To say that a perceived object is beautiful is to pass a value judgment upon the experience. Beauty is thus neither subjective nor objective. It is a predicate affirmed of a situational experience within which reflection reveals two essential components—subject and object.

4. ORIGIN OF ART

The beginnings of art are lost in the lapse of time. Whatever of primitive man's art is discovered by anthropologist, archaeologist, and historian, in being pieced together needs interpretation. Our most assured results are largely theoretical. Of theories there are many. It

⁹ *The Psychology of Beauty*, chap. ii, also pp. 285 ff.

¹⁰ *The Sense of Beauty*, p. 49.

¹¹ *A Sacramental Universe*, pp. 350, 378.

¹² *Introduction to Philosophy* (rev. ed.), p. 467.

is with a fair measure of assurance that we assume that art did not originate in any Minervan miracle. Rather we are inclined to the view that in its distinctive sense it is an emergent, a by-product of experience. Primitive man's experience was in the main undifferentiated. His energies were expended in the sustenance of life. In these endeavors art, morality, and religion originated as did science, law, and agriculture. As elements in this primitive complex, totemism, animism, and magical practices are found. Out of this matrix the arts and sciences gradually appeared. In her delightful little book—*Ancient Art and Ritual*¹³—Miss Harrison tells us that ritual, which is the rudimentary art form, arose out of practical life and is therefore social in origin. The Panathenaic frieze "is nothing but a great ritual procession translated into stone." Ritual is a "frequent and perhaps universal transition stage between actual life and that peculiar contemplation of our emotion towards life which we call art." In ritual we have the first expression of the withdrawal of art from practical pursuits.

To the same effect does Dewey argue in his great work, *Art as Experience*,¹⁴ that art is not a transcendent eternal essence which descends upon certain souls, but that it "is a strain in experience rather than an entity in itself."

I have tried to show in these chapters that the esthetic is no intruder in experience from without, whether by way of idle luxury or transcendent ideality, but that it is the clarified and intensified development of traits that belong to every normally complete experience. This fact I take to be the only secure basis upon which esthetic theory can build.

Dewey cannot agree with Plotinus or Hegel, who thought of art as an anticipation of the ultimate triumph of mind over matter, and of beauty as the effort of the infinite to express itself under the limitations of the finite, for the simple reason that he denies the absolutism and dualism implicit in such statements. He rather agrees with Croce, who believes that every man is born an artist, the difference being that of degree. Speaking of rites, ceremonies, dances, feasts, etc., Dewey says, "Each of these communal modes of activity united the practical, the social, and the educative in an integrated whole having esthetic form."

Prominent among theories as to the origin of art are those that find it in play. Kant likens art to play. The poet Schiller identifies the two. He and Herbert Spencer alike explain play as the exercise of surplus

¹³ Pp. 172, 205.

¹⁴ Pp. 46, 327, 330.

energy; i.e., the excess of energy beyond that required for the satisfaction of practical or actual need expresses itself in play. Konrad Lange and Karl Groos take substantially the same view. Play is to the child as art is to the adult. Lange finds a close parallel between play and art. Each in certain forms is characterized by pleasure, disinterestedness, make-believe or illusion, etc. In terms of illusion, play and art are essentially the same, the only difference being that the latter has a more matured and human content. "Art is an enhanced and refined illusion play adapted to the need of the adult."¹⁵ Illusion games "are of the same essential nature as art; they are preliminary stages of aesthetic activity." For Groos play is a means by which the strain between the sensuous and the rational in our experience is reduced. "Man is wholly human only when he plays."¹⁶ Man seeks completeness. He can neither remain an animal nor live up to the higher life of reason. Art is the means for a reduction of this "harsh tension to mild harmony," a means by which the spirit of man may regain equilibrium. Through art our otherwise unfulfilled desires find fulfillment. In this way, and in this way only, man achieves freedom and humanity. As in play the feeling of freedom, of power, and pleasure, is at its maximum, so in art. The principles that operate in artistic production are those that prevail in play.

Ernst Grosse¹⁷ observes that the uniformity found in primitive art implies a uniform source. This common denominator in the activities of primitive men is their means of securing food. Primitive art is thus closely related to life-promoting activities. Hunting, fishing, and fighting are practical activities. The dance that usually follows success, especially in war, is a form of emotional expression and so aesthetic—a form of art. It is the same as our snake dance on the football field after a victory except that the participants here are bleacherites, not the original performers. Play for Grosse, as for Lange and Groos, is a transition means from practical to aesthetic activity. One is here reminded of Bergson's statement that "comedy lies midway between art and life." A variant of this is what we may call dramatic recital or rehearsal. On the return of the participants in some activity they frequently re-enact to the home folk their exploits and achievements. Hirn¹⁸ calls this "narrative art."

Whatever may have been the ultimate sources of art we may safely

¹⁵ See M. Rader, *A Modern Book of Aesthetics*, p. 35. I am indebted to this author beyond quotations used. The Table of Contents is suggestive; the author's brief "Introductory Note" to each chapter is valuable.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹⁷ *The Beginnings of Art*, pp. 310, 48 f.

¹⁸ Yrjö Hirn, *The Origins of Art*, p. 157.

assume that it arose out of or in connection with life-preserving activities, that the art impulse is not due to an incursion from some transcendent area or of some "power not ourselves," but that it is rooted in effective experience activities. It arose in a situational and social context and was primarily practical. It is not, therefore, in origin at least, an escape from reality; it is a culture product. Impulses, ideas, and belief in magical powers expressing themselves in response to situational need must be taken into consideration. Play is not so much a factor as an elementary form or expression of art. Only gradually did art become drafted off into a separate enterprise variously esteemed. With relief from the pressure of need new desires appeared seeking satisfaction. Not finding it in his experience with nature man gains release from his limitations and finds self-expression and self-realization through art. It is Spencer's view that as evolution advances and leisure increases aesthetic activities will play a larger part in human life.¹⁹

5. THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF ART

Among other theories as to the nature and function of art are: (1) Those centered about the emotions. For Véron art is the germ of civilization, not its product; it is emotion expressed, objectified. In addition to this, Tolstoy maintains that the art object aims to communicate to the beholder the feelings that prompted the creator of the object. Hirn stresses art as a means of "relief from emotional pressure." (2) The pleasure theory of Santayana, for whom beauty is "pleasure objectified." (3) The intuition theories of Bergson and Croce. Through our will to live we become habituated to seeing things from the side of their utility. Life thus is overweighted on the side of action. Could we detach ourselves completely, "brush aside those utilitarian symbols that veil reality from us" and see the world in virginal manner, we would then have a direct vision of reality, we would see with the soul of an artist. This is Bergsonian intuition. For Croce "art is *vision* or *intuition*." By intuition Croce means, so far as I understand him, the apprehension of form unfalsified by intellectual knowledge; it means seeing a sunset with the painter's or the poet's eye; it is the lowest limit or first degree of spiritual activity; it is a prereflective mental activity upon presented images. Art's "only riches are images." Intuition is one with "expression." There is no such thing as an unexpressed intuition, no "mute inglorious Milton." "Expression is the actuality of intuition, as action is of will." Expression is of two

¹⁹ *Principles of Psychology*, II, 648.

kinds—inner and outer. Inner expression is the intuition had; outer expression is that intuition objectified through the use of some medium whether color, mass, or rhythmic phrase. Of the two the inner is the more real form of art.²⁰ (4) For Freud art is a form of wish fulfillment, a means by which daydreams and sex impulses are sublimated, i.e., deflected into more socially approved channels of expression; it is a "path from phantasy back again to reality." Darwin notes the place of sex in what we may call animal art, or, perhaps better, the place of art and beauty in sexual selection. Its place in artistic creation is obvious.²¹

As in other areas of cultural progress, art became a relatively independent enterprise. In having done so it has immeasurably enriched life and culture. It came out of life and in turn ministers to life. The experience of beauty whether in nature or in art has intrinsic value. One cannot look at the *Age of Innocence* (Reynolds) or the *Madonna of the Chair* (Raphael), or hear a Beethoven symphony, or witness an Aeschylean tragedy or Shakespearean drama without finding response in the depths of his being. Otherwise he may be "fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils." Art is an echo of the soul. It speaks a universal tongue. For this reason morality and religion are forms of fine art.

6. ART AND LIFE

In discussing the value of art for life we need not dwell at length upon its service to religion. When religion suffers disesteem or when art finds favor at the expense of religion, it is well to be reminded of the converse proposition—of the service of religion to art. Between the two there was mutual nurture. Under the guidance of religion the art of architecture gave us Greek temples and medieval cathedrals; under the same inspiration we have in sculptured form an *Apollo*, a Phidian *Zeus* and an *Athene*, a *Moses* by Michelangelo and a *David*; painting yielded Raphael's *Sistine Madonna*, Michelangelo's *Last Judgment* and his creation frescoes, both in the Sistine Chapel, and Da Vinci's *Last Supper*; in poetry Dante in the *Divine Comedy* and Milton in *Paradise Lost* have immortalized themselves, and like immortality was achieved by Handel in the *Messiah* and by Bach in his *Passion according to St. Matthew*. When in the Renaissance art became autonomous, finding aesthetic values in so-called profane themes, we cannot conclude that, although religion was no longer the prime motivation in art, religious art lost its influence. We still find appeal

²⁰ For a valuable criticism of Croce's theory see Angelo Crespi, *Contemporary Thought of Italy*, chap. iii.

²¹ For these and other theories see M. Rader, *op. cit.*

in the stately cathedral, with its stained glass windows, its deeply impressive soul-searching music, its intonations, antiphonal responses, and other forms of artistic ritual. True, art is responsive to contemporary interests, yet the new rarely evacuates the old. The new both sifts and adds to the old. This is the meaning of the continuity and growth of culture. In terms of art and life perhaps the uncertain status of some of the arts today, say of painting, may be due to the absence of any dominating life motives or objectives, to the bewilderment and incoherence characteristic of current life.

When Plato urged that Homer, Hesiod, and Aeschylus be expurgated, that poetry and music be censored, or when he uttered his conviction that changes in a people's songs were followed by changes in their laws, he was paying tribute to the psychological, social, moral, and political influence of these arts. Of the influence of art who can tell! Experience seems weighted in its favor. In primitive life music and the dance were means to tribal unity and action. By such activity imagination was stimulated, fellow feeling was engendered, loyalty and co-operation were assured. Music so far as we know has always been indispensable in war. Witness its place in our own war camps. Indulgence in the arts, whether the dance, music, painting, or poetry, yields not only recreation but *re-creation*. It enables us not only to lift up our eyes unto the hills, but to attain the heights; it raises us out of dull and often deadening routine, and enables us to see life in better perspective. It was this Goethe had in mind when he said that "one should every day at least hear a little music, read a good poem, look at a first-rate painting, and, so far as possible, speak some sensible words." In like strain was Darwin's classic regret over his "lamentable loss of the higher aesthetic tastes" due to his too complete devotion to science. In age he said:

If I had to live my life again, I would have made a rule to read some poetry and listen to some music at least once every week. . . . The loss of these tastes is a loss of happiness, and may possibly be injurious to the intellect, and more probably to the moral character, by enfeebling the emotional part of our nature.²²

Art has great emotional value. For Aristotle tragedy, the finest form of poetry, transvalues our fears and our pities. It is a means of inner lustration; it gives a needed emotional bath. In witnessing a tragedy with its heightened horror we are lifted above ourselves and our own little woes; we forget ourselves in our sympathy for the tragic hero.

²² Francis Darwin, *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, pp. 81 f.

This heightened emotion toward another in actual life or toward a fictional person on the stage yields in us, on our return to ourselves, a lessening of our own difficulties and despairs, a cleansing of our emotions; indeed in their transformation our toils and troubles assume an aspect of aesthetic pleasure. Aristotle does not mean by this the elimination of all fear and pity, since "there are some things which it is right and noble to fear" and some "things we ought to pity," but their removal "in so far as they are in excess." This is Aristotle's well-known doctrine of *catharsis*. Tragedy is purgative and therapeutic. Nietzsche in his *Will to Power* speaks of the transfiguring power of art in love. While love is but an organic "intoxication," an "intestinal fever," yet, though loving is a form of lying, of self-deception, the lover is actually transformed in his loving; he "has a greater value, he is stronger. . . . His whole economy is richer, mightier, and *more complete* when he is in love than when he is not"; he acquires "wings and new capacities." Love like art is "the great seducer, the great stimulus to life."

To know the culture of a people through their art makes for mutual understanding and respect. Too often disesteem is born of ignorance. Appreciation of the art of Russia, Arabia, China, or of primitive peoples stimulates imagination, cultivates intelligence, creates sympathy, and dissolves prejudice. Different languages divide peoples; art is a common unifying language. Art refines tastes and desires. To lunch at a table artistically prepared with sparkling glasses and shining silver is not only aesthetically pleasing; it has bodily value. Occasional indulgence in evening clothes promotes valuable personal qualities. Really to love beauty will soon yield revulsion against all ugliness, yes, against the ugliness of war. Thanksgiving Day, as I now write, is a summons to express gratitude for life's blessings. It invites wonder, imagination, and appreciation, and is so far a means of aesthetic experience. This, too, is "natural piety," the original of both religion and art. This raw material cultivated gives us practical religion, elaborated imaginatively and expressed objectively in art.

7. THE SELF AS A WORK OF ART

To say that art is a major influence in life is to utter what should be the obvious. Rather than an incidental luxury art is integral to life; it affects our attitude and outlook; it forms and informs, ennobles and enriches; it saves from provincialism by expanding horizons and by heightening and deepening life's meaning and value; it challenges the individual to make his own life a work of art. And, why not? To set before one's self the problem of making the becoming self into the

sort of self he would like to be is both a moral and an artistic approach to life. This art of self-making would mean, as for Aristotle, the harmonious development of all one's powers, rational, moral, and aesthetic, carefully avoiding excess and defect. While the aesthetic is not necessarily the moral, it has large possibilities of contribution to the moral life. Of this means morality has not yet sufficiently availed itself.

The self as a work of art places art at the center of experience. That art is not taken seriously, that it does not have deserved recognition in our culture, is due to a lack of understanding and to the hang-over or lag of traditional attitudes. Experience we have said is a whole. The Copernican revolution and Darwinian evolution changed our whole outlook on life, its ideas and values, its aims and activities. This is seen in the themes of late Renaissance art and in the far-reaching miracles of modern science. What makes a difference anywhere makes a difference elsewhere. To propose to make the developing self an artistic pursuit is not a vague abstract idealistic dream; it may well be a practical moral duty. It would lift life to a higher level, transforming it from drab endurance to a colorful creative enterprise and privilege, making it purposeful, joyous, and beautiful. Such a program would find "art with its work clothes on," as a former colleague used to say.

Art would thus be a reality, an actual functioning factor in experience, the only dwelling place of beauty. It may be charged that a person aiming to fashion himself, as here proposed, by entertaining and expressing the beautiful in his attitudes and feelings and in all social relations is very apt to become an unattractive self-centered, self-satisfied, and self-congratulating being. The danger is no greater than in any other case where one aims to make of himself a definite kind of person. In the former as in the latter it is not a matter of adorning or reshaping a pre-existent self; it is that of living a definitely qualitative life and as a consequence becoming the kind of self sought. A fallacy implicit in such criticism is that of conceiving the self as an entity, an *it*, rather than what it really is, an organized and typical set of behaviors expressive of feelings, attitudes, purposes, etc. Furthermore, this "work of art" *self*, popularly speaking, at any stage might well experience a qualitative satisfaction in such significant social living or, shall we say, social art.

8. CREATION, EXPRESSION, APPRECIATION, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMEMORATION

These five terms remain to be considered very briefly. The artist

is confronted with an object in nature or an idea of high emotional value. It may be a sunset, a rainbow, a waterfall, or the beauty and power of love. He sees it with the artist's eye and feeling whether he be a Praxiteles in terms of form, a Titian or a Turner in color, a Rembrandt in light and shade, a Swinburne or a Shelley in liquid rhythmic phrase, or a Beethoven in terms of tone. In each case the aesthetic experience deeply felt and vaguely formed seeks further manifestation in external form. Already creative activity is under way. This feeling gains in clarity of meaning in the process of objectifying it. In the thought of Croce, referred to earlier in this chapter, the emotion is already expressed. We are using "expression" now in the sense of an art product. Rarely does "expression" appear full-fledged in the aesthetic experience of the artist. To express satisfactorily the aesthetic experience draws upon all the resources of the artist. The author undergoes discipline in his effort. It requires work and much retouching on the part of the artist, but work of an absorbingly happy kind, to capture and express his vision.

Now that the artist's vision has gained somewhat of satisfactory expression we turn to the spectator, the appreciator. The creator of the art object has a profound aesthetic experience. His problem is to create a form in which his experience is adequately embodied. The appreciator, on the other hand, is confronted with an art form. His problem is to recapture imaginatively the author's experience and meaning embodied in the object. Kate Gordon tells us that "to produce, one must have feeling and imagination, and, to appreciate, one must have imagination and feeling."²³ To appreciate is a creative experience. The appreciator of a work of art asks, "What did the author seek to express?" His appreciation is in the degree of his grasp of the author's motivation. As a minimum the appreciator must understand and appreciate human nature. Where this is utterly wanting there is no problem of appreciation. Too many tourists in passing through art galleries are at this level; they are ever ready for the "next" and are glad finally to emerge from the cave into the light of the sun. Our bootstraps cannot lift us up; neither can a blank appreciate. To appreciate requires capital of imaginative insight and sympathetic understanding. For me to understand a work of art means at least that it *finds* me. That it *finds* me means a responsive plus in me; that is, I experience an expansion of self. This personal experience multiplied in others is art at work, making a difference, functioning socially. The appreciator is a creator; at least he must *re*-create the urgent experi-

²³ *Aesthetics*, p. 6.

ence of the artist.

Of communication and commemoration little need be said. The problem involved in the former is as to whether the artist in expressing his experience does it with an audience or with spectators in mind or whether his creative activity is the necessary fulfillment or completion of his aesthetic experience. That all appreciated art is communication is obvious, but whether the thought of an audience accompanies or motivates the artist is the question. The question involved in commemoration is: Do the writer of verses, the painter of pictures, the builder of a cathedral, and all other creative artists express a will to immortality interpreted as prolonging their personality at least beyond the narrow limits of their active years? Would any such artist be satisfied to have his masterpiece destroyed, "unwept, unhonored, and unsung"? The answer to the first question I feel must be *Yes*, and to the latter *No*. Dissenters, it would seem, must be of a mold different from most of us or have a psychology with depths yet unprobed. Communication and commemoration are characters of close kin in common life as well as in professional art, the difference being that in the latter they are more in focus. A Lincoln Memorial both commemorates and communicates; perhaps it commemorates only as it communicates.

References in addition to those in footnotes

1. Carritt, L. F. *The Theory of Beauty*.
2. Carritt, L. F. *What Is Beauty?*
3. Cunningham, G. Watts. *Problems of Philosophy*. Chap. xiii.
4. Laird, John. *A Study in Realism*. Chap. vii.
5. Prall, D. W. *Aesthetic Judgment*. Chaps. ii, xv.
6. Rohrbaugh, L. G. *A Natural Approach to Philosophy*. Chap. xxv.
7. Torossian, Aram. *A Guide to Aesthetics*. Chap. xvii.

CHAPTER XVI

RELIGIOUS VALUES

1. SOME DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION

Apart from the biological, it may safely be said that religion is a more widely prevailing phenomenon than any other human interest whether viewed historically or geographically. In terms of value religion is the most inclusive concept. Religion in its comprehensiveness may be thought of as an organization and sublimation of all other human values raised to the *n*th degree. At the threshold of our discussion we are faced with an inquiry as to the nature of religion. A few definitions may prove of some help even though definition is always weighted by the individual's interest and appreciation. Any definition of religion is but a pointer indicating a direction; it cannot capture or express completely the reality itself. Leuba¹ has gathered together forty-nine definitions of religion. These he divides into three groups—the *Intellectualistic*, expressing a metaphysical bias; the *Affectivistic*, emphasizing the emotional element; and the *Voluntaristic*, stressing the practical or functional aspect of religion. A reflective study of these would prove valuable. As an example of the first type we take that given by James Martineau: religion is "the belief in an ever living God, that is, in a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and holding moral relations with mankind." Of the second type Schleiermacher finds that "the essence of religion consists in the feeling of an absolute dependence." The words "upon the Universe" or "upon God." Leuba rightly suggests, should be added to this definition in order to complete Schleiermacher's thought. Professors James and Royce represent the third type. For James the "religious life consists of the belief that there is an unseen order and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto." For Royce, "Religion is the consciousness of our practical relation to an invisible, spiritual order." These three types agree as to a transcendent spiritual object or order; they differ in their emphasis upon the elements involved: thought, feeling, and will.

Coming to more recent definitions, we note a new focus of interest. For Pratt, "Religion is the serious and social attitude of individuals or communities toward the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies."² Here the

¹ James H. Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, Appendix, pp. 339-361.

² James B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 2.

objective factor is present, whereas belief has retreated, its place being taken by *social attitude*. Ames defines religion as "the consciousness of the highest social values."³ Höffding's basic religious axiom is *the conservation of value*. "The core of religion . . . consists in the conviction that no value perishes out of the world." Again, "The feeling which is determined by the fate of values in the struggle for existence is the religious feeling."⁴ In the spring of 1918 when the Germans were pounding their way toward Paris at the rate of miles per day, the writer was deeply stirred. The democratic idea in government was about to go down before the autocratic. "What can I do?" he asked himself. The fate of values was in the balance. In such dredging of soul, for Höffding, is the religious experience *par excellence*. Coe, King, Durkheim, and most other recent writers interpret religion in social rather than in individual terms, in value rather than in correctness of belief. There can be little doubt that religion as the acceptance of great creedal formulations has lost standing. Nor, on the other hand, can there be any doubt that religion as a way of life, as a qualitative life, self-verifying in individual and social experience, has much to offer a distraught world. This is the *Jesus way*, religion in the laboratory of life proving its worth by its fruits. Religion as a theory of life need not lose its significance; it will gain in value by becoming much more a practice.

The same note is struck again and again by the Old Testament prophets. In the name of Jehovah, Isaiah asks, "To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me?" He exclaims that he is weary and sick of bloody sacrifices, multitudinous empty formalities, and spiritual poverty—abominations all, and cries out, "Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil; learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow" (1:11, 16, 17). In like manner Hosea says, "I desire mercy, and not sacrifice" (6:6), and Amos, "Let judgment (*justice*) roll down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream" (5:24). Micah asks, "Wherewith shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before him with burnt offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul? He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" (6:6-8). The

³ E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, Preface, p. vii.

⁴ Harald Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion* (1906 ed.), pp. 6, 107.

Apostle James tells us, "Pure religion and undefiled before our God and Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world" (1:27).⁵

In his book, *A Common Faith*, Dewey has contributed to the clarification of religion by distinguishing between "religion, *a* religion, and the religious." He differentiates the three terms as follows: the word "religion" is too vague; it embraces "the most savage and degraded" religions as well as the most moral and spiritual forms. A term that ranges so widely is bereft of practically all content of meaning. So used, "religion" is but a collective term, a "miscellaneous aggregate." The difficulty with "*a* religion" is that it is altogether indefinite: it may refer to any one of the multitudinous forms from the lowest and most shocking to the highest and noblest expressions. By the "religious" Dewey means, not any specifiable entity, content of belief, or peculiar type of experience, but a quality of all experience whether "aesthetic, scientific, moral, [or] political." The "religious" then, is an attitude, spirit, perspective, finding expression in the whole range of practical life, whether toward persons, problems, ideas, ideals, or values. It is the common denominator, the uniting and fructifying principle among all historical religious groups. Religion as creedal forms is plural and separative; the religious as a spirit, attitude, and outlook is singular and unitive.

Religion historically has pointed too much heavenward, to the supernatural, to unseen powers, and too little earthward, to the natural, to the seen. Leuba in his challenging book, *God or Man*, tells us that we have over-rendered to God the things that are God's and failed to render to Caesar his due. When we review the concept of "unseen powers" in its many interpretations and practices from savage religions to the present and strip off the incrustations and encumbrances that still linger from outgrown cultures, the concept of unseen powers and religion itself is practically emptied of significant content. When one reflects upon the varied and incompatible concepts of spirits, of mysterious powers, of sacred books and specially favored peoples, he can but conclude that the common denominator of "religion" approaches zero. As a consequence there is no "religion in general." What we really find is a multiplicity of religions each with its body of doctrine, practices, and organized forms. We must, therefore, begin anew and interpret religion in terms of the prevailing cultural concepts of our day.

⁵ Quotations are from the Authorized Version, Revised, published by Oxford University Press, 1895.

2. RELIGION AND THE SUPERNATURAL

Religions have capitalized those unseen, supernatural powers and segregated them in a world by themselves. We have thus two worlds on our hands, the natural and the supernatural. We may observe that the supernatural varies with the several varieties of religion. The "religious," on the other hand, is a quality of spirit, an attitude in an individual toward persons, events, ideas, and ideals. It seeks to understand rather than judge; it is sympathetic through use of the imagination and understanding. The religious is this-world focused; it is not a unique, because remotely sourced, experience—but rather an aspect of all personal experiences. It may be said that all experience having these qualities is religious, rather than that these qualities are products of a religion. Such an approach renders unnecessary, initially at least, the two-world theory. When the dualism of two worlds appears, the "other" world will be the projection and more ideal fulfillment of this—not an opposed and distinct world. The world's great religions, such as Judaism, Christianity, Mohammedanism, Buddhism, etc., divide mankind into groups, not always friendly. They are surface phenomena each constituting a class or group whose only bond of unity is a word destitute of meaning, the word *religion*. They all claim anchorage and haven in another world order. By way of contrast, the "religious" operates at a deeper, and perhaps higher, level in the here-and-now world. It can look underneath men as Protestant, Catholic, or Jew. It is so delicately sensitive that it feels the rhythm of souls aiming, aspiring, and hoping. It sees and understands man by seeing men stripped of their traditional hereditaments of religion. In rising above racial and sectarian differentiations, in associating with his fellows, in appreciating their heart hungers and their inherent worth, a man is religious even though his name may not be enrolled on the register of any institutionalized religion. Religions separate; the religious unites.

There can be no doubt that the historic emphasis upon the supernatural as the only source and support of ideals, and the current tendency as seen in neo-Thomism, in Barth and Berdyaev, to make God not only supernatural but also suprarational, coupled with an implied disesteem for man and his powers, has proved and is proving a real detriment to religion. The so-called Oxford Movement 'outdoes' itself in stressing man's utter helplessness and his complete dependence upon God. Two harmful results attend such teaching—first, a complete divorce between reason and faith and, second, the reduction of man's natural powers to a zero value. To the first we shall make some refer-

ence in the following chapter. As to the latter, Dewey⁶ sets himself in direct opposition. Justice must be done to Caesar. We have observed that in the lower animals there are certain instinctive qualities such as co-operative action, care for and protection of young, etc., which at the more conscious level in human beings are clearly moral. Man expresses natural impulses of mutual aid, kindliness, social sympathy, and justice, among others. These he has fashioned into ideals, values; and he has flung them forward as goals to be attained. Toward the accomplishment of these ends he has made no mean progress. As these ends are approximated new goals blossom forth. The present tragic condition of our civilization presents an inescapable challenge to moral men. We have not used aright our resources, intellectual, social, scientific, moral, and political. We have left undone the things we should have done. We have not lived up to our possibilities. Without over-optimism it may be said that we can do better, and that as moral beings we must. Science, the product of man's energies, is banishing disease. Through its penetration into all forms of human activity life is being transformed. A science of human relations is on the horizon. To nurture and develop it is an imperative laid upon us by intelligence. When a more adequate assessment of man than that of supernaturalism is made, when his potentialities are soberly and dispassionately recognized, when the supernatural is seen as the imaginative and unlimited projection of our ideals, when all this is accepted and applied in all human relations with a devotion truly religious, there is none so bold as to set limits to social advance and human well-being by man's own effort. Realization of this will pyramid his powers. Undue emphasis upon our dependence on the supernatural tends to anaesthetize the mind with respect to human possibilities, social participation, social obligation, and human advancement. To envision the resources and possibilities of the human spirit and to be faithful thereto is to be religious. The religious and the secular cannot be severed.

3. THE GOD CONCEPT

That the foregoing does not mean the abolition of the God concept must now be made clear. The God concept is one of the most persistent in the human consciousness, vague even though it be. Otto, in *The Human Enterprise*, reports Rabbi Solomon as having found not less than forty-five conceptions of God in Hebrew literature, and Haydon to the effect that the highways of life are marked by the graves of dead gods. The history of God or of the God concept from primitive animism up to its highest expression in the Hebrew and Christian religion, or

⁶ *A Common Faith, passim.*

from a purely anthropomorphic being on to a vague, filmy cosmic principle, would prove a fruitful study. It is interesting to observe that, while the God idea changes with our enlarging concepts, the need for some such notion persists as a sort of organizing ideal. "Enlarge your God," cried Diderot.⁷ Our purpose is more modest, viz., to suggest somewhat of the content and meaning of this concept by an empirical approach. In our vocabulary of religion there is no term used more frequently and with less meaning than the word God. The name Jesus has for most of us a concreteness and reality beyond that of the name God. The writer remembers when, in an Eastern university as a member of a class in the philosophy of religion, he was asked to write a paper on "Reasons for My Belief in God." His first impression was that that assignment offered no difficulty, as he had always believed in God. When, however, it came to putting down on paper reasons, one, two, three, his assurance suffered diminution; he realized that his convictions were much more emotional and habitual than reflective. This felt conviction reinforced by the inertia of words, in this case the word God, gave the impression of definite content and meaning.

Words are symbols of reality and not themselves the reality. The confusion is easy. Labels are libels when they assume the status of reality. The symbol should not usurp the place of the reality. The words God, Theos, Deus, Dieu, and Gott are variant forms of, referents or pointers to, some value reality; they are not to be identified with the reality itself. In view of this confused identification James was not far wrong when he said that for most people God was but an "oblong blur." Leuba tells us that we neither know nor love God, that we "use" him usually very selfishly and unworthily. He is for too many people but a crisis reality or interest. Apart from such rhythmical and familiar phrases as "God is love" and "God is spirit," with their habitual emotional flavor and thrill on repetition, there is little content of significant meaning. In such instances words and phrases get between us and the implied reality and screen us off rather completely from it. They are like professors' lectures, which too often prove non-conductors, screens between the students and the sources whence the instructors derived their inspiration and which should be made more accessible to the students.

Yes, God is love, God is spirit. Than the fact of love there is no

⁷ Since writing this sentence my attention has been called to a work, which I have not seen, somewhat of this character, *I Yahweh*, by R. M. Grey, published by Willett and Clarke, 1937. In a review of it A. E. Haydon says, "The narrative shows him (God) charmingly conservative as gods should be, but willing to be instructed by the leaders of each new age and to adjust himself to their hopes and ideals."

more tremendously significant reality in human experience. If values are commensurable, Drummond was right when he said that love is the greatest thing in the world. That it covers 'bears' and reconciles the erring is seen in the *Oedipus Colonus* of Sophocles, as well as in our own experience. Royce challenges us to be loyal to loyalty. Might he not also have urged us to love love, i.e., the principle so expressed? In less limited range love is a synonym for friendship. Love is an ultimate in our experience. It sweetens, strengthens, enriches, ennobles, unites, expects, and trusts. Love is long-suffering and kind, does not envy, is neither proud nor self-seeking; love believes, hopes, and endures (I Cor. 13:4-7). Man loves because it is of his very essence. He is organic to nature. Love is an emergent in nature's processes. It is a social *More* (James) transcending the individual. Love as friendship yields enrichment rather than impoverishment. As such it has neither temporal nor spatial limits. It is an eternal value. Love is not only like unto God, it is God. Because we love, God is and loves. God is love fulfilling itself or, as ideal, love fulfilled. The actuality of love is experiential and functional, not substantive in a metaphysical sense. Love as friendship is a spirit, an attitude, a practice, a vital value reality. Yes, God is love, God is a spirit. So interpreted God, otherwise an empty word, is neither degraded nor denied. On the contrary the symbol, so far at least, is invested with experientially verifiable content and intelligible meaning.

Among other values of the same type, social, moral, and aesthetic, are justice, equity, mercy, goodness, trueness, fidelity, and beauty. Were these undeniably real values taken out of our lives the remnant would be subhuman and perhaps sub-animal. Life at this subhuman level would then be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes). These and such qualities have a reality range beyond present attainment. They are superindividual and supersocial, at least in ideal. Each is a quality of the good life, the God life. Each is a predicate of God; i.e., God is just, merciful, good, and kind. By this it is not meant that God is a substance or has being prior to these qualities, but rather that these qualities are constitutive of him. God means these. The practice of these virtues, and all virtues are actual or ideal practices or ways of behaving, makes us kin and Godlike. These qualities are in him because they are in us. He is the present embodiment or fulfillment of our ideal values. God is our ideal values at a premium. That we make God in our own image has a large measure of truth. Biblical and recent history alike justify this view. During the First World War our passions, prejudices, and hates were God's. Our preachments, publications, and practices were sourced in him. With the sub-

sidence of passion, the return of reason, and the reinstatement of our moral sense, we discharge our God of the immoralities attributed to him during our temporary and more marked insanities. He was apart from the tempest all the while. As a result many of us would unwrite our writings and unsay our sayings if we could.

Such reflection tends to the view that the word God is a symbol of our value participations and devotions. He may be thought of as that *order of values glimpsed* and partially experienced by us when life runs in its deepest channels and at its highest and worthiest levels, rather than as a substance, being, or essence prior to and behind those values. God as a substance other than, below, or beyond such values is without meaning to the normal mind. That he is the embodiment of our present values and ideals and *more* is conceivable. The probable *more than* of our present ideal reals will be actualized in human experience in the course of human evolution. The *more than* will ever be projected farther forward. God is thus in process of becoming. As the order and principle of our valuation experience, God is much more than a vague attenuated theological tradition. This view does not deny or detract from God's actuality; it rather gives definite content to a term otherwise empty, save emotionally. He is as real as those great and undeniable spiritual values that make man *man*. He is our ideal, his will is ours at our best; he is our ideal *Best*.

This view, we have said, does not deny any significant reality to Deity. Neither does it deny to him personality, an insistent predicate on the part of many. Since these value qualities, it is argued, are the unique possession of persons or selves and since personality is our highest category, God must, therefore, be a person. So we argue. The conclusion does not necessarily follow. It may be, as for Herbert Spencer, that God cannot be less than personal. To say that personality is our highest category may from an evolutionary point of view be but temporarily true. To speak of personality as absolutely *the* highest category is short-sighted, it savors of the dogmatic. As already intimated, God is the ideal direction of our developing selfhood. Since personality, at our present level, is our highest and noblest concept, we, therefore, naturally attribute it to Deity. The attribution of this predicate to Deity, on account of our temporal point of view, may place an unnecessary limitation upon him. We as persons are beset with limitations. To apply this predicate to him cleansed of its limitations is to say that he is both a person and not a person. This is fraught with as much meaning as the conclusion of the cleric who, when faced with the obvious contradiction that God is and that God is not, with conciliatory logic replied that in all probability the truth

lies midway between the two. The attribution of personality to Deity, we should remember, is achieved via our own personality refined beyond reflectively meaningful recognition, with no common content save the word. God may as well be super-personal. He is at least intra- and inter-personal.

4. TWO CONFLICTING FORCES

We have said that the term God is the symbol for our most cherished values. For most of us, on the other hand, the opposites of these values are equally facts of experience. Injustice and inhumanity, hate and brutality *are* and apparently prosper temporarily. In other words, in our experience two irreconcilable forces are in conflict. To deny outright the actuality of evil as Mrs. Eddy is said to have done, to reduce it to an appearance due to our fragmentary view as Royce, Bradley, and Bosanquet do, or to treat it as a lesser good and therefore relative as many mediating moderns do—none is an adequate solution. Each cuts the taproot of morality. These two forces of good and evil are symbolized as God and the Devil. Were either absolute or omnipotent, theological swordplay aside, the issue would soon be determined. To assume both as absolute presents a meaningless contradiction; thought has bogged down. When one accepts the fact of these two great conflicting forces, each limited by the other, with the issue undetermined, there comes to all moral beings an inescapable challenge. Moral values claim our enlistment in their behalf. To these as moral beings we cannot be indifferent. We must ally ourselves with the good in order that it shall prevail and that evil shall be overcome. God is thus through our loyalty on the way to triumph—the Devil is destined to defeat. Somewhat in Höffding's thought, the concern of morality is the creation of values; that of religion is their conservation. Even this distinction is difficult of complete justification. In a changing world the conservation of values is best assured through creative activity. In a changeless world the status of values would be at least uncertain.

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CHAPTER XVII

RELIGIOUS VALUES (Continued)

5. PRAYER AND WORSHIP

Prayer and worship are central values in religion. In the concept of God just set forth the question may properly be asked, Have prayer and worship any place or function whatever? Hobhouse¹ tells us that at the lowest ethical levels sins were washed away by means of magic and incantation formulas. At the next stage men were purged of their iniquities by bargaining with the gods and offering a bull or ram or, in extreme cases, their own children. The ethical stage appears only when "men conceive God as caring neither for gifts nor for ceremonial adulation, but for repentance and change of heart." These levels are somewhat paralleled in prayer development. The Sioux Indian prays,

I wish to kill a Pawness. I desire to bring horses when I return. I long to pull down an enemy! I promise you a calico shirt and robe. I will give you a blanket also, O Wakanda, if you allow me to return in safety after killing a Pawnee!

Again,

I promise you a blanket, O Wakanda, if I succeed. I promise you a feast, O Wakanda, if I succeed.

At a higher level we hear Jacob's vow and prayer,

If God will be with me and will keep me in this way that I go, and will give me bread to eat, and raiment to put on, so that I come again to my father's house in peace, then shall the Lord be my God, and this stone, which I have set up for a pillar, shall be God's house: and of all that thou shalt give me I will surely give the tenth unto thee (Gen. 28:20-22).

Socrates prays,

Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry.²

¹ *Morals in Evolution*, II, 123.

² *Phaedrus*, 279.

Again, Jesus prays,

Not my will but thine be done.

The first of these prayers is a gangster proposal, the second a contractual bargain, the third a soul's longing for beauty and harmony, the fourth a dedicated life.

The third and fourth of these prayers are spiritual. "Ceremonial adulation" is not prayer. Neither is prayer the flinging of words and adulatory phrases across a godless gulf in times of need to some alien mysterious power. The mystery of prayer consists in what happens within him who sincerely prays. "Circumcise therefore the foreskin of your heart!" cry Moses and the prophets. To pray implies the consciousness of a *better*, of values unattained, and also a sincere desire for and effort to achieve these values. An old lady prayed that God would remove overnight a discommoding snowbank from in front of her house. On finding it still there in the morning she is said to have exclaimed, "Just as I expected!" Hers was not prayer. Referring to those who love to stand and pray in synagogue and on street corner "that they may be seen of men" Jesus dryly observes, "Verily they have received their reward"; i.e., they have been seen of men. Prayer as a real spiritual experience has passed from petition and supplication to communion with what is conceived to be the highest good. Genuine prayer is an outgoing of desire, an energizing of soul seeking identification with the values sought. Prayer is *entering in*. Preparation to meet an obligation whether to pay a bill, to write an article, or to deliver an important address, any situation into which the whole self enters reflectively and feelingly is of the essence of prayer.

Worship is little more than another name for prayer. Institutional technique and habit have nurtured the two terms. The existence of two different terms aided by the fixation of words has led to the conviction that they represent two different forms of experience. Tradition lingers long in the lap of modern thought. Prayer is a species of worship just as is the singing of the great hymns and psalms of the church. The taking up of the "collection" may also be a form of worship. *Worship* and *worth* stem from the same root. Worship means the going out of the soul to that which has worth. The "hour of worship," if it is more than attendance upon corporate traditional institutional procedure and habit, yields in the individual a rededication to already verified values and a dedication to an extension or creation of values. While worship in a real sense is Godward yet its reality is an inner experience consisting of what happens within the worshiper. Yes, God is a spirit and they who worship him must worship him in (and as) spirit and in truth.

Humility is another aspect of worship. They who come before God must come in the spirit of humility. The essence of this concept does not consist in feelings and expressions of self-abasement and self-depreciation—a sort of self-defamation of character. As a phase and result of worship the substance of humility is positive, not negative. It consists in a vision of an unattained and an urge toward its actualization. Although in this worship experience there is an implicit contrast between the attained and the unattained, yet the emphasis is upon the attaining of the unattained. Such vision of, and impulse toward, unattained values invest life with strength and significant meaning. The Athenians whom Paul addressed were an “extremely religious” people, the reason being that every area of their interest was presided over by a deity. They had gods many. Pausanias, in exaggerated utterance, said it was easier to find a god in Athens than a man. They even had erected an altar “To the Unknown God.” This expressed not agnosticism but faith. It meant that there were undiscovered areas inviting their search which, when attained, would also have each its deity. The vitality of Greek thought today is in no small measure due to their forward-looking and consciously expectant faith. Humility is an envisioned and vitalized spirit. This, too, is worship.

6. FAITH AND REASON

We return now to a promise made in the preceding chapter, regarding the relation of faith and reason. Their divorce has been expressed by Pascal as “reasons of the heart” over against “reasons of the head.” “The heart has its reasons which reason does not know.” In terms of judgment Ritschl declares that in the religious area “judgments of value” obtain in contrast to “judgments of existence” in other realms of experience. Of course when we define faith as believing things which we know aren’t so and regard reason as a transcendental, *a priori* capacity of the self, irreverently termed by Carlyle “transcendental moonshine,” the two are incompatible. The relationship, however, is not of such sorry status. Faith is a practical working assumption. Biologically speaking, it is a sort of unconscious “will to believe” in the service of the “will to live.” As such it suffers no disesteem in comparison with procedures in the sciences. Science makes its unproved assumptions which must undergo the empirical test. That nature is uniform is one of these. It is both unproved and unprovable. To attempt a logical verification of the concept of uniformity is to assume it. However, in the macroscopic world, at least, it meets the pragmatic test. Our conviction is that a wholly faithless reason or an utterly irrational faith is nonexistent.

For our purpose faith and belief are used interchangeably. They might be differentiated by thinking of belief as an uncritical acceptance, a form or expression of the "will to believe." Faith, on the other hand, is a more reflective belief uttering itself in action. Faith acts, belief accepts. F. C. S. Schiller³ defines faith as "the mental attitude which for purposes of action, is willing to take upon trust valuable and desirable beliefs, before they have been proved 'true,' but in the hope that this attitude may render possible their *verification*." He would have us note that faith is "pre-eminently an attitude of will, an affair of the whole personality and not of the [abstract] intellect; that it is expressly concerned with values . . . ; that it involves risks, real stakes, and serious dangers . . . ; [and] that a reference to verification is essential to it." This verification or, better, adequacy of an idea or faith object is determined by the way it works out. William James defines faith as "the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance."⁴ Faith is thus a working hypothesis. In the parable of the talents he who *did* well was pronounced *faithful*, whereas he who failed to use his talent was addressed as "wicked and slothful" and, by implication, faithless. Unfruitful faith is a contradiction in terms. The New Testament James tells us repeatedly that faith without works is barren, dead. The faith of a patient in his physician means that he will *follow* the doctor's instructions.

We must neither derationalize faith nor dehumanize reason. Faith is not a slushy emotionalism, nor is reason a distant iceberg jewelled in the sun. All reason is shot through and through with faith just as all faith that is not spurious has rational grounds or justifying elements. Any unprejudiced thoroughgoing psychological analysis of these terms would reveal a large common denominator and thus deny the traditional antithesis. Faith and reason are not departmental activities of a logical self whose only function is to keep the two in hand. Neither can be drawn off completely from the complex of our practical needs. To think that such separation is possible savors of an outgrown faculty psychology (the view that mind possesses various distinct powers or "faculties"). "All actual mental procedure is thoroughly personal and permeated through and through with purposes and aims and feelings and emotions and decisions and selections."⁵ In other words, the self is a whole in its mental life and cannot be departmentalized into an aggregate of separable functions. In the normal imbalance of

³ *Hibbert Journal*, IV, 336.

⁴ *The Will to Believe*, p. 90.

⁵ F. C. S. Schiller, *Studies in Humanism*, p. 354.

our complex mental life now one and again another may prevail, but neither in so-called "purity." "The only escape from faith," says James, "is mental nullity."⁶ Pure untainted reason is a fiction. We are all inerascably marked by the accidents and pressures of tradition and environment. Scientific hypotheses are meaningless without faith in their possible validity. The linkage of steps in any mathematical demonstration is possible only through faith in the validity of its assumptions and procedures. Faith is an essential ingredient, a postulate of reason.

7. RELIGION AN EMERGENT IN EXPERIENCE

There is wide consensus of opinion today that religion is an evolved form of human experience. Its germs were present in primitive man's undifferentiated experience. It existed before man's intelligence had developed to the point where the concept of gods arose. Early Buddhism was a religion without God. The history of religion is that of a gradually emerging form of human experience rather than that of a revelation from an absentee deity. This view saves an infinitely perfect being from the embarrassment of getting in touch with and revealing himself to a finite and altogether imperfect being such as man. At the same time it sets a value upon experience and thus denies the divorce between the finite and the infinite, between the natural and the supernatural. In the satisfaction of organic hungers such as food and sex, basic and enduring needs, with the accompaniment of ceremony and ritual, we find the raw material of religion.⁷ The Thanksgiving and Christmas seasons invite us to count our blessings. In less specific form primitive man had and enjoyed his satisfactions. These satisfactions, however dimly appreciated, were glimmerings of what we call "Natural Piety." It is easy to imagine the gradual passage of satisfaction into gratitude. From this point of view one does not "get" religion; it is natural to man. Höffding declares that:

Religion cannot be made or constructed. It grows up out of life itself, springs out of the basal mood of man in his struggle for life, out of his resolution to hold fast, under all circumstances, to the validity of that which he has learnt from experience to be of the highest value.⁸

8. CHANGING CONCEPTIONS

Many of the traditional values and formulations of religion are

⁶ *The Will to Believe*, p. 93.

⁷ E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 92.

impossible of acceptance on the part of thoughtful students. What was once seizure of the devil is now seen as epilepsy or other bodily disorder. The miracles of science have displaced the miracle narratives of biblical literature. Boils today mean bad blood rather than a visitation of divine displeasure. It is impossible to believe that Noah took into the ark a pair of each of the 500,000 species of ants and other animals now known to science. The Copernican revolution was far-reaching. It decentralized and degraded our earth to a lesser and younger planet; it dislocated the prevalent biblical cosmology with its three-layered universe, and rendered bodily ascension into heaven without point or meaning. Knowledge of New Testament manuscripts compels revision of our acceptance of inspiration sourced wholly in the supernatural. When the epistles (letters) to the churches were circulating among the members, they, in the language of Dr. Gregory, "had not become Bible yet." That God literally made an evening call upon and took a walk with Adam and Eve is too anthropomorphic and infantile for adult acceptance. Creation of the earth occurred, according to biblical chronology as calculated by Dr. John Lightfoot, that great seventeenth century Hebrew scholar, in 4004 B.C., October 23, at 9 o'clock in the morning. Current geology estimates the age of the earth as not less than two or three billion years. The result of all this is that too many college students in their rejection of these older affirmations think that in so doing they are of necessity bidding farewell to the whole content of religion. They do not see that these affirmations are formulations, encrustations, and to us encumbrances that have gathered about the religious life of man as he sought to interpret that life and express its values in terms of the interests and insights of the times. A man may be innocent of, indifferent to, or a disbeliever in, theology and yet be essentially religious.

From this, however, it by no means follows that theology is necessarily foolish or evil. It is difficult for an intelligently religious person wholly to escape some formulation of his views and their relations in the world order. Theologies vary with culture development. The curricula of theological schools of today are far different from those of yesterday. Church architecture changes with reinterpretations of religion. In Protestantism the tall tapering spires pointing heavenward are mostly gone. The more spread-out structures express a more socialized concept of religion. Prayer-meeting has passed into "young people's meetings." Family prayer and grace at table are taking their place as specimens in the museum of religion. Nor, again, does it follow that all losses are gains, or that all change is loss. No, in sloughing off many

of these temporary estimates, evaluations, and expressions, religion does not go by the board. The student should be aided to make this distinction and, furthermore, should be challenged to an intellectual participation, penetration, and expression of this value experience in terms more adequate to his day. Such fitting for life is the proper function of education. In a very real sense man is "incurably religious." The religious life is the normal life, a life lived in the pursuit and furtherance of the highest values.

9. IMMORTALITY

Immortality is a long-cherished doctrine among Christians. Popularly interpreted it means endless life in a time line. As such it is the will to live without limitation in time. When the objective reality of time—i.e., its existence as a thing in itself—is questioned, the doctrine of immortality assumes the status of a problem. For Kant space and time were not things-in-themselves, but forms imposed by mind upon all the data of sense perception. Einstein's doctrine of relativity denies the absoluteness of space and time as held by Newton. Upon the acceptance of any such negation of the absolute reality of time the doctrine of immortality as just defined, if maintained at all, requires reinterpretation. Endless existence to many minds is no longer attractive, it might conceivably become wearisome. Unending existence imposed upon man by his very nature has never had nor does it now have universal appeal. For Spinoza immortality means true transcendence; it is a state or condition of being, rather than infinite duration in time. It may be that the inordinate passion for endless life is due to traditional teaching. The tired worker at the end of the day desires unconscious sleep; so may it be at the sunset hour of life.

Under the title "Immortality as a Known Fact" W. K. Wright speaks of biological and social immortality. By the former he means whatever physical and mental traits are inherited from parents and ancestors; i.e., parents and ancestors immortalize themselves through their offspring. Plato speaks of this as "immortality in the unity of generation."⁹ Those without offspring evidently do not share in this phase. To those aware of the effects of crossbreeding and the shuffle of the genes this immortality becomes over a comparatively short period so diffuse as to be wholly unacceptable, especially to those who think in terms of individual personal immortality. The latter theory, illustrated by reference to Plato, Shakespeare, Franklin, Washington, Garibaldi, Jesus, and others, limits immortality to geniuses, inventors,

⁹ *Laws*, IV, 721.

and men (no women mentioned) of heroic stature. It consigns the rest of us to oblivion except for the proviso, worthy of serious consideration, that "every person acquires just as much spiritual immortality as he deserves."¹⁰ The term "deserves" in the light of hereditary and social inequalities is a rather hard, chill term. Immortality viewed as something to be achieved, rather than as an inherently constitutive and inescapable element of our being or phase of our destiny, offers a strong moral urge. However, the degree of such immortality, to repeat, is within the limitations of our biological and social heredity. In the game of life some of the dice are loaded. Plato suggests immortality as a possible achievement when through a life devoted to the creation of beauty and true virtue one may "become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may."¹¹

A comparatively recent and carefully conducted inquiry in the United States as to belief in God and immortality among our intellectual leaders in the physical, biological, historical, sociological, and psychological sciences, yielded the following percentage results:

Believers in the God of the Christian Churches	Physical Scientists.	Biologists	Historians	Sociologists	Psychologists
Lesser Men	49.7	39.1	63.0	29.2	32.1
Greater Men	34.8	16.9	32.9	19.4	13.2
Believers in Immortality					
Lesser Men	57.1	45.1	67.7	52.2	26.9
Greater Men	40.0	25.4	35.3	27.1	8.8

It is interesting to learn that belief in God and immortality is not so prevalent among the more distinguished scientists as among the less distinguished.¹²

May it not be that time is not for reflective minds a necessary factor in immortality? In this case immortality would be a qualitative rather than a quantitative linear concept—a qualitative life, not mere temporal duration. Royce points in this direction when he says that we may enjoy "eternal life in the midst of time." For such experiences time is but an envelope within which timeless eternal values are experienced. In other words "eternal" is a qualitative experience wholly inadequately conceived as endless duration. Münsterberg's *Eternal Values* interpreted more experientially, less metaphysically, suggests the view here proposed. To be seized by a philosophy of life, by a system of values discovered by long reflective experience, and to be loyally and joyfully devoted to their more complete actualization, is to experience eternal

¹⁰ W. K. Wright, *A Student's Philosophy* (rev. ed.), pp. 428-432.

¹¹ *Symposium*, 212.

¹² J. H. Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, p. 324.

life in the midst of time. To this interpretation of immortality the critic may reply that it is but using the term in a radically different sense. In granting this contention I may say that immortality finds itself in no worse estate than does the term God. Neither concept employed in the traditional sense is satisfactory; each is fluid and requires reinterpretation, new inwardness and depth of meaning.

10. RELIGION AND LIFE

Religion is a way of life expressive of an inner spirit and attitude. He who feels at home in his world, not a stranger or pilgrim — whose conduct is marked by a wholesome insight into and outlook upon life's meaning and possibilities, by reverence for human beings (even the misguided) and appreciation of their aims and endeavors — who is sympathetically understanding, thoughtful, imaginative, kindly, a lover of the true, the beautiful, and the good, and devoted to the promotion of these self-verifying values in a world of need — such a person is essentially religious. Or, again, he is religious who is conscious of personal and social ideals in and beyond the attained and who steadily seeks their realization. Religion, rather than an outer formal ritualistic and ceremonial observance, is a matter of inner spiritual motivation expressing itself in an ordered life. In high places at times the spiritual life, as moral, was low while formal fidelity was high. It does not follow, however, that the spiritual and the properly formal are necessarily antagonistic. The ideal is a form of life spiritually induced. Once great emphasis was laid upon the distinction between the religious and the moral even though it were only that religion is more cosmic and morality more terrestrial. Distinction between the two is less important now. Religion is an aspect of the whole business of significant living just as the moral and the aesthetic are other aspects or points of view from which to evaluate the same life content. As all faith, psychologically speaking, is one and the same, differing only in its interests and objects, so the aesthetic, the moral, and the religious are but varying emphases upon the same data of experience with different interests and employing different techniques.

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■

PART FOUR

MAN AND SOCIETY

■

CHAPTER XVIII

SOCIAL THEORIES

That men live together and desire to do so needs no elaboration. The why of this fact is our concern in this chapter. Many theories have been offered to account for this phenomenon. Of these we shall note but four — the instinct theory, the social contract theory, the economic theory, and what for lack of a better name the writer calls the situational theory. The instinct theory in its golden age declared not only that man's sociality was due to a social impulse or instinct but that all his responses, moral and religious alike, were instinctive in origin. Man was a congeries or aggregate of instincts. The ants in their co-operative activities, wild animals hunting in packs, and domestic animals in their herding habits were said to behave instinctively; i.e., the gregarious instinct operated in man and the lower animals alike. More recently it is said that whereas gregariousness is common to men and animals yet man alone is social. This means that human social activity is the product of a combination of innate urges or drives rather than the expression of a single social instinct.

1. THE INSTINCT THEORY

a. Plato

Before coming to Aristotle, who is a pronounced instinctivist in social theory, it is well that we consider Plato, though he is rather difficult to fit into this theory. In the *Laws* (676 ff.) we are told that after successive destructions of coastal and plain cities by repeated deluge and pestilence a surviving remnant escaped to the hills and led an individual shepherd life. With civilization and all the arts gone those persons began a social order anew. But how? Under the circumstances we are told that "the desolation of these primitive men would create in them a feeling of affection and good will towards one another." Desolation was the occasion though not necessarily the cause of their mutual approaches. Unless we interpret their desolation as the means of awakening a hitherto slumbering social urge this theory can hardly be called instinctive. On the other hand, some color is given to the instinct theory in that while in this isolated condition with abundance of food and clothing from their flocks and herds yet, we are told, "The fewness of the survivors at the time would have made them all the more desirous of seeing one another." Speaking of the origin of the state, the city-state, by which he means an ordered community in which

each may function according to his fitness and thus attain the highest good of all, Plato says, "A State arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?"¹ An ordered society, then, originates in the helplessness, as Shorey says, of solitary man. Necessity is the true creator of the Platonic state. The primary necessities are food, shelter, and clothing. Other needs follow in turn and multiply gradually.

With the growth of the state husbandmen, carpenters, smiths, weavers, shoemakers, and other workmen become necessary. Luxury demands additional purveyors to bodily wants. Thus the complex social order, the state, gradually arises. Because of the fact that men by nature have different abilities, and the further fact of the unprofitableness of spreading special talents in the satisfaction of diverse needs, a division of labor appears. A jack-of-all-trades is outmoded. As in man we find three levels of prevailing capacity — the sensuous or appetitive, the spirited, and the rational — so in the state we have artisans, defenders, and rulers, respectively. In such an ordered community where each serves according to his ability we have justice, to expound which was Plato's purpose in writing the *Republic*. This division of labor in the state, we should note, is in behalf primarily of moral rather than economic ends. The ordered state is the flowering and fulfillment of satisfactions less clearly sought in earlier forms of community life. The state is an organized society aiming at the highest development of individuals in their several capacities, wherein each contributes to the welfare of the whole. That Plato's theory puts him in the group of economic theorists is only secondarily justifiable. By implication at least he may be said to belong to the instinctivists. However we classify him, and that may not be of major importance, the fact is that Plato has made enduring contributions to social theory.

b. Aristotle

Aristotle, "the master of the sapient throng," in the opening sentence of the *Politics* says, "Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good." Proceeding genetically he tells us that "in the first place there must be a union of those who *cannot exist* without each other; for example, of male and female, that the race may continue." This is the first indication of an inherent sociality common to animals and plants. When we are told that this union is "not of deliberate purpose, but because . . . mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of

¹ *Republic*, II, 369.

themselves," we are reminded of the biological immortality mentioned in the preceding chapter. In the combination of this first relation of male and female with that of master and slave we have the origin of the family, an "association established *by nature* for the supply of man's everyday wants." The family then consists "naturally" of man, wife, child, and slave. Upon a criticism of Aristotle's rather free use of the word "natural" we shall not enter. We meet it again in Rousseau. Slavery was "natural" for Aristotle; it would not be so did he live today. Next came the village community, a union of several families, a sort of "colony from the family" consisting of children and grandchildren, and aiming "at something more than the supply of daily needs. . . . When several villages are united in a single community, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence." The state, then, originates "in the bare needs of life" and continues "for the sake of the good life." "Friendship is the motive of society." For Aristotle, as for Plato, the "state exists for the sake of a good life"; again, "political society exists for the sake of noble actions," and neither "for the sake of life only" nor for "mere companionship." The state is the natural completion of all earlier natural forms of association. From this it follows "that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal." By "political" Aristotle means one dwelling in an ordered social community. Police, politic, polity, and political are variant forms of the same root idea.

Again we are told that "the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part." It would not be fair to Aristotle to interpret "prior" in a chronological sense. It rather means logically prior, that is, that in man's very nature there are basic and constitutive needs and desires, instincts if you will, which under proper nurture will ultimately find expression in an organized state. Proof for Aristotle of the priority of the state to the individual is found in the fact that when isolated no individual is self-sufficing. Moreover, "men, even when they do not require one another's help, desire to live together all the same." Once more, "He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god; he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature."² In discussing friendship in his *Ethics*³ he says, "nobody would choose to live without friends, although he were in possession

² The above quotations and exposition are from Aristotle's *Politics*, Bk. I, chaps. i, ii; Bk. III, chaps. vi, ix. Italics mine.

³ Bk. VIII, chap. i; Bk. IX, chap. ix.

of every other good." Again, "it is I think absurd to place the fortunate man in solitude, as nobody would choose to possess all good things by himself. For man is a social being, and disposed to live with others." From all this, then, we can say that man is instinctively social or that sociality is inherent in man.

c. McDougall

At the present time instincts appear to be passing into eclipse. Many psychologists have given the term up; others use it apologetically. Not so with William McDougall. He bases sociality squarely on the instinct of gregariousness. It is displayed in the behaviors of animals low in the mental scale as well as in man. In its simplest expression it is "mere uneasiness in isolation and satisfaction in being one of a herd." With James he agrees that in the case of normal man: "To be alone is one of the greatest evils for him." The social is the gregarious at the higher human level. The gregarious blindly seeks its kind; the social, superimposed on the gregarious, seeks its kind consciously. Although gregariousness leads men to the crowded cities, yet some by temperament live unsociably, giving rise to the paradox of unsociable sociability, or unsocial sociality. They must live with their fellows and yet cannot. Gregariousness in the lower animals is a great ground instinct that supplements the more special instincts. When an animal is alarmed it does not dash away, rather it seeks its group, communicates its fear, flees with the group, and in so doing satisfies the combination of impulses. Such behavior "becomes in us the desire of seeing ourselves surrounded by others who share our emotion." This McDougall calls "active sympathy," a "reciprocal relation between at least two persons" in each of whom there is both the desire to share and an actual sharing of the emotions involved. This is the level of the social. Our author takes exception to "the consciousness of kind," Gidding's well-known "basic principle of social organization." This principle he thinks is but "the gregarious impulse, operating at a high level of mental life in conjunction with other impulses." This important criticism leaves McDougall confident that the gregarious instinct is the basis of all social organization.⁴

2. SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

a. Hobbes

Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau are the major exponents of the view that the social organization known as the state is the result of a social

⁴ For this exposition, see William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, chaps. iii, vi, xii.

contract. Spinoza and Kant are noted more briefly. Hobbes lived at a time when revolution was rife in England. In less than twelve years he witnessed the execution of Charles I, the overthrow and subsequent restoration of the monarchy, with the protectorate of Cromwell in the interval. Against this condition of turmoil the *Leviathan* was written in support of the absoluteness of the state. The state and society originate in fear. In the condition of nature, though individuals vary in respect to bodily and mental powers, yet on the whole, they approximate equality. Equality of hope in attainment of ends ensues. Equality makes for instability. When two persons desire some unsharable thing, conflict arises, if need be to the death. In this state of nature war, actual or possible, is the normal condition. "Warre consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known." Under these premoral conditions there is no right save this "natural" right to do and to will one's own good pleasure. Force and fraud are here the cardinal virtues. The moral concepts of right, justice, etc., "relate only to men in Society, not in Solitude." War today is a resurgence of the primitive and the premoral with no right save that of "Nature." How easily we can divest ourselves of civilization! It appears to be no more than skin-deep. Peace and security are demands or laws of human nature. Neither is possible in a situation where the hand of every man is against every other man. Under such conditions life becomes intolerable. Man cannot forever suffer the denial of the law of his nature, founded in reason, which demands peace and security of life. The cause of this unendurable insecurity is man's cherished "Natural Right." It must, therefore, be given up.

The giving up of "natural right" by mutual transfer is *Contract*. The spirit and substance of this mutual transfer is

as if every man should say to every man, *I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing myself to this Man, or this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his actions in like manner.*

This unity accomplished is a *Commonwealth*. In quite modern spirit Hobbes says that such "Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all" or, in more recent phrase, are but scraps of paper. The "Sword" means "Power." This power consists in the covenanted will of the people and resides in the Sovereign, whether one "Man or Assembly of Men," to whom transfer of the natural right of aggression against others at will is made. Be it

noted that the sovereign was not a party to the contract. Sovereignty is, therefore, absolute, indivisible, and inalienable.

In view of the circumstances under which the *Leviathan* was written—the revolutionary times, and its purpose—the defense of civil authority, we must think of it as a more or less logical working out of certain assumptions as to man's nature rather than a delineation of human history. Given a state of nature wherein a lawless, self-centered individualism is rampant, where neither right nor wrong, neither justice nor injustice is known, we are led step by step up to an organized society or state wherein law prevails and a more tolerable life is assured. Ours is a necessarily sketchy outline of "the Generation of the great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that *Mortall God*, to which we owe under the *Immortall God*, our peace and defence."⁵

b. Locke

In contrast to Hobbes, Locke wrote his *Two Treatises of Civil Government* in defense of the principles involved in the revolution of 1688. He differs from Hobbes in the following respects: that society and the state are not one and the same; that society existed in the state of nature, i.e., that there was no presocial condition of man though there was a prepolitical period; that the state of nature is not a state of war; that whereas Hobbes's approach was logical, Locke's was historical; that absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society; that the social compact arose within society, not that society arose through compact; and that while political society arose through compact, the supreme power always resides in the people, i.e., that the powers of the legislative are delegated by the people and conditioned by its fidelity "to the trust reposed in them." In the state of nature all men are free and equal, free to order all their actions "within the bounds of the law of Nature," which is the law of reason, free to change the legislative when its will contravenes the will and good of the people, free to dispose of "their possessions and persons as they think fit, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man," but with the limitation, since liberty is not license, that no man has the liberty to destroy himself. In the state of nature there is equality among men, not equality in age, virtue, ability, or birth, but equality in respect to life and sustenance and in "his natural freedom without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man" and, later under the commonwealth, equality before

⁵ The above exposition and quotations are from the *Leviathan*, chaps. xiii, xiv, xvii.

the law where there is but "one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at Court, and the countryman at plough." So much does Locke stress man's freedom and equality in the state of nature that the casual reader might conclude that the state of nature is nothing but a condition that might be called a social atomism.

If such happy conditions obtained in the state of nature we may ask, Why a commonwealth? To begin with, Locke says,

God, having made man such a creature that, in His own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination, to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it.

The origin of society in the state of nature is thus based on inherent natural drives. Locke is so far an instinctivist. "Convenience" suggests a utilitarian source. On the other hand, he is just as clearly a contractualist relative to civil or political society. In fact, the germ of contract exists even in the state of nature in the "voluntary compact between man and woman" and consequent family obligations. It might be said that the political state is an evolution of this original compact. The major reason for the formation of political society, which may be regarded either as a superstructure erected on the basis of the natural order or as a refinement within that order, is that in the state of nature although the individual is "absolute lord of his own person and possessions," his enjoyment of these rights is very uncertain. The state of nature would suffice for all the needs of man "were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men." In this acknowledgment of some invasions of man's freedom his natural society savors somewhat of Hobbes's state of nature, with the distinction that for Hobbes this "ill condition" was general and premoral, whereas for Locke it was occasional and immoral.

The answer to why men unite into commonwealths and submit themselves to government is: for the preservation of their property. By "property" Locke means "lives, liberties and estates." The state of nature lacks "an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them." Hume says that "the vast apparatus of government" has "no other object or purpose but the distribution of justice."⁶ Again, for Locke the state of nature lacks "a known and indifferent judge, with authority to

⁶ *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*, Vol. I, Essay V.

determine all differences according to the established law." Once more, in the state of nature power is often lacking "to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution." Because of these and such inconveniences commonwealths with their orderly procedures come naturally into being. Locke, though believing strongly that governmental power always depended upon the consent of the governed, failed to set up a means other than revolution by which consent or dissent might find expression. Tacit reservations and consents in Locke were given formulation by Rousseau.⁷

c. Spinoza

For Spinoza virtue varies directly with one's effort to preserve his own being. "The endeavor after self-preservation is the primary and only foundation of virtue." In seeking self-preservation one is dependent upon outside objects. Those objects that are most in accord with his nature serve him best. Such an object above all is man. This is true of mental development. "Our intellect would be less perfect if the mind were alone." Therefore "nothing is more profitable to man than man." Two individuals of equal mental or physical capacity when joined together are doubly stronger than either alone. The natural inequality of men gives rise to fears. Fear drives men together. Men differ, again, in respect to their passions. Passions separate men. The exercise of reason controls our passions and desires, causing men to desire for themselves only what they would desire for others. In other words, through the exercise of reason men would see that personal good is the common good. Uncontrolled emotions make for social severance and servitude. Controlled emotions yield justice, fidelity, honor, and natural piety. Where reason fails to control human passions, the state with its punitive powers becomes necessary in order that harmony shall prevail and that self-preservation in its higher forms shall become possible. Individualism based on passion yields anarchy; community based on reason makes peace and well-being possible. Human fears and passions uncontrolled necessitate the state.

Spinoza appears to think, with Aristotle, of man as a social being. "It is in almost everybody's mouth that man is a God to man." Even though men are rarely guided by reason and are "generally envious and injurious to one another, nevertheless, they are scarcely ever able to lead a solitary life, so that to most men the definition of man that he is a social animal entirely commends itself." This inherent social impulse, on account of the reign of the passions, does not suffice.

⁷ The exposition and quotations are from Locke's *Of Civil Government: Two Treatises*, Book II, chaps. ii, iii, v, vi, vii, ix, xiii.

Passions dislocate natural social tendencies and estrange men while at the same time men "need one another's help." This makes it "necessary for them to cede their natural right and beget confidence one in the other that they will do nothing by which one can injure the other." The way to accomplish this is by the creation of a stronger power than that of the individual. The state, then, comes into being as a restraining force over those whose reason has become the servant of passion; it is in fact the creation and objectification of man's rational and true nature. With the transition from the natural state to the civil state good and evil, just and unjust first appear since in the former the individual consulted only his own profit whereas in the latter the good of the universal community is sought and promoted.

In this theory, so sketchily outlined, we find likeness and difference when compared to Locke and Hobbes. It agrees with Hobbes in that the civil state is superimposed upon the natural, superimposed, however, upon a nature, for Spinoza, warped by emotions. It differs from Hobbes and agrees with Locke in that by nature man is social, that his original nature becomes vitiated by the sway of his passions, that in his need for his fellows he is naturally, as for Aristotle, fitted for political union, and that citizenship, i.e., membership in a state, is a natural outgrowth in the process of attaining self-preservation.⁸

⁸ For above exposition and quotations, see *Ethics*, Bk. IV, propositions 18-37.

CHAPTER XIX
SOCIAL THEORIES (Continued)

d. Rousseau

Rousseau begins his *Émile* with the sentence, "Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the Author of Nature; but everything degenerates in the hands of man." The first sentence of Chapter I, Book I, of *The Social Contract* is, "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains." His concept of "Nature" is very obscure. In the *Émile* we are told that nature means "primitive dispositions, including our sensations and feelings of pleasure and pain, together with the judgments founded on these"; that "we are born weak . . . destitute of everything . . . and stupid"; that "the natural man is complete in himself . . . the numerical unit, the absolute whole, related only to himself or to his fellow-man" in contrast to civilized man, who is but a "fractional unit." The confusion is not completely cleared up when we are told that we ought "to limit the term nature to habits that are in conformity with Nature." *Nature* uncapitalized probably refers to the child's outfit at birth, whereas *Nature* capitalized refers to objects and contacts in the physical world as the means by which the child's true education is properly carried on. The child is one object in a world of natural objects. One may say then that for Rousseau the nature of the child is what he is when stripped of the artificialities imposed upon him by civilization. In this sense "man is naturally good." Finally in the *Social Contract* "nature" means the fullest development of human capacity. In this he approximates Aristotle, for whom human nature could be known only when man had run his course.

In his *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* we find four stages in human social evolution. At the first level

as he must have come from the hands of nature, we behold in him an animal weaker than some, and less agile than others; but, taking him all round, the most advantageously organised of any. I see him satisfying his hunger at the first oak, and slaking his thirst at the first brook; finding his bed at the foot of the tree which afforded him a repast; and, with that, all his wants supplied.

In strength of arm, in length of vision, and in fleetness of foot he was far superior to civilized man. Exposure to a gradual evolution of

civilization, according to Rousseau's fundamental thesis, led to a process of devolution in man. Man's "first feeling was that of his own existence, and his first care was that of self-preservation. The produce of the earth furnished him with all he needed, and instinct told him how to use it." A blind propensity "urged him to propagate his species." Once the sex urge was satisfied "the two sexes knew each other no more; and even the offspring was nothing to its mother, as soon as it could do without her." "Such was the condition of infant man; the life of an animal limited at first to mere sensations, and hardly profiting by the gifts nature bestowed on him, much less capable of entertaining a thought of forcing anything from her."

Soon difficulties presented themselves. Man was forced "to learn how to surmount them." Cares increased with population. Necessity became the mother of invention. Faint glimmerings of reflection appeared which were little more than mechanical prudence in adjustment to circumstances. Sticks and stones became natural weapons; hooks and lines, bows and arrows, clothing, and better shelters than caves in due time appeared. The passage from isolated effort to occasional mutual undertakings marks the second stage. Distinct families and the idea of property arose. "The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying *This is mine*, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society." From the habit of family life "conjugal love and paternal affection" arose, speech became established, the rudiments of public assembly in the form of singing and dancing appeared, morality emerged.

The third stage was marked by a revolution due to the discovery and use of the arts of metallurgy and agriculture. Iron and corn were the great civilizers. Corn soon became king. With agriculture the concept of property was emphasized. Property gave rise to the concept of justice and, we may add, injustice. "There can be no injury," says Locke, "where there is no property." Labor gave title to the ground. Property, "the foundation of the social compact," is the root of strife. Equality and gentleness marked the primitive man, inequality and brutishness the civilized man. Rivalry, competition, power, pride, and conflict of interests followed in the train of property. "Usurpations by the rich, robbery by the poor, and the unbridled passions of both, suppressed the cries of natural compassion and the still feeble voice of justice, and filled men with avarice, ambition and vice." A constant state of war existed.

The fourth stage was reached when the rich man, unable to join with his equals because of mutual jealousy, all alike being plunder

bent, with a generous gesture toward justice and fair play proposed, on account of self-interest, "to make allies of his adversaries, to inspire them with different maxims, to give them other institutions as favorable to himself as the law of nature was unfavorable." His proposal was:

Let us join . . . to guard the weak from oppression, to restrain the ambitious, and secure to every man the possession of what belongs to him: let us institute rules of justice and peace, to which all without exception may be obliged to conform; rules that may in some measure make amends for the caprices of fortune, by subjecting equally the powerful and the weak to the observance of reciprocal obligations. Let us, in a word, instead of turning our forces against ourselves, collect them in a supreme power which may govern us by wise laws, protect and defend all the members of the association, repulse their common enemies, and maintain eternal harmony among us.

"Such," says Rousseau,

was, or may well have been, the origin of society and law, which bound new fetters on the poor, and gave new powers to the rich; which irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed the law of property and inequality, converted clever usurpation into unalterable right, and, for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labour, slavery and wretchedness.

This contract, however, was not satisfactory; it led from bad to worse. In the *Social Contract* proper Rousseau cuts loose from the former fictional pact and gives us the beginning of the civil state or commonwealth. The problem of the *Social Contract* is

to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.

This means "the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community." In other words each divests himself of certain claimed freedoms in order to reinvest himself in actual, real freedom. Whether or not the *contracts* here studied are historical, we have in the "Mayflower" compact an actual case. Near-

ing New England and anticipating the necessity of some form of governmental control, while declaring themselves "the loyal subjects of our dread sovereign Lord, King James," the Pilgrim Fathers covenanted: We "do by these presents, solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and of one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body politic." The purpose of the social contract is the preservation, the well-being of the contracting parties.

In sketching Rousseau's theory of the social contract two concepts must be considered, those of Sovereignty and the General Will. Hobbes and Locke agree with Rousseau that the compact is made between individuals composing the state, and not between people and ruler. Locke and Rousseau differ from Hobbes as to the seat of supreme power. For Hobbes the ruler was sovereign, whereas for Locke and Rousseau sovereignty rested inalienably in the people. For Locke and Rousseau in Milton's phrase, "the power of kings and magistrates is only derivative," or delegated. The people are the ultimate determiners of their own destinies. For Hobbes sovereignty and government were identical, whereas for Rousseau government was a "body within the State, distinct from the people and the Sovereign, and intermediate between them," whose function was to execute the laws and to maintain civil and political liberty.

As nature gives each man absolute power over all his members, the social compact gives the body politic absolute power over all its members also; and it is this power which, under the direction of the general will, bears, as I have said, the name of Sovereignty.

Again, philosophically speaking, "Sovereignty is the exercise of the General Will."

Sovereignty, that basic operative principle, "that by which a people is a people," can better be understood in its relation to the General Will. The General Will is "the constant will of all the members of the State"; it is always "unalterable and pure." Within this General Will are lesser general wills such as the will of a labor union, or of some industrial or political group. Lobbyists at the seat of government illustrate these lesser general wills. While such wills are general in reference to their groups, they are at the same time particular in relation to *the* General Will. In the matter of voting, individuals or lesser groups, through self-deception and shortsightedness as to their real interest as represented in the General Will, may vote for their special interests. Such votes in the light of the General Will are negligible; they cancel one another. In modern practice these lesser,

lobby-type wills compromise with, rather than cancel, one another. The General Will as State is a just and moral "public person."

This public person, so formed by the union of all other persons, formerly took the name of *city*, and now takes that of *Republic* or *body politic*; it is called by its members *State* when passive, *Sovereign* when active, and *Power* when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of *people*, and severally are called *citizens*, as sharing in the sovereign power, and *subjects*, as being under the laws of the State.

Under ideal conditions the will of each would coincide with the General Will, which is Sovereign. In such ideal circumstances each citizen would be sovereign. In the transition from the state of nature to membership in civil society man becomes transfigured. "The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had hitherto lacked." In fact, for Rousseau the virtues of man as citizen are but the free flowering and expression of potentialities inherent in man in the state of nature.

Rousseau capitalizes pity or compassion. Compassion is "an innate repugnance at seeing a fellow-creature suffer." Brutes exhibit it. It is a "pure emotion of nature prior to all kinds of reflection." Without it men would have been but monsters. It controls and moderates the violences of which self-love otherwise is capable. Compassion is the single source of all the social virtues. The preservation of the race depends upon it. It is superior to reason though an aid to it. Had the acquirement of the social virtues, by which the human species is preserved, depended upon reason, "the human race would long since have ceased to be." So important was compassion for Rousseau, one may say that had this truly natural virtue been nurtured by an education according to nature it would have yielded the General Will and the civil state.

Given the social compact, legislation is needed to give it guidance and direction. The ideal legislator would be a man of intelligence superior to that of the herd, capable even of changing human nature. Although "the general will is always in the right the judgment which guides it is not always enlightened." The General Will must be aided to see more clearly what it too often but blindly sees. The legislator, then, must possess sublime insight and reason, must be able to "make

the gods speak" to the people. As a result of such legislative wisdom laws become "the conditions of civil association." They are acts of the General Will, made by the whole people for the whole people.¹

e. Kant

For Kant it is vain to inquire as to the historical origin of civil society. His starting point is that of "a state of society not yet regulated by Right." In such condition insecurity and disorder necessarily obtained. Man for Kant is an unsocially social being. He can neither get along satisfactorily with his fellows nor without them. From the antagonism between man's social and individual tendencies arises eventually the civil order "regulated by Law." Man's unsocial sociability practically implies a sociality prior to the state. This self-resistant, unstable sociality is the germ whence stemmed political and moral rights and obligations in the civil state. Kant does not say specifically that man is social by nature, but rather that he possesses a universal nature; or, in his own words, "The only original Right, belonging to each man in virtue of his humanity, is Freedom." Humanity, then, is the common denominator that ultimately yields the state. The state, a product of man's own will, is an objective form or instrument which offers the largest guarantee to man in the pursuit and fuller exercise of his freedom. In fact, because of our "unavoidable co-existence with others," man is morally obligated to "pass from the state of nature" into a union based on right and law. "The act by which a people constitutes itself into a State, or rather the idea according to which its legitimacy can alone be conceived, is the *original contract*." In interpreting the significance of this changed status Kant says that we must not think

that one in such a State has sacrificed a part of his native, external freedom in order to gain an end, but rather that he has completely abandoned his wild, lawless freedom, in order to find his real freedom undiminished in a lawful dependence, i.e., in a lawful State, since this dependence arises from his own law-giving will.²

It would be interesting for the student to make a careful comparative study of the views of Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Rousseau, and Kant. We may note a few agreements and differences. Neglecting Kant's oscillations and consequent vagueness we may fairly say that he agrees with

¹ The exposition and quotations are from *The Social Contract, A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, and *A Discourse on Political Economy* (Everyman's Library).

² *Werke* (ed. Cassirer), *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, VII, 122.

Locke and Spinoza and differs from Hobbes in finding some impulse to sociality prior to the stage of contract. For Kant the lawful state yields freedom; for Locke it protects "lives, liberties and estates." Kant agrees with Hobbes and Spinoza in the practically absolute power of the state wherein all rights have been transferred to the sovereign, whereas for Locke and Rousseau sovereignty rests with the people. Hobbes differs from Kant in that the state for him is motivated by self-interest while for Kant the transition from the state of nature is a moral obligation. And, finally, believe it or not, notwithstanding their common view of the absoluteness of the state, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Kant suggest possibilities of relief when the sovereign is no longer able or no longer cares to protect the interests stipulated and embodied in the contract. For Hobbes laws and contracts are but scraps of paper when not backed by the sword; for Spinoza the validity of a compact is conditioned by its utility; whereas for Kant the legislative authority may depose the governor or chief executive when he disregards the authority of law.

3. ECONOMIC THEORY

a. Karl Marx

We have intimated in this chapter that Plato might be regarded as an exponent of the economic theory of society in that society grew up around the satisfaction of basic and multiplying needs and the specialized modes of satisfaction through the division of labor. In modern times Karl Marx is the great promoter of this theory. Marx's economic theory does not pretend to account for the origin of social relations. He acknowledges a primitive tribal society in which land was held in common. Even here the economic factor existed in germinal form. The economic factor proper becomes more expressly operative on the dissolution of that primitive society. For him the whole historic structure of society, all its institutional forms, legal, industrial, political, and spiritual, are the products of economic forces; they are rooted in the material conditions of life and are but different forms of the struggle for power between social classes. Engels in his letter to Starkenburg (Jan. 25, 1894) says that the economic is not always the "sole active cause" in human affairs. Between and within the areas of our culture there is mutual interaction. All these interactions, however, are "within a fundamental economic necessity which in the last instance always asserts itself." History "is the activity of man in the pursuit of his ends." The fundamental proposition of the Marxian philosophy, as stated in the preface to the *Manifesto*, is that

in every historical epoch the prevailing mode of eco-

conomic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch.

As a consequence of this, "the whole history of mankind has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes."

The "materialistic interpretation of history" means, not materialism in the grosser sense, but the view that the principles and processes of production and exchange within society are completely controlled by the economic motive. Marx used the phrase "materialistic interpretation of history" in order to set his view in clear contrast to the Hegelian idealistic conception of history. He wished, in James's phrase, to show himself as "tough-minded" in contrast to the "tender-minded" idealist. Were he writing today he would probably use the word "realistic" rather than "materialistic."³ His general thesis is:

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will . . . The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society — the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.⁴

In primitive tribal life we have noted that land was held in common. Co-operative effort marked this period. With the dissolution of this relation and the emergence of private property competitive class struggle appeared, the familiar dualism of capital and labor arose. Where there is abundance of free land, labor is free. The freedom of labor varies directly with the diminution of free land. When there is no longer free land, labor is in chains. Thus in the course of time with the improvement in the instruments of production we have two classes in battle array — Capital and Labor, Bourgeoisie and Proletariat, Master and Slave — the one growing more powerful, the other more powerless. Capital is "the kind of property which exploits wage-labor." Capitalism is the conversion of a collective product or common social property into personal private possession and use. In other words, it is

³ See G. D. H. Cole, *What Marx Really Meant*, pp. 14 ff.

⁴ Karl Marx, *Critique of Political Economy*, Preface.

the system in which, through the seizure of the social means of production, privileged persons use these means for personal ends. "Capital is a monster that is fruitful and multiplies."

Within this general setup the landlord appears. When land, which in connection with labor is a means of production, becomes separated from labor, two things occur: first, labor is then reduced to "wage labor" and, second, land divested of labor becomes an independent power, i.e., capital. As the capitalist is but capital personified, so the landlord is but land personified. In this way land, which in conjunction with labor is a means to production, in the person of the landlord "rises on its own feet" to claim its independent share of what in reality is a joint product.⁵ Thus we have the "trinitarian formula" of Capital, Land, and Labor, or, respectively, Profit, Ground Rent, and Wages—or, in other words, capitalists, landlords, and laborers, who "form the three great classes of modern society resting upon the capitalist mode of production."⁶ For Marx there are four epochs or periods of social development, each of which rests upon an economic basis—(1) a primitive communism, (2) ancient society and slavery, (3) medieval feudalism, and (4) modern capitalism.

Class struggle is a historical fact. As this struggle becomes intensified the spirit of revolt enters the mind of the worker. To live in hope that conditions will change for the better—i.e., that the inherent character of communist principles will become so obvious and self-witnessing that they will finally triumph—is but self-deception. For Marx the only way out is by revolution. With the success of the *coup d'état* a period of reconstruction follows. Since revolution is liable to breed counter-revolutions, this interim period must be guided by an iron hand until all gains have been thoroughly consolidated. Then exploitation, inherent in the capitalistic system, will cease and the classless society will have become a fact. This is the story of the proposed passage from a capitalistic economy with its private ownership of the means of production to a socialized economy wherein the resources of production are socially owned and controlled. The regulative principle of the former system is that of private greed, that of the latter is social need. Although Marx based his views of conflict upon Hegel's triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, in perpetual recurrence, he departed from that philosophical faith in his utopia of a society wherein exploitation and conflict are no more. Again, although he delighted in being compared to Darwin, in that Darwin was the explorer and discoverer of the laws of organic evolution and he himself

⁵ Karl Marx, *Capital*, III, 959 f.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 947, 1031.

rendered like service in social evolution,⁷ yet his classless society with its cessation of conflict hardly accords with Darwin's continuing process of the struggle to survive. Furthermore, evolution is productive rather than reductive of forms; its drift is toward multiplicity rather than toward unity.

b. Criticism

There can be no doubt that Marx when shorn of his exaggerations presents some ugly facts in our socio-economic order. The army of the unemployed in normal times is a most disturbing social phenomenon. The subtle influence of wealth in our institutional life, whether in church, or court, or state, is writ large on the current page. Educational institutions trim their sails to prevailing capitalistic and political winds of doctrine. But were the undercover trails of the widespread influence of capitalism in our current life revealed in all their hideousness, this would not furnish a complete picture of the forces operating in social life. Racial hatreds, religious prejudices, and political propaganda are some of the noneconomic divisive forces in our midst today. On the other hand, Red Cross, homes for the aged and indigent, orphanages, and public libraries are a few among many other unitive forms of noneconomic, constitutive, social actualities. This is to suggest that the economic, the instinctive, the contractual, the geographical, and the environmental are each too single a feature to account for the social complex. Although bread is important, man does not live by bread alone. The social as we know it is a product of many co-operating factors such as the satisfaction of bodily needs, mutual sympathy and aid, suggestion, imitation, habit, and other forms of organic response situationally stimulated and engendered. The whole can never be satisfactorily explained in terms of a part.

The family as we know it cannot be traced to a single origin or cause. It is the product of complex antecedents. Biological, economic, and other factors combine in producing it. Neither can society, a more complex and comprehensive phenomenon, be attributed to a single cause. There was a time when there was neither church nor state, yet in the light of social evolution we cannot say they had a definite beginning. Neither the Industrial nor the Russian Revolution had a datable or single origin. All such phenomena are emergents from a complex background. Without contradicting the assumption of development, we may say that they achieve uniqueness at the confluence of widely sourced, hinterland streams.

⁷ John Spargo, *Karl Marx*, p. 323.

In leaving Marx we may observe that his division of society into two distinct groups, the bourgeois and the proletarian, is overdrawn; it is not true to fact. In modern society the so-called proletariat, not to speak of the bourgeoisie, exhibits divergent interests and changing status. As the laborer enjoys a measure of success and satisfaction he is less anticapital. Then he really belongs to neither group. He may hope that he is "on his way" with multitudes of his fellow men. This clear-cut dualism of proletarian and bourgeois classes in hostile array exists only in the mind of the theorist; it does not square with the facts. In saying this, however, I do not mean that in the human group in terms of economic status there are not two undesirable extremes.

4. THE SITUATIONAL THEORY

That man is part and parcel of nature, that he cannot isolate himself therefrom, that his characteristics are in large measure reflections and expressions of that relationship, is the common property of intelligence today. Until recently the question as to which was the more important factor in man's make-up, heredity or environment, was promotive of heated debate, dividing ready participants into two emotionally warring camps. This problem could have meaning only while it was assumed that these components had independent existence. The theological doctrine of the soul favored this assumption. Now that heredity and environment, when separated, are meaningless, the question of "the more important factor," being empty and verbal, no longer appeals to intelligence. Heredity and environment are distinguishable but inseparable factors of a legitimate totality or organized whole called the self.

The environment of man is both physical and social. The original impulse of life is fashioned by the impact of this twofold environment. Whatever we are, we are that by virtue of our exposure to this twofold environment and our responses to its stimuli. Our responses are in terms of environmental stimuli both physical and social. Although it is true that with development we gain a measure of control over our environment, yet our controls are in terms of and conditioned by environmental situations. Otherwise we could not survive. The vital impulse, the will to live, takes form thereby. Ellen Churchill Semple says, "Man can no more be scientifically studied apart from the ground which he tills, or the land over which he travels, or the seas over which he trades, than polar bear or desert cactus can be understood apart from its habitat."⁸ Soil, topography, and climate differentiate people. The mountaineer differs from the plainsman, the dweller in

⁸ *Influences of Geographic Environment*, p. 2.

the temperate zone from that in the torrid, the seaman from the landsman. Man as we know him is the product of hereditary and environmental energies, physical and social.

What of man as a social being? Is his sociality instinctive or situational? In recent years instinct, as we have said, has lost status with psychologists, for three reasons: First, because separate instincts savored of an outgrown faculty psychology. We have learned that mind is not a composite of separate interests or activities. Today mind is a unity, man is a whole. Second, certain phenomena formerly explained by instinct are now satisfactorily accounted for on other grounds. For example, man's interest in religion or morality was attributed to a religious or moral instinct. We now know that religion and morality are emergents in the give and take of experience, value forms of human experience. Third, in our empirical age instincts in the large because of their vagueness do not satisfy as explanatory means. They are verbal and fictional in character. To use them as explanatory instruments is to explain the known in terms of unknowns, an unsatisfactory procedure. To explain a phenomenon or event is to create the setup or conditions under which it occurs. Explanation is situational. To go outside the realm of relationships within which an event occurs for purposes of explanation is self-deception. Moreover, to think of instincts as a set of different and definitely organized modes of adaptive responses is to reduce the self to a mechanism, is to assume a constancy in both organism and environment which the facts contradict. Under such a hypothesis, to understand the self is the game of relating these mechanisms like that of reconstructing a map of the United States from the several states when cut out of the original whole.

Neither is clarification gained, according to Josey,⁹ when we think of instincts as innate capacities for response. Instincts are not forms of ancestral response. For him instincts are characteristic forms of organic response. These characteristic forms of response are not to be thought of as masses of impulses within the organism ready for release and seeking expression. Their appearance and being require situational stimuli. Responses do not occur in a vacuum. Organism and environment are related in terms of mutual action and reaction. The form of any activity is a function of the component factors of the situation, viz., organic structure, physiological condition, environmental stimuli, and experience. Impulses, desires, and emotions are consequents of situational activities rather than determiners of the form of the activity in question. In like manner does Josey account for the so-called in-

⁹ *The Social Philosophy of Instinct*, *passim*, especially chap. vi.

instincts of fear, anger, pugnacity, sex, etc. From this point of view the innate is reduced to the capacity of the organism to be affected rather "than in drives of a definite character." In familiar paraphrase of Aristotle we become builders by building, harpists by 'harping,' or just, courageous, and temperate by corresponding activities. "No moral virtue is implanted in us by nature." This point of view finds support in behaviorism's assumption that our knowledge of original nature is limited to the organism's responses to situationally evoked stimuli.

In a broad general way we may then regard our characteristic situational responses as registrations of experience somewhat of the habit type. We are born into a set of rather definite relations, not of our own choosing. These condition our desires, values, needs, responses, and satisfactions. In a very real sense we take form, are constituted thereby. One inescapable factor or element in the total situation is our social relatedness. Each of us is born of two parents and nurtured within a social group. Normal human beings from birth are socially environed. It is this fact that makes us actually human. Were one isolated from early infancy and environed by lower forms of nonhuman animal life he would not, he could not, develop human proportions. Such a one would, on sight, flee human beings and seek his environing kind. Sumner and Keller

do not believe that man was outfitted with any innate quality of sociability implanted in his germ-plasm, but that the tendency to associate is acquired rather than inherited, and that man's association with his kind is a product of societal rather than of organic evolution.¹⁰

The will of the *human* being to associate with his kind, to seek his fellow human beings, is begotten through the fact of his social relatedness. It is rooted in, is an emergent from, his social experience. The habit of living together gave rise to the desire for associated living. This is what is here called the *situational theory*. Its advantage over the instinctive theory is that it is more factual than theoretical in character.

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CHAPTER XX

INSTITUTIONS

Man is a social being. He is socially begotten. His early and continued helplessness, his dependence upon the social group, constrain him toward and habituate him to sociality. Biology and psychology combine to make him social. Ants are biologically social; man is psychologically, culturally social. We do not know all the factors that contribute to his sociality. That he is conditioned socially by his environment there can be no doubt. In the satisfaction of basic needs such as food, sex, and safety, social origins are found.

1. ORIGIN OF INSTITUTIONS

Our concern in this chapter is with institutions. All forms of our institutional life, whether economic, familial, political, educational, or other, are emergents in human experience. Some, such as the family, we know reach far down in the human scale. Their beginnings reach back to a legendary level of well-nigh undifferentiated experience when needs and satisfactions were organic, vague, and below the level of clear consciousness. If at this rudimentary stage an institution was "a meeting-point of wills," the wills were largely blind. Only very gradually, i.e., over long intervals of time, did this dawn period or zone gain in illumination. With the growth of consciousness organic needs become interests. In the pursuit of interests experience becomes differentiated, nuclear in character; action becomes grooved into habitual and customary forms. These habits and customs, be it noted, like Topsy, "just grew" as it were naturally, without plan or purpose. This stratification of action, these *ways of behaving* Sumner calls *folkways*. These more or less plastic folkways or customs suffer modification as changed conditions necessitate. Maladaptations produce pain. Successful efforts to allay pain by trial and failure and success are noted in an organic way and gradually incorporated in subsequent behavior. At such points evaluation enters, criticism in elementary form appears. Satisfying—that is, approved—folkways, yielding welfare, become *mores*. The mores "are the popular habits and traditions when they include a judgment that they are conducive to societal welfare and when they exert a coercion on the individual to conform to them, although they are not co-ordinated by any authority." These approved ways of behaving, or *mores*, are the germinal forms of our institutional life; they, Keller affirms, "are institutions in their lowest

terms." Further, he says, "All of society's forms and institutions are found, when reduced to lowest evolutionary terms, in custom."¹

2. INSTITUTIONS, HABITS, AND CUSTOMS

So far we have proceeded genetically, i.e., in terms of the origins of institutions. An important distinction between mature and immature human beings is the capacity in the former to substitute remote for immediate satisfactions. To forego an immediate appeal when in the light of more remote consequences that appears advisable is essentially a moral act. Such conduct means the control of impulse by intelligence, or the subjection of the desired to the desirable. Primitive man like most of the lower animals lived in the realm of immediacy. While he is so living, individual habits and group customs appear unconsciously, long before their existence is known, and longer still before they are critically evaluated and reshaped in terms of means to the attainment of foreseen and desired ends. The story of human progress is embraced in the slow passage from unintentional and as yet noninstitutionalized habits of conduct up to the varied forms of our institutionalized life purposely planned for the preservation and promotion of human values. One might well ask whether our social drifts point toward planned social order. Folkways, we repeat, are the matrix whence institutions emerge. In saying that the folkways are centered about food, sex, and safety activities, based on natural laws, if you will, which is about the best that we can do, it is well to remember that we have not thereby exposed to view all the roots and fibers from which our institutions stem. Social phenomena are so complex that it is unwise to try to reduce them to a single or a few simple causes. Such assumption would be only less absurd than to assume that on a leisure day some primitive persons convened for the purpose of legislating social institutions into being. In their earlier forms institutions are little more than life-preserving habits.

That custom controls conduct long before it is recognized as a determining principle we may assume. That custom directs conduct implies not only some sort of group relatedness and co-operation but that the well-being of the group is directly related to the behavior of the individual. The converse of this is that the welfare of the individual is tied up with membership in the group. Violence to him is violence to the group; it meets group resistance. The outcast is of all men most defenseless and desolate, there is always an open season on him, he has no avenging group. How, how long, or by what stages this un-

¹ Sumner and Keller, *The Science of Society*, I, 31, 34, 35.

reflective primitive group control passed into consciously co-operative forms of value realization, is not our concern. We assume continuity of development between primitive and civilized forms of institutional life. Industry, for example, is a development of man's effort to extract sustenance from a too "stepmotherly nature," even though some modern forms aim to create new needs which in turn demand new industrial products for their satisfaction. The need for orderly control of conduct within the group and for defense against external invasion has given us on the one hand our complex of legal and ethical institutions and on the other our military establishments. For the enrichment of individual and social life, and for the maintenance of democratic values, educational institutions have come into being.

We have said, somewhat incidentally, that institutions are customary forms of action in the satisfaction of need. This deserves further emphasis. For most of us institutions are objective, impersonal entities rather than specialized forms of intimate personal activity. Laski, the London political scientist, thinks the apparent indifference of American students to political life is due to the fact that they look upon political institutions too objectively, as having a being remote from persons and, consequently, they regard themselves as spectators from afar rather than as present and future participants and constituents. Such an attitude may well be a factor in the prevalent indifference to one's duty at the polls. It is this sort of thing that makes it possible for a grown boy to use the street lamp as a target for his skill whereas, were it an item of equipment in his own back yard, he would be the first to become indignant because of any such violence. Another factor in the objectification of institutions is the fact that institutions have and express themselves through structures. Religion has its churches, a university has its buildings, but neither is to be identified with its structures. Institutional instruments or structures, essential as in some cases they are, are not the institutions themselves. This is true whether it be a law court, the postal service, a market place, a county home, or a hospital. Institutions are varied specialized forms or sections of social activity through which certain purposes or ends are achieved. They are not structures, not even groups of persons such as administrators. Structures and staffs are but forms of "setup," instrumental necessities to the proper functioning of the institution.

3. INSTITUTIONS AND PERSONS

The institution, then, is not a thing-in-itself apart from persons. Institutions are organizations of persons co-operatively active in the pursuit of social purposes, ends, and values. They have no more an

independent, nonpersonal, external existence than has society, conceived as an entity apart from or in addition to persons living socially related and mutually influencing and influenced. Society regarded as a superpersonal entity or system of forces operating through and upon individuals is a fiction. A committee, let us say, is named to consider some item of public concern. There is at first wide variance of opinion. As a result of their joint consideration a conclusion is arrived at which was not the precise view initially of any member of the group. It would be absurd to say that this joint-product result was another will or idea distinct from the committee's co-operative thought activity. In the process of the interstimulation and reciprocal influencing of minds their original ideas were changed, and not by any force superior or external to the inter-committee activity. We observe changes in our economic life. Since neither we nor our neighbors appear causally related to these phenomena, we, in our unthinking, attribute those changes to impersonal forces, to the reign of economic laws, and speak with eyebrow obviousness and complete understanding of economic determinism.

In like fashion we think of the state and nation. Even the more intimate forms of our human activities such as the church and the school we hold at arm's length, regarding them as superpersonal forms of our institutional life. Willy-nilly the church *stands* and the school *keeps*. Thus do even theologians and educators speak. The plain fact is that a university is a specialized form of social co-operative activity in behalf of values mutually determined and agreed upon by the socio-individual participants. Apart from this, "university" is not even a word; it is but an aggregation of letters yielding noise when vocalized. Mysticism and fictionalism are in the saddle and ride mankind in too much of its social thinking. As a member of the family its interests and good name are a direct and immediate interest of mine. So in nearer face-to-face community life. Its institutions, embodiments of community values, are mine. Institutions will be reformed and rendered more efficient when seen, not as superpersonal in character, as things-in-themselves, but as structural forms of social activity in the conservation and promotion of socially recognized values. When they are so interpreted a moral alertness and participation will result; social advance will be recorded.

4. PERMANENCE, CHANGE, AND CONTINUITY

MacIver distinguishes between community, association, and institution. A community is a social area, usually of limited extent as when one is said to live in a certain community. That the term is elastic

is seen when we speak of a world community. In each case community implies a spirit and an area though perhaps the former prevails over the latter. MacIver illustrates community mainly geographically as "country, city, village, nation, tribe," etc. Association is a lesser social group organized for some specific or general purpose, such as a church, a business enterprise, or the Association for the Advancement of Science. Institutions, such as marriage, inheritance, or Wall Street, are "recognized modes in accordance with which communities and associations regulate their activities." Although associations and institutions are objective forms of human relationships, the former term has a subjective aspect which the latter does not have. An institution, as objective, is a means only.² Institutions, we have said, grow out of community customs or habits. They are those customs having emerged into consciousness, evaluated, willed, set us as standard, and thus "instituted." For this reason an institution may be defined as an organized expression in more or less permanent form of the social will. Although permanence does not of itself constitute an institution (disease, poverty, and suffering, for example are permanent), yet institutions must have a measure of permanence.

Permanence, however, must not be construed as changelessness. Times change and we are changed in them, we are told—in fact, we know. It has been thought that times change because we change. Changes in transportation and communication, in our industrial and economic life, in the sciences of astronomy, physics, biology, psychology, etc., when reflected upon, are apt to make us think with Heraclitus and in less degree with Bergson that change is the only abiding reality in our experience. Certainty has yielded place to probability. Science has transformed our concepts of nature, man, and God. Evolution has impinged upon creation; space and time are shorn of their absoluteness; the fixed and immutable has given way to flux, product to process, and finality to procession. So much is this true that our whole outlook upon life has changed. A new world with multiplied and inviting possibilities, with consequent changed attitudes, is ours. In view of this welter of change it should be impossible to think that our institutional life, religious, political, economic, and other, can carry on uninfluenced. Such benighted views when dominant prove serious brakes on social progress.

It is said that institutions are necessarily backward-looking. True, most institutions, as all mature persons, have a history, a past. This, however, in no sense limits them thereto. Loyalty to any past does not

² See R. M. MacIver., *The Modern State*, p. 5 f.; *Community*, Bk. II, chap. iv.

mean that one shall camp beside its grave. As conditions change, the content of our loyalties changes. We may be loyal to George Washington's principles without punctilious observance of all his precepts. Since his time the industrial, economic, political, yes, the temporo-spatial map of the world has been remade. "Splendid isolation," then possible, is no longer so. Has our moral map undergone change also? Is America's morality determined by and identical with manufactures and the maintenance of markets? The efficiency of institutions in the past is translated into and capitalized as a necessity for their maintenance, unmodified, in the present. The effort to project into the present and future an institution or value from the past, unmodified, irrespective of changed conditions, throttles and harms the cause in whose behalf it exists. Religion through the conservatism of church administration has suffered such loss of power and prestige.

In saying that few, if any, institutions have escaped the dead hand of the past, it is not meant that institutions must trim their sails to every passing breeze. Although in a real sense institutions are depositories of values, yet, as banks must use their funds in the interest of stock holders and depositors, institutions must be sensitive and responsive in the service of social need. As the safe motorist is guided by the curves and conditions of the road, so institutions, to accomplish their purpose, must be observant of social drifts and trends. Otherwise they cease to serve and become vestigial in character.

5. INSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP

Although the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath, although institutions were established in the service of human need, it is common experience that they tend to dictatorship. They acquire a sanctity all their own. Function becomes transformed into entity. The emotional devotee experiences spinal thrills as he contemplates "the Law," "the State," or "the Church" as existents, as things-in-themselves, rather than as social forms of service and value. Among various reasons that have been marshalled to account for this transformation we may mention, perhaps the most important, the fact that we are born into our institutions. They are not of our own creation. We are nurtured in them and conditioned by them. Their structural forms make for objectivity. Objectivity plus prestige, evoking a reverence rather characteristic of unfamiliarity and immaturity which continues into maturity in the form of habit, constitutes an admirable preparation for the assumption, by ambitious institutional administration, of control and authoritative determination to the point of exploitation of social processes. The inertia of the masses favors the granting

and extension of institutional franchises. These factors and procedures supplemented by others contribute to institutional self-existence and self-determination. Since institutional administration consists of persons the same principles are operative there, but in heightened measure. These servants of an institution soon identify themselves with it. Its virtues and vices, mainly the former, are theirs. With time its habits and practices become as set and inflexible as theirs. It and they become hermit-like, independent, and indifferent, while the tides of social life swirl on. This is the penalty that a rigid, insensitive, and unresponsive institution in a continually changing world must pay. To have no function is equivalent to having no meaning or significance. This in turn is equivalent to nonexistence.

Institutions, we have said, are forms of social action in the satisfaction of personal and social need. They are value forms. As satisfactions of permanent needs such as food, sex, and security, they have a relative permanency. The specific forms of these satisfactions vary with culture levels. Once mates were secured through seizure, later through parental disposition, now through personal consent and will. Established institutions in a changing world are faced with the necessity of perpetual readjustment in order to serve their purpose and justify their being. The advent of the automobile has left no area of life, social, moral, religious, industrial, or other, unmodified. Witness the social distress because of wartime restrictions on tires and gasoline. New problems requiring new adjustments have followed in its train. New situations to the meeting of which old forms are inadequate necessitate modified or new institutions. When labor became self-conscious and found a deaf ear turned to its rightful demand for a more equitable share in industrial profits the labor union appeared. Life is fluid, not fixed or static. Institutions as emergents in social experience in the service of need, as means never as ends, must remain flexible else they will prove a drag on culture progress. The permanency of institutions, then, is not that of fixity, but rather that of continuity through adaptive change. Institutions are to the state as memory to the individual. They give continuity to a people, nation, or state. When they fail identity is gone as when memory fails in the individual.

But how shall this be accomplished? Who are the vigilants? The answer goes back to persons—not to persons outside institutions, if such there be—but to persons of social insight participating consciously and co-operatively in institutional life. Institutions as forms of social life have no superpersonal external existence; they are but forms of socio-personal and valued procedures. They, like municipally owned utilities, are *ours*, yes, *mine*. *We* are our institutions. *We* are the watchmen and

guardians, the preservers and promoters, the engineers who keep our institutions tuned up, as it were, that they may render their most perfect service. This institutional adjustment to life's needs is *our* perpetual socio-personal problem. That this social and personal obligation is pre-eminently a moral obligation needs no elaboration. In terms of the preservation of the concept and institutions of democratic society we are today experiencing a rude awakening.

That right and truth, and brotherhood and faith are
integral to man and formative;

That God omnipotent of their permanence and triumph
is the guarantor: — all this we falsely have assumed.
We must conserve our heritage of liberties and rights.

6. INSTITUTIONS AS DEPOSITORIES OF SOCIAL VALUES

Institutions may be regarded as depositories of social values. They are not only ways of behaving, but also *valuable* ways of behaving. In the long experience of the race they justified themselves in the satisfactions rendered. Especially was this true in the case of elemental needs and, again, when the current of life was more constant and slow, when the tempo of change was much less marked than today. Institutions grew out of group customs, are groupal, we may say, both in origin and in goal. Their aim is the welfare of the group; i.e., they serve the great common denominator of social rather than of individual need. In our more unsteady times irritated individuals, tangential souls, occasionally appear. And often, in peacetime, rightly so. Now and then an emotionally high-strung individual, becoming vocal, and thereby heightening his emotional tension, would throw institutions into the discard, by threat of violence if necessary. It is comparatively rare in our American life that such extreme procedure is entertained. Although an institution may visit a real hardship in some respect upon even a considerable number of persons, the logic of that fact does not necessitate action to destroy such institution. The more rational method would be to undertake to correct in orderly fashion the manifest injustice. This method is the *really radical* procedure, i.e., going to the root of the evil, exhibiting it to the light of intelligence in a scientific way. So revealed the evil will eventually disappear. It would be difficult to name an institution so perfect as to be beyond need of improvement, or one utterly impervious to just and rational social appeal. Evolution is socially preferable to revolution. By such procedure institutions as depositories of social value become increasingly significant and serviceable in social life. It is ours to make them what they ought to be.

7. INSTITUTIONS AS STABILIZERS

Institutions are stabilizers, control agencies in our social life. Although this is true, it must not be taken to mean that they are absolute determiners of social conduct. A stabilizer in a vacuum, in a cemetery or other static situation where there is no motor, power, or action, is a meaningless abstraction. A boulder in a bluegrass pasture is in no sense a stabilizer. Stabilization means control of behavior. As habits control individual conduct, so group habits or institutions give determination, i.e., steadiness, to group conduct. They constitute balance wheels. This is not to say that flexibility is wanting in either case. Institutions give continuity and control to social processes, to social values. Without continuity there would be no social leverage. We would be, as it were, suspended in mid-air. We cannot begin anew. A new institution is a necessary expression or formulation that has gradually and necessarily emerged from experience. Institutions that come down to us are the funded experience of the race. They constitute our original capital, to use and modify as the exigencies of the times demand.

8. INSTITUTIONS AS EDUCATIONAL AGENCIES

Furthermore, institutions are not only rather permanent embodiments and expressions of social attitudes and values; they are in a real sense fashioners of attitudes in their functioning as transmitters of values. From birth the child is subject to social pressures both in the home and in play groups. The very breath of his life in these normal and informal relationships has an institutional flavor. He becomes habituated to and unconsciously conditioned by the rules of the game in his home and play life. Through the social forces that play upon him in his pre-teen years he comes to his more formal education with rather definitely ingrained habits of thought and action, with attitudes and convictions of value. In primitive life initiation ceremonies were a more formal method of transmitting tribal values. At higher cultural levels varied forms of institutional life sought to perpetuate themselves in a practical way, by a sort of apprenticeship. At our present stage of culture this apprenticeship type of practical training, yielding fitness for a vocation only, no longer suffices.

Man is more than a biological being, a food-finder, a safety-seeker, or sex-satisfier. He cannot live by bread alone. Again, as time passed on, the increase and complexity of the culture heritage made it incapable of anything more than the most fragmentary transmission by the more informal methods. By these methods the individual was shut out from a vast wide-ranging and valuable heritage. As a result purely

practical training resulting in skill passes into education, a concept and institution which in a less directly practical way widens the range of man's interest, making possible to each a fuller and richer life. Within this institution of education all the other forms of institutional life are embraced and seen, in theory at least, in perspective. Education, it is fair to say, is the major institution for the transmission of institutional values.

Education as transmission of the social heritage is not enough. This has too long been *the* educational objective. The school and its personnel have been regarded as a sort of pipe-line connective apparatus between the reservoir of racial experience and the empty youthful mind. So viewed the transfer, in the degree to which it occurs, is of too little practical value, may have a minimum of life value. As such it may be little more than so much mental freight on board, of little use and of less interest. It yields but an added skill, more spinal than cerebral, in the manipulation of another kind of meaningless material. We of mature years know this to our regret. Such transfer enslaves rather than frees. The net outcome is a mind docilely reproductive rather than one vigorously active and creative. In other words, such ideal and practice imply a static social order and produce minds fitted thereto. It should be obvious that such a system of education is an anachronism in a rapidly changing world.

In contrast to this the aim of education must be the production of reflective and creative rather than reproductive minds. How shall this be accomplished? The thing of moment here is not so much the inheritance itself as the use to which it is put. Were a further discriminatory judgment permissible one might say that what happens to the person in the educational process is of more importance than the data employed, or than the transfer of content. The pathway of human progress is strewn with values or modes of procedure, religious, moral, legal, and scientific, once important but later outgrown and left behind. This fact has given rise to another institution, the modern museum. Education as the transfer of content may well be little more than propaganda. Propaganda *uses* persons, while education, ideally at least, profoundly *respects* persons. Education is *for* persons as ends; persons should never be reduced to mere means. With persons at the center, and their development the motive and goal of educational activities, the whole process becomes one of the liberation and nurture of capacity. Where the transfer and perpetuation of traditional values intact is the major motive, the individual is reduced to a mere instrument, shackled in the prison house of the past.

In a real educational situation content is presented not as something

to be taken over whole, usually yielding indigestion and nausea, but as a set of stimuli designed and actually operating to evoke reflective response on the part of the student. In this way the natural tendency of the mind to wonder (to wonder is to wander) and investigate is nurtured, capacity for critical evaluation is developed, and knowledge as sight-acceptance drafts becomes impossible. Under the intellectual influence of imaginative and scholarly teachers, to use a Whiteheadian phrase, persons capable of creative thinking and intelligent participation in social problems become the goal and product of the educational process. So conceived and practiced, education is ever a present and interesting vital activity, neither a dull and dreary reaffirmation of the past nor a promised preparation for some remote future. It means, in Dewey's conspicuous emphasis, living significantly now—the only promise and guarantee for a better tomorrow.³ In such process of social self-realization and its satisfaction is the promise of tomorrow's more adequate institutions in a fluid world.

9. SUMMARY

By way of summary we may say: Institutions have their origin in basic human need seeking to satisfy itself in and conditioned by its environment, physical and social. They are gradually changing forms of man's adaptations to nature, man, and the higher powers. They are patterns of conduct, approved ways of behaving. As such they are reinforced by a network of beliefs, feelings, sentiments, attitudes, and habits, that make them highly disciplinary of ourselves in our thought and action. In their control they serve. Service is their primary purpose. "*Ich dien*" (*I serve*) is their motto. Institutions represent racial experience evaluated and adapted to present need. They are thus a language, a vehicle of communication between past and present, giving continuity and direction to racial experience. As servants of life they not only fulfill purposes, they are embodiments of social purpose. As purposes they are both forms of value and instruments in their realization; they are both forms and functions of socially willed values; they are at the same time creations and creators of social ends or purposes.

How shall we reduce the variety of institutional purposes and bring them into some sort of harmonious whole? To what end, if single end there be, may we synthesize them? We are here faced with a philosophy of life. Into this we shall not enter other than to say that a major purpose of the whole fabric and web of our institutional life is to provide means for the freeing and development of human potential,

³ See the author's *A Philosophy of Friendship*, chap. i.

of individual capacity, to the end that through them man may, as a socio-individual, achieve the richest, fullest, and therefore the most enjoyable life, that is, a socially significant and increasingly satisfying personal existence.

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6. MacIver, R. M. *The Elements of Social Science*. Chap. vii

■

CONCLUSION

THE FUTURE OF PHILOSOPHY

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CHAPTER XXI

THE FUTURE OF PHILOSOPHY

1. THE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

The title of this chapter does not imply prophecy. Today prophets belong to the extra-hazardous class. Prophecy is, to say the least, a precarious adventure. In 1931 an American philosopher wrote:

We have definitely passed out of the crudest stage of nineteenth century nationalism. . . . To grow strong and defeat other nations seemed the very wisdom of nature itself. But a new political insight is developing in which the conception of nations joined together in the common enterprise of advancing the life of man is becoming axiomatic among us.

In the same year a well-known American physicist writing said:

In my judgment war is in process of being abolished chiefly through the relentless advance of modern science—the principal diverter of man's energies and interests from the warlike to the peaceful arts.

Would that these hopes had been justified! Obviously the function of philosophy is not prophecy, at least in the older acceptation of the term. The purpose of this chapter is not even prophecy in the more modest sense of guidance for the future based upon interpretation of the past. It is rather to suggest that philosophy should assume more the form of a social program than that of an abstract individual indulgence or profession. If it is true as someone has said that we have philosophers but no philosophy, the way appears open for some modification, reformulation, or redirection of the philosophic enterprise, the more so in view of our disordered and distraught world.

A philosopher is not a heaven-sent messenger of truth. He is a complex, among other factors, of temperament and time. In first intention social values concern him. He advances along his way as exponent and critic of these values. As he gains his wings he soars beyond the immediacies and limitations of experience. He becomes a creator of another of "those brilliant mirages known as 'philosophic systems'" (Nietzsche). That philosophers are responsive to the prevailing interest of their time is seen in the medieval era, when philosophy became the handmaid of religion. Today under the deserved prestige of science a new generation of philosophers appears for whom philosophy is nothing if

not scientific. For them data of experience not amenable to the techniques of scientific method are cast aside as verbal indulgences having no reality, as mere metaphysical nightmares.

The result of this situation is embarrassing to philosophy. In the golden age of religion philosophy, though the handmaid of sacred theology, was still the queen of the secular sciences. The Church embraced the whole range of human interests. In the course of time she lost her universal empire. Under the influence of science in terms of invention and discovery man's world widened, his interest in a transcendent world gradually lessened, he became increasingly profane. Medicine, law, and, shall we say, politics became independent professions. We cannot say that this secession from the influence of the Church has ceased today. In like fashion philosophy has suffered diminution of prestige. Her status as an independent interest or discipline is increasingly uncertain. It would perhaps be an understatement to say that philosophy today is becalmed. Science is sapping her foundations. Especially is this true of the work of the youthful generation of philosophers of today. These scientific philosophers, trained in the methods of physics, mathematics, and logic, could as comfortably and as well function in these fields. For these physical and mathematical philosophers philosophy, in the traditional sense, is little more than an indulgent emotional commentary on things in general and, since there are no things in general, the philosopher is but a self-appointed ambassador at large without portfolio. Furthermore, in addition to these philosophers of science we have teachers of literature, of history, of politics, of sociology, and of law, functioning as philosophers. In view of all this it might appear that the owl of Minerva is in flight as the evening shadows fall. Although this appears to endanger the profession of philosophy as such, it may be interpreted as a growing appreciation of philosophy and an extension of its range of application. Then, too, these extra-professional philosophers will require training in philosophy beyond their present equipment in order to render competent service.

The preceding paragraph is not a lament; it is rather a challenge to philosophers to take account of conditions and trim ship accordingly. It may well be that philosophers must get into a huddle, as classicists and psychologists are known to have done, to take note of the signals of the time, to salvage their values and jettison what perils progress, what time has outmoded. Even though the drift just indicated were to continue, a somewhat doubtful proposition, it does not follow that philosophy must finally fold her tent and disappear. As systems of philosophy, like tides of the sea, have swept in, left some increment, and ebbd again subject to the pull of continually changing cosmic

conditions, so will other systems follow. On the other hand, there is much to encourage the philosopher. It is interesting to note some of the recruits to philosophy especially from the fields of science. Among them we find: Whitehead, an eminent mathematician, developing into a full-fledged philosopher; Bridgman, a physicist; Driesch, a biologist; Haldane (J.B.S.), a biologist; McDougall, a psychologist; Helmholtz and Mach, distinguished physicists and physiologists — all achieving eminence in philosophy. Eddington and Jeans, noted physicists, are developing philosophic wings, while Einstein threatens eruption at any time.

2. A RECENTERING OF PHILOSOPHY

The history of philosophic systems justifies the relegation of any claimed final philosophy to the realm of dreams. In view of all this it may be opportune to suggest that philosophers should feel themselves free and perhaps obligated to reinterpret their role. In view, too, of the recent world-shattering war and the current epoch-making international reorganization, is it too much to ask philosophers to rethink their program and function, to descend from their ivory-domed tower, where rare skills in logic-chopping and hair-splitting have yielded mostly pale and bloodless victories, to descend, I say, to the streets where the bewildered masses assemble and pass, seeking direction, scarce knowing what they seek or whither they tend? This, philosophy must do in order to revitalize itself.

During the emergency of war our long-range thinkers, our spectators of time and eternity, had nothing to offer. In such crises they are not called by the government to render professional aid. This is not against them, since their commerce is not of the irrational. The possibility and fact of such periodic irrationality in human behavior should be a matter of most urgent concern to all philosophers, especially to those more socially minded. There is no area in which philosophic reflection is more needed and where greater returns would result than in the field of human relations. In a word the whole mental map of thoughtful man must be redrawn. Science has justified its existence in its outlook, methods, and products. Philosophers have made contribution through their criticism of the assumptions of science and of those of a large and less reflective group of fellow human beings. Even apart from the preponderance of scientists in our colleges and universities in comparison with philosophers and other workers in humanistic fields (which, by the way, indicates our center of interest), it would be sheer folly to say that science should take a holiday; it would be self-justifying wisdom to urge that philosophers and other reflective minds should

focus their resources upon man and the social order. Were scientists and philosophers to unite in an attempt to introduce order into our current chaos, to unravel the tangle of human relationships, who can set limits to their achievements! A recentering of mind from appliances and means that minister merely to bodily desire and comfort, to man *as man*, a spiritual being, whose highest development is possible, whose hungers and needs can find proper satisfaction only in a free and orderly community or world—this recentering, I say, is an urgent need.

The philosopher must operate in a new world, an atomic world. With the psychologist and other scientists he must seek to discover the roots of the prevailing fear in international relations. To lay bare the causes of our fears would prove a contribution to their correction and elimination. To learn that scientists who worked in the production of the atomic bomb are deeply concerned as to its ethical aspects is highly significant. May it mean that an era is about to dawn in which science will be ethically conditioned? Such convergence of the physical sciences and the world of values would mark an incomparable advance in human relationships.

Man's behavior is marked by impulse rather than by reason. His mind is grooved and linear rather than areal. He has marked tangential tendencies. He is apt to be engrossed in one interest to the exclusion of other important interests. At one period a single interest, whether philosophical, religious, or scientific, captures the mind of a people. From this point of view history is an alternating series of interests with appropriate activities. This is the case today with respect to science. Is it possible that our preoccupation with the physical and chemical sciences has yielded in us a distorted view causing us to neglect other important human values? Is it possible that the present debacle of our civilization is due to the fact that we have become in a sense myopic by centering our thought upon some self-centered interest or value such as national prestige, profit, or power, to the exclusion of other constituent aspects and more elemental needs of man as a social being? We too readily lose perspective. Such procedure does not accord with reason, one of whose major functions is the elimination of contradiction from our ideas and values, the introduction of order into individual and social thought and life.

To the philosopher we have a right to look for a clearer portrayal of man, actual and potential, individual and social, in his concrete relationships to the community, to the nation, and to the whole family of mankind. In promoting his enterprise of reason the philosopher cannot fail to note the distressful magnitude and influence of irrationalism in human life. Neglecting this he would be functioning in a vac-

uum. Observing this he will not make it a springboard to the stratosphere. He will give vitality to his undertaking by operating in close touch with the stream of life where the clouds of unreason too heavily prevail. In this connection Will Durant writes:

It [philosophy] may linger further in that calm death of social ineffectiveness in which we see it sinking; or it may catch the hands of the few philosophers who insist on focusing thought on life, and so regain the position which it alone is fitted to fill. . . . If philosophy is to live again, it must rediscover life, it must come back into the cave, it must come down from the 'real' and transcendental world and play its venturesome part in the hard and happy world of efforts and events.¹

3. PHILOSOPHERS' PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL LIFE

a. As Kings

The suggestion that philosophy should concern itself more intimately with social life is not without precedent. Plato dreamed of the day when philosophers would be kings, rulers in the state. To check undue enthusiasm on the part of philosophers, it is well to remember Plato's failure in his two adventures with Dionysius at Syracuse. His failure, however, was due more to the material and conditions confronting him than to the inapplicability of philosophy to the problems of state. His optimism was too great, his program too sudden, his method, perhaps, unpedagogical. He discovered that it was as difficult, at least, to transform kings and courtiers into philosophers as to make philosophers kings.² Plato thought of philosophers as men guided by reason, a sort of "Brain Trust"; he thought that reason should rule in the affairs of the state. What a commentary on politics the failure of his experiment was! What a commentary on American politics is the recent application by the old-line politicians of the term "Brain Trust," a phrase of derision, to those trained specialists in governmental theory when made participants in governmental planning and procedure! Would Plato succeed much better were he here to try it today? For him reason should be the regulative principle in all relations of human life. It would give perspective, it would see and compose things in their proper relations, it would co-ordinate the interests and energies of men, special and private interests would not steal the show. This is the substance and meaning of Plato's dream.

¹ *Philosophy and the Social Problem*, pp. 266 f.

² See the author's interpretation of this experiment, "When Philosophers Are Kings," *Social Science*, Vol. XI, No. 1, pp. 10-16.

In the Roman emperor, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, we have a philosopher of note whose whole life was engrossed in an effort to bring order into human relations. "We are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands," he said. He believed that the universe is an ordered system of which he and all men are inseparable parts. In directing the affairs of his troubled empire, which extended from the chill mountain heights of Scotland to Africa's burning sands, from the Euphrates to the Western Sea, he believed that "the one and only thing" that in all vicissitudes is able to direct a man is philosophy. "My nature is rational and social; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, it is the world."³

Tomas Masaryk, professor of philosophy at Prague for twenty-nine years, carver out of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, and its first President, with life tenure, was an instance of the philosopher as ruler of the state. In him and in Marcus Aurelius would Plato have found concrete expression of his ideal of leadership. Early in his teaching career at Prague Masaryk revealed his view of philosophy as practical. He was not interested in the abstractions of metaphysics. His traditionally trained colleagues, whose philosophy functioned only in the empyrean, were piqued at the descent of this young philosopher in his interpretation of philosophy and in his insistence that its primary purpose is to improve the lot of man. This indignity was of such dimension that Masaryk even invited students to his home to discuss current practical problems. From an abstract discussion of the relationship of the true, the beautiful, and the good, he would relate them to the good of man in social and civic life, "in daily life, in business and in politics." In the ruthless destruction of the Czechoslovakian Republic, a signal instance of craftily applied intelligence, mankind suffered a deplorable loss.

b. Uncrowned Philosophers and Their Participations

We may note two other philosophers, not rulers in the state, but who shared largely and efficiently in its program. Lord Haldane (Richard Burdon), a profound thinker, author of *Pathways to Reality*, in which he dealt with relativity, humanism, experience, education, empiricism, etc., and author of other important works, is worthy of our consideration. He earned his livelihood at the bar, but he said, "I cannot allow it to swallow me up." He had a sense of proportion. For him life was more than meat. He took "chambers" at twenty-three and "silk" at thirty-four. At twenty-nine he entered politics, and he continued to

³ *The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*, tr. George Long, pp. 55 f., 89, 116.

sit in Parliament for more than forty years. The variety and effectiveness of his participations stagger the imagination. Twice Lord Chancellor, he reformed the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, making it the supreme tribunal of the Empire; he initiated the reform of the English Land Laws, and was Minister for War in the war of 1914-1918. As a testimony to his success in that office, on the evening, of "Victory Day" when the troops paraded in London led by the King and Field Marshal Haig, the latter called upon Haldane and left with him a volume of his war dispatches inscribed:

To Viscount Haldane of Cloan—the greatest Secretary of State for War England has ever had. In grateful remembrance of his successful efforts in organizing the military forces for a war on the Continent, notwithstanding much opposition from the Army Council and the half-hearted support of his Parliamentary friends.

Haig, F.M.

Of his efforts in behalf of the Labor Movement and of Home Rule for Ireland, of his reforms in the educational system and other Herculean accomplishments we cannot here write.⁴ Viscount Haldane, later Lord Haldane, met Spengler's first specification of a philosopher, who must have an "eye for the great facts of his own time." Haldane's lifework refutes Spengler's extravagant charge that not one modern philosopher "has intervened effectively" in politics, economics, the science of government, "or in any other *big* actuality, with a single act or a single compelling idea."

John Dewey is another significant thinker whose philosophy is pointed earthward and manward. He is not blinded by focusing on the sun. For him man as thinker is a form of energy within nature. "The distinction between physical, psycho-physical, and mental is one of levels of increasing complexity and intimacy of interaction among natural events." Philosophy is not something injected into the world from without; neither is it concerned with some "staked-off section of experience." It is sourced in the total give and take of man's experience with and within his world. "Of necessity he acts within the world, and in order to be, he must in some measure adapt himself as one part of nature to other parts." Philosophy arose in a gradual effort by man to find a better way to meet the concrete problems of living than that of unthinking custom and uncontrolled impulse. It is concerned with the whole interests of man. It is a movement within, a phenomenon of, civilization and culture. The historic remoteness and consequent

⁴ For further instances see my article, referred to in footnote 2, this chapter. Upon it I have leaned heavily in these paragraphs. Best of all, see Haldane's *Autobiography*.

comparative insignificance of philosophy is due in large measure to its historic concern with a pre-existent eternal truth and an absolute reality. Seen as a constitutive factor or phase of experience, as the discovery and rational projection of meaningfulness in the experience process, philosophy becomes significant and itself an element in the ongoing stream of human culture; it is no longer a "sterile and monotonous preoccupation with unsolvable or unreal problems."

A proper reading of history, whether of philosophy or other, is an inquiry into the meaning of events. Without meaning and purpose, the very substance of events, experience is a chaos of mere happenings. Happenings in the human sphere become facts when seen as ends sought or purposes in process of accomplishment. Meanings are not irrelevant to the world of existence; they are the warp and woof, the very fiber and fabric of a factual world. Philosophy, then, as the portrayal and projection of meanings, coupled with its criticism of values and beliefs, is at the heart of cultural experience; it is a phase of life. Otherwise expressed, ours is a changing world. Traditionalized habits and values are stabilized in institutions whose tendency is to persist unchanged. As a consequence, institutions are found resistant to the newer demands of the time. At these junctures reconciliation, adjustment must be effected. In such social and moral emergencies clarification of beliefs, habits, ideas, meanings, and values must be had. To insist upon approaching such situations in a rational spirit is the noblest contribution of philosophy, whose "aim is to become so far as is humanly possible an organ for dealing with these conflicts." Philosophy is thus a practical and scientific method of dealing with the concrete, matter-of-fact problems of men. However far in imaginative flight philosophy may range beyond these practical problems, it cannot neglect them and remain fruitful. Philosophy is social and situational in origin; its findings are social and situational in reference.

On Dewey's concept of ideas as plans of action determined by the context or situation in which they appear we need not dwell. It has already been noted in this text. Situationally evoked, ideas point to action; indeed they are forms of action, anticipatory action leading to further action whether it be the avoidance of influenza, the filling in of an income tax blank, the spending of a summer vacation, or the organizing of one's life. Ideas as plans are hypothetical in character, they are not formulated in any final fashion; rather in their execution they are subject to modification as demanded by circumstances. Thus intelligent behavior in any elongated situation is a continual replanning. Planning is as essential in the social order, especially in the present anarchic condition of our entire life whether personal, moral,

social, or political, as in individual life. The alternative to this is drift and its dire consequences. Social planning is a rational effort to control the irrational. Ugliness is writ large across our civilization. Spiritual values are imperiled by brute force, "a fantasy and trick of fame," implemented by science.

Mannheim tells us that "the form in which the future presents itself to us is that of possibility." It is not therefore determined. Here is not only the need for, but the opportunity and obligation of, the philosopher to furnish a searching constructive criticism and a reformulation of ideals for guidance to worthier and more humane living. The function of the philosopher at any time is "to determine the character of changes that are going on and to give them, in the affairs that concern us most, some measure of intelligent direction." Especially is intelligent direction an urgent need in the present emergency. Philosophy will be a sterile thing unless it sheds some light along the uncertain path wherein tread millions of our fellow men. Again, Dewey says, "The task of philosophy is to clarify men's ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own day." In so far as philosophy "assumes responsibility for setting forth some ideal of a collective good life by the methods which the best science of the day employs," so far is it worth while. "A first-rate test" of philosophy for him is: Do its conclusions, when "referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful?"

These are the primary problems of the philosopher, in strong contrast to the view that the major philosophic problems center about the nature of *reality* in the abstract, understood as existing apart from the actual situations within which our human problems arise. For Dewey experience situations constitute an experimental laboratory where ideas and hypothetical formulations may be empirically verified. It should be observed in justice to Dewey that his interest in, and emphasis upon, the practical problems of man is not to the exclusion of imaginative projection and reconstruction of the values of primary experience. Philosophic detachment is necessary to more adequate perspective. His thought includes a reflective criticism and reformulation of entertained ideas and values in the conviction that human effort is directed by, is part and parcel of, ideas of value. It is the function of the philosopher to bring to clearer consciousness and to reshape, where intelligence demands, ideas and values already operative in the mass experience of mankind. In this consists the creative power of ideas. For Dewey social conflicts are conflicts of values and beliefs. Civilization is, at least in ideal, a philosophy expressing itself

in concrete form.

That Dewey finds his problems in human experience and, after reflection, returns to reconstruct that experience is obvious from his social participations, some of which we note. We have had, as Overstreet suggests, "laughing philosophers" and "weeping philosophers." In Dewey we have a "working philosopher." He seeks to reinstate philosophy as "the guide of life." In method he would combine "the sciences into one powerful instrument for improving civilization." In this Dewey is in apostolic or philosophic succession. He was preceded by Socrates, Plato, Bacon, Spinoza, Comte, and others.

Dewey's contribution to education is monumental. He vitalized education at home and abroad. Sidney Hook speaks of him as "the unofficial intellectual ambassador of the United States to the world." On educational missions he lectured and held conferences with leaders in education in Mexico, China, Russia, Japan, Turkey, South Africa, and other countries. We are acquainted with the Copernican revolution in astronomy, and with Kant's revolution in theory of knowledge. Few are unacquainted with what may well be called the Dewey revolution in American education, dating from his Laboratory School founded in Chicago in 1896. Here his empirical scientific bent found expression in actual practice. This school was a life-fitting and a life-sharing enterprise, an embryonic co-operative society. Education is the cultivation of the art of social living, of the development of understanding and appreciation of fundamental social attitudes, and of adequate responses in all human relationships. It is a life process co-extensive and continuous with life itself.

It would be impossible to indicate the variety of Dewey's participations in behalf of human welfare. Those we shall mention, as representative of many more, are regarded by many unbegrimed empyrean philosophers devoted to "eternal problems" as nonphilosophical, even as unphilosophical. For Dewey, on the other hand, through such sharing in the adventures of life, philosophy assumes the status of a real enterprise. Besides, through these undertakings, as in a laboratory, philosophy validates its theories and conclusions. Apart from this the theorist has no check upon himself other than that of the logical coherence of his ideas with one another and with his original assumptions. We find Dewey as a promoter of the Pact of Paris, an instrument to outlaw war. He was not satisfied with the Covenant of the League of Nations, which legalized war as an instrument of peace. Later he was chairman of the People's Lobby at Washington to counter the competing interests represented by numerous lobbies or pressure groups operating on the principles of the jungle man. At the close of the

Hoover administration he became spokesman for the League for Independent Political Action, an "educational movement aiming at a new party along constructive economic lines." Like Masaryk he was the enemy of all forms of injustice. Although he detested Trotskyism, he headed in Mexico City a Commission of Inquiry into the evidence produced in the Moscow court in its effort to compromise Trotsky. After two years of study of the evidence of the Commission's findings his report completely exonerated Trotsky of the charge of anti-Soviet activity. We need but mention his part in organizing the American Association of University Professors and the American Civil Liberties Union, and in the promotion of the Farmer-Labor Party.⁵ Sidney Hook speaks of him as "the philosopher of American democracy." In all these labors Dewey expresses in concrete form his conception of ideas as originating in situations demanding action and, after mature reflection, returning to share in and give direction to human experience. "When philosophy shall have co-operated with the course of events and made clear and coherent the meaning of the daily detail, science and emotion will interpenetrate, practice and imagination will embrace."

c. Views of Other Philosophers on Social Participation

We may now note some other thinkers who though differing widely in philosophic outlook and interest agree that the practical is a concern of philosophy. The Italian philosopher Croce in an address before the Sixth International Congress of Philosophers said, "Philosophy is not real and concrete except through experience and in experience." For him transcendent and theological philosophy is bankrupt. Because of the close relationship of philosophy and experience a new type of philosopher is required, one

who should take part in the investigations of history and of science, and in the work and life of his own times, both from a political and a moral standpoint, if not always from a directly practical action, at least through his observations and his passion: the student of philosophy, who, in order to be true to his vocation, must not be a pure philosopher, but practise, as all other men do, some profession, and above all the profession of man.

Frederick Engels, co-worker with Marx, in his criticism of Feuerbach speaks of the classic German philosophy as "the thin soup of eclecti-

⁵ For these and other participations see Sidney Hook's *John Dewey, An Intellectual Portrait*, chap. i; and Wendell Thomas, *A Democratic Philosophy*, chap. i.

cism" and of the professors of philosophy as "pettifogging pedants." In an Appendix he gives us Marx's eleven theses on Feuerbach. Marx criticizes Feuerbach for his interpretation of sense objects as conceptual, private, and theoretical in character, to the neglect of regarding human sensory activity as practical, public, and objective. For Marx, as for Bacon, knowledge is power when employed in the satisfaction of human need. Only in practice can man prove the truth of his thought. To dispute "the reality or unreality of thought isolated from practice is a purely *scholastic* question." Hunger is natural to man, but the methods he employs to satisfy that hunger, his activities, are objective social facts. The essence of man is not an abstraction dwelling in each individual; it consists rather in the totality of social relationships. Man is essentially a social being. "The life of society is essentially practical." Thesis XI says, "Philosophers have only *interpreted* the world differently, but the point is to *change* it." Marx criticizes Feuerbach for his appreciation of theoretical thought as human and fruitful while "practice" (*Praxis*) is isolated and presented "in its disgusting form." Without testing ideas in practice, "philosophy," says Hook, "becomes a mere playing with possibilities unrelated both to the quest for truth and the furtherance of the good life — its professed objectives."⁶

Mannheim in *Man and Society* says that only the cloister dweller can think of thought as self-contained, as independent of life and action. While commending pragmatism for denying a disjunction between thought and action he, in turn, interprets it inaccurately, I think, and then criticizes pragmatism for limiting thought and action to immediate interests and situations. Pragmatism may overemphasize the immediate, but it does not limit itself thereto. When thought rises above "chance discovery" and advances beyond the level of a filler-in between isolated hunches it becomes inventive and "independent of the demands of immediate activity." By inventive thinking he means the projection of an idea in advance of the objective or purpose desired and aimed at. Dewey would disagree both with Mannheim's interpretation of pragmatism and with his distinction between thought at the stage of immediacy, where "it is lacking in constructive power," and thought at the level of invention without any immediacy. Surely the longer-range project or problem originates, is rooted in a present condition where correction is demanded. The distinction between the two is that between the actual and a conceived better or more desirable

⁶ Although the eleven theses were but notes "jotted down" by Marx, Sidney Hook in his *From Hegel to Marx*, chap. viii, gives an admirable exposition of them on the basis of the Marxian philosophy.

condition; or, in other words, the difference is that of degree of immediacy or remoteness, of simplicity and complexity, and not that the one is concerned with "hunches" in a practical situation and the other is "independent of practical necessity."

In lighter vein Nietzsche pays his respects to ascetic ideals and philosophic aloofness from mundane affairs. He speaks, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, of philosophers as, those "royal and magnificent anchorites of the spirit," the greatest of whom is he "who can be the most solitary, the most concealed, the most divergent, and the man beyond good and evil." In ironic vein he refers to "those extraordinary furtherers of humanity whom we call philosophers." The philosopher has long been "confused by the multitude either with the scientific man and ideal scholar, or with the religiously elevated, desensualized, desecularized visionary and God-intoxicated man." To live as a philosopher "hardly means anything more than prudently and apart." In his *Genealogy of Morals* he tells us that "a married philosopher belongs to comedy." He quotes Buddha as saying, when informed that a son was born to him named Rahoula, which means 'a little demon': "Rahoula has been born to me, a fetter has been forged for me." Marriage and such cares prove but a "fatal hindrance" to the achieving of the philosopher's *optimum*. In confirmation of this thesis he cites Heraclitus, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Schopenhauer as having enjoyed single blessedness, and adds further, "One cannot imagine them as married." Socrates is a signal exception, who with malicious afterthought married himself. Philosophical systems are but brilliant desert mirages. The perspectives of the metaphysician devoted to the transcendent world, i.e., gained from below, are but "frog perspectives." The motto and method of these metaphysicians was: "We must remove hence to where *you* are least at home."

Although this view, so far, is mostly caricature and negative, yet even Nietzsche's negations are positive in his exposé of philosophic follies and shortcomings. We find a more positive note. He distinguishes between philosophers and philosophical workers. The future philosophers "will be men of experiments," men of affairs with wide experience, hardy, daring, with "standards of worth" and courageous in their defense. As such they will not tolerate the view of "The Positivists of France and Germany" that "philosophy itself is criticism and critical science — and nothing else whatever." They will be creators of values, determiners of "the whither and the why of mankind."

4. SOME SOCIAL PROBLEMS WHICH CHALLENGE THE PHILOSOPHER

We come now to some problems to which the philosopher cannot be

indifferent. Reference has already been made to the insufficient attention given in our colleges and universities to social problems. The science of *man* must come into its own; else education will fail of its purpose, and man will unwittingly continue to contribute to his own undoing. In Platonic figure, enlightened men must descend into the cave whence they sprang (this world, as opposed to the world of Ideas) and aid in the supplanting in mankind of shadow reals by more real realities and values. Have we lost perspective in our scientific age? The use of gas and electricity has not only revolutionized the conditions of life; it has changed our ideals and values and consequently our character. Civilization in turn follows character. Is it true that the hardihood that enabled our fathers to face and triumph over the difficulties of sea and sky and soil is gone? Is it true by and large that our ideals, if they may be called such, are those of indulgence, comfort, and ease? If so the handwriting is on the wall. We have been jolted out of our complacency by the forces and ideals recently operating in Europe and Asia. Democracies have disappeared. America is waking up and in self-interest is asking *why*. This is the theme of recent magazine articles and books by serious thinkers. Is it true, as they declare, that through the ascendancy of the "eternal feminine" in our democracy we have become soft, that we have lost the sturdy moral ideals and spiritual allegiances of our fathers in our will-to-comfort and indulgence, that the voice of our stomachs and bowels, not of our conscience, is to us the voice of God, that we ourselves and "our college students and recent graduates do not take *any* moral issues seriously"? American life is challenged and especially American education. It may be popular, but it is fatal, to smile aside these analyses of our social drift as not in accord with the facts. This is a case where it is not the part of wisdom to anaesthetize against the surgeon's probe or knife. Rather we should inquire by scientific methods into the facts and thus test the validity of our analysts' more popular diagnoses. Our will-to-ease must be translated into a Spartan will-to-hardihood in order not only that our democracy shall preserve itself in storm and stress but that it shall gain in meaning and momentum in fair weather. We must learn to discipline ourselves or dictators will do it for us.

Not many years ago some parent said, "I did not raise my boy to be a soldier," a statement emotionally capitalized and publicly applauded. "Of course not," is the response of intelligence. Any such view suffers from over-specificity. Persons are not predestined by a disjunctive "either . . . or." Passage is possible in the course of individual development. The quotation here made, while negative, implies some purpose

in "my boy's" being. It is fair to ask, "Why did I raise my boy?" I shall not commit the fallacy of single specification, of partial perspective. Whatever the motivations yielding that boy's being, I am sure the author of that statement would agree with the universally accepted moral purpose that "I raised my boy to be a *man*," a whole man, with high moral purpose and capable of loyalty to his personally discovered cause. This is a minimum moral expectation. To this cause as a sincere moral person he will devote his energies, for it he will *live*. If in the course of his fidelity a condition arises which demands that he become a soldier, a soldier he will become, and, if need be, he will give his life in behalf of that cause. In such emergency his dying, however regretful, will be, as in the case of Jesus, *the last act of a life consecrated to a cause*. That will be his glory and that of his family and friends and community as well. His life and his death cannot be separated; they constitute the single story of a devoted life.

Is it true as Lewis Mumford says in regard to our economic life that "this is a world in which business men become gangsters and gangsters become business men without changing a single essential habit in their lives"? A severe indictment this, and one that should give us pause. That there is serious social injustice in our economic life no one can deny. Does modern salesmanship, for instance, make of most of our salesmen and advertisers with their competitive search for superlatives mental and moral prostitutes or, in Shavian phrase, "liars to the backbone of their souls"? Was Nietzsche far wrong when he said that "all political work, even with great statesmen, is an improvisation that trusts to luck"? All is not well in our political life. The future well-being of democracy is not assured by legislation promoted by backslapping, by pork-barrel methods, by trading votes for personal and sectional interests and gains, by telegraphic pressure at the instance of state and national lobbies, whether of capital, labor, or other, without social soul or public conscience, or when great issues determinative of the welfare of the whole world of humanity are decided on the basis of traditional party loyalty or personal hatred. Such description of political procedure does not exist merely in the writer's imagination. Supporting data can readily be cited. Nietzsche spoke with keen insight when he said, "The time for petty politics is past." His prophecy that "the next century will bring the struggle for the dominion of the world — the *compulsion* of great politics" is fulfilled in our eyes. Norman Angell says:

If the world has nearly destroyed itself, it is not from lack of knowledge in the sense that we lack the knowledge to cure cancer or release atomic energy but is due

to the fact that the mass of men have not applied to public policy knowledge which they already possess, which is indeed of almost universal possession, deducible from the facts of everyday life.⁷

Our education has left us self-divided, we have not integrated our intelligence and our emotions, our theories and our practice, our insights and our skills. This union is a most urgent demand and challenge to our educators. Educational social theory must be wed to social practice. A practical educational social psychology must teach us *how* to use *and to use* our knowledge in the guidance of social life. Our non-social individualism in educational fields finds parallel in our democracies. Mr. Angell observes that European democracies have gone under because of their nationalistic individualism. In the face of the will and threatening might of dictatorial states the story of these ravished and vanished democracies might have been different had they nurtured a sociality among themselves not merely to meet the tempest but to further democratic ideals and meaning. Recognition on the part of democracies of common purposes, values, and ideals would make them, in the phrase of Nietzsche, "all dear to one another" and yield in each the courageous will to stand by one another. Each would be his brother's keeper. And we may observe that democracy is a spirit and method, a form of organized socio-political life, wrought out in human experience, responsive to change, rather than a once-for-all heaven-sourced and divinely guaranteed mode of life revealed to a peculiar and chosen people. "We the people" are its promoters and preservers. In the postwar world nationalistic individualism must not prevail. This does not imply that the postwar world will be a world of political democracies. It does mean that peoples will be free to choose their own form of political organization and that between all such peoples the spirit of fraternity and co-operation will be nurtured.

We are at our journey's end, and pleasant even when confronted with difficult grades was every step of the way. The author is convinced of the need and possibilities of philosophy. In the later paragraphs of this chapter and in other places some urgent social problems have been suggested, problems to which the philosopher cannot be indifferent *as philosopher*. The currents of life run strong and uncertain. In their convergence the social waters are troubled. Some thought-pilot, experienced in such situations, is necessary to safe guidance. Should we not look to the philosopher for aid in exploring and relieving our confusions? Is it asking too much of him from his vantage point to

⁷ See *News Bulletin* (Institute of International Education, Feb., 1941).

formulate some chart based on scientific insight into the nature of man and his motivations that shall yield more intelligent control in personal and social life? Social drift has brought us to the precipice. The philosopher should share in large measure in giving direction to the social mind and to social practice. In so doing philosophy will revitalize itself. This does not necessarily mean that the philosopher shall don workman's clothes and proceed to execute details of his plan. It does mean that he shall at least chart great goals of life and sketch highways to their attainment. A planned social program is essential. Its fashioners will not fear to face the stark realities that threaten our whole society. It will be undertaken as a social-moral obligation. Such a planned program must be flexible enough to permit adjustments as occasion demands, to the end that we shall emerge from the chaos of our *laissez-faire* civilization and live a more tolerable, worthy, and significantly satisfactory life. In this way lies hope. Such participation is not unworthy of the true philosopher. By his fruits shall he be known. In such creative enterprise the future of philosophy will be assured.⁸

⁸ For this chapter no references, other than those in footnotes, are given since the literature is legion.

Appendix A

GLOSSARY

OF

THE MORE DIFFICULT TERMS IN TEXT

- Agnosticism:** Used by Huxley. It means either the absence or the impossibility of knowledge in certain areas. As to knowledge of God many are agnostic.
- Analytic:** A proposition whose predicate term is included within or the equivalent of the subject term is analytic, as "all black cats are black." Kant held that arithmetical truth such as $7 + 5 = 12$ is synthetic. Modern logic holds that arithmetical and logical truths are analytic. See *Synthetic*, *Tautology*.
- Animism:** All nature is ensouled in varying degrees; an earlier form of religion.
- A Posteriori:** Based on experience; not native to mind.
- A Priori:** Native to mind; independent of experience; for Kant logically prior to data of experience.
- Axiom:** An undefined, self-evident elementary assumption, as in logic and mathematics. See *Postulates*.
- Category:** A pure form of the understanding. For Kant there were twelve such forms. They condition knowledge and experience. Objects can be thought only in terms of the categories of quantity, quality, relation, etc.
- Clear and Distinct:** A Cartesian criterion of the truth of an idea or proposition; with the clarity of mathematical procedure; self-evident, sun-clear, intuitional, indisputable; with the convincingness that "I, a thinking being, am" (*Cogito ergo sum*). See *Intuition*.
- Cognition:** The processes yielding knowledge. It is adequacy of the concept or idea, as expressed in the proposition, to its object. Such sentences or propositions are said to have cognitive meaning.
- Cosmology:** A study of the origin and nature of the sensible universe as a universe, and of the laws operating in its processes. See *Ontology*, *Metaphysics*.
- Dialectic:** For Plato dialectic is the science of first principles. Its method is criticism of the implications, assumptions, and conclusions of discourse in order to discover their validity. In so doing it promotes consistency in thinking. Kant's transcendental dialectic showed the futility of trying to attain knowledge by applying empirical principles to a transempirical world.¹
- Dogmatism:** For Kant dogmatism is the procedure of reason without scruples or previous criticism of its own competence. Bacon likens dogmatic philosophers to spiders weaving their webs out of their own substance. Positive statements of opinion or belief, uncriticised and unverified, are dogmatic.

¹Modern dialectic stems from Fichte, for whom knowledge of self or of any object or idea necessitates the positing of its opposite. Knowledge of self apart from not-self is fictional. The interplay of the 'given' and its implied 'other' yields for the time being a synthesis, a new idea which in turn has its own 'other'. This triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in repetitive fashion Hegel makes the method of all development of ideas. This dialectic Marx employs, but substitutes for Hegel's march of the absolute idea in time economic forces as the ground principle of all historic development.

- Dualism:** The view that reality consists of two irreducible world principles or elements, as for Descartes—thinking and extended substance, mind and matter.
- Empiricism:** The doctrine that all our knowledge and its so-called first principles are based upon experience. Knowledge cannot transcend experience; there is no innate, no a priori knowledge.
- Epistemology:** Used largely as synonymous with theory of knowledge. It inquires as to the possibility of knowledge, its origin, nature, extent, and validity.
- Essence:** A variously used term. For Locke it is that which makes a thing to be what it uniquely is. It is used as substance or principle other than the substance composing a sense object; the absolute character or internal principle of an existing object; it is not unlike Plato's Ideas, Aristotle's forms, or Whitehead's eternal objects. Things are essences clothed with temporary (and accidental) sense qualities. For Critical Realism, to know is to apprehend an essence.
- Experience:** We know what it is until we come to define it. It is all that which a person suffers or undergoes, active and passive, present and past; the actual living through the events or happenings in one's career, it includes responses to stimuli, physical, social, and personal, and their remolding into a conceptual order.
- Functionalism:** A biological concept taken over into American psychology and philosophy by James, Dewey, Mead, and others. It interprets mind as an organic activity, a means of control in environmental situations.
- Humanism:** A man-centered doctrine whether in religion, ethics, literature, or philosophy. It is a pragmatic emphasis by the Oxford Schiller; antirational, antimetaphysical, and antisupernatural.
- Hylozoism:** The theory that matter is everywhere endowed with life, that the two are inseparable. See *Animism*.
- Instrumentalism:** Dewey's pragmatism is so characterized. Ideas are instruments, plans of action. Knowledge of the world means mastery and control of it.
- Intuition:** The native power of mind to grasp any reality immediately, without resort to experience or reflection. Ethical intuitionism holds that right and wrong, good and bad, are basic primitive concepts, i.e., cannot be defined, are irreducible and thus intuitional in character. See *Clear and Distinct*.
- Meaning:** A highly technical term in philosophy today. Popularly we may say the intent expressed whether by sentence, gesture, or look.
- Metaphysics:** The science, so-called, which undertakes to know the true inwardness or nature of Reality in its wholeness, i.e., the nature of *Being* as such. It has ranged all the way from the natural to the supernatural. See *Ontology*.
- Monads:** A metaphysical doctrine impressively associated with Leibniz. Monads are elementary units of energy, indivisible and imperishable. They are, as elements of reality, whether of selves or things, essentially spiritual in character.
- Monism:** The doctrine, metaphysically speaking, that the universe is in final analysis reducible to a single principle, in contrast to dualism and pluralism. Absolute idealism, materialism, and energism are instances.
- Mysticism:** That theory of knowledge according to which access to ultimate reality, God, is gained by immediacy of insight without employing the circuitous methods of scientific procedure. The experience of "illumination" makes knowledge an "unknowing knowing." See *Intuition*.

Naturalism: Is opposed to supernaturalism. There is but one level of reality; there are no outside causes or purposes; man is a nature product; his aims and achievements are within nature and explicable thereby. Naturalism is essentially a scientific philosophy.

Neutralism: The theory that mind and matter are but aspects of a more basic neutral stuff. As such it is monistic. It is strongly Spinozistic in flavor. So far as this stuff may be thought of as consisting of independent reals it is pluralistic.

Nisus: A formative impulse in nature. Used more recently by Morgan (*Emergent Evolution*) as the urge or drive in nature through which "emergents emerge," i.e., through which higher levels appear. This Nisus (God) directs the whole course of emergent evolution. Spinoza used the term.

Noumenon: For Kant a concept of the understanding, an idea only, i.e., without any corresponding object, a thing-in-itself. As nonsensuous it is unknowable since knowledge is limited to phenomena. It has great practical significance in the realm of religion and ethics. See *Phenomenon*.

Objective: It primarily means having the characteristics of a real object, i.e., other than a thought object, or an object independent of a subject. An idea or principle such as in scientific and logical procedures, publicly accepted and operative, is also regarded as objective. The term is used in contrast to subjective. See *Subjective*.

Ontology: As the name indicates ontology is the science of Being, as such, i.e., of the most general and essential principles and attributes of things. It is largely synonymous with metaphysics. See *Metaphysics*.

Panpsychism: A speculative theory to the effect that every entity is ensouled and that nature as a whole is ensouled, is psychic in character. Leibniz's monads are instances.

Pantheism: The theory that there is but one substance—God, and that things are but modes and attributes of this substance. Spinoza is an exponent. It is a basic principle in Hindu thought. It tends on the one hand toward materialism and, on the other, toward an exaggerated theism.

Phenomenon: That which appears or is perceived or perceivable and, for Kant, to which knowledge is limited. It is opposed to noumenon, the thing-in-itself, which is beyond the realm of actual or possible experience. See *Noumenon*.

Pluralism: The doctrine that reality is ultimately many rather than one and that this *many* is irreducible to *one*. James is an exponent. For him in terms of religion ultimate reality may well be social rather than singular or individual. Leibniz's monadism is a pluralism.

Postulates: In mathematics postulates are synonyms for axioms, i.e., undemonstrated assumptions which serve as premises for the demonstration of theorems. They are hypothetical in character. Locke's substance is a postulate. For Kant, God, freedom, and immortality are postulates of the Practical Reason.

Pure Ego: Conceived if not directly apprehended, (1) as an inference from introspection; (2) as the theological soul; (3) as, for Kant, the "synthetic unity of apperception," i.e., as a transcendent being necessary to the linkage into unity of the data of consciousness.

Skepticism: Is synonymous with doubt. As method in inquiry it is *criticism*; as final conclusion it is *dogmatism*. It may be partial or total; it ranges from indolence to nihilism. For Kant skepticism may be a resting place but not a dwelling place. Philosophically, it doubts the possibility of human knowledge.

Solipsism: The word means *I alone am*. When idealism reduces the external world to terms of consciousness it appears logically driven to the conclusion that the experiencing or self alone is. Other persons are data of my consciousness.

Subjective: Dependent upon or referring to the self or subject whose the experience is. For Kant all knowledge is relative to our faculties of apprehension; it is not absolute or objective in the sense that the subject can be eliminated. Its extreme form would be solipsism. See *Solipsism, Objective*.

Subsist: Bodies have concrete existence in space and time. More abstract reals, such as logical and mathematical principles, laws, relations, values, and universals, independent of conditions which limit existing objects, are said to subsist. Subsistents are real and have being, but not existence.

Substance: Either that which truly is in itself independent of all else (Spinoza), or that which is the support or bearer of qualities (Locke). In a more popular use it means essence—as the substance or essence of a statement.

Synthetic: A proposition is synthetic whose predicate is not already contained in the subject, as "All bodies have weight." It is *a posteriori* as opposed to analytic which is *a priori*. The existence of synthetic a priori knowledge is a main tenet of Kantianism and is denied by modern empiricism. See *Analytic*.

Taboo: Also spelled *tabu*, means forbidden. Prohibitions against touching sacred objects, eating certain foods, etc., are forms of taboo. Taboos are primitive forms of social control.

Tautology: Means saying the same thing or idea in other words. "Rotation is movement about an axis" is a tautology. Analytic propositions are tautologous.

Totemism: Among primitive people each tribe or clan is distinguished by a mark or symbol, whether of plant or animal. Such object is a totem. It means that the group are blood descendants of the class of objects represented by the symbol. This common descent is a strong group bond.

Transcendental: Applied by Kant to the a priori conditions of experience and knowledge. He distinguished between transcendental and the transcendent, though not always faithfully thereto. They are opposed respectively to empirical and to immanent. The former is immanent in experience though not of experience, the latter transcends experience.

Truth: Is no longer considered a realm apart from experience. "Truth," says C. W. Morris, "is a meaning confronted by what is meant." Only propositions are true or false. A proposition adequate to its claim is true. Truth is an abstraction from a series of trues.

Validity: A formal concept. An inference or conclusion from premises is valid when it is the result of fidelity to the laws of logic. Truth is factual; validity is formal: An inference may be valid, but not necessarily true.

Appendix B

TABLE OF AUTHORS AND DATES

- Aeschylus. Gk. tragic poet, 525-456 B.C.
 Alexander, S. Eng. philos., 1859-1938
 Ames, E. S. Amer. philos., psych., 1870-
 Amos. Heb. prophet, 8th cent. B.C.
 Anaxagoras. Gk. philos., 500?-428 B.C.
 Anaximander. Gk. philos., 611?-547? B.C.
 Anaximenes. Gk. philos., 6th cent. B.C.
 Angell, Norman. Eng. author, 1874-
 Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius. Rom. emp., philos., 121-180
 Aquinas, Thos. It. scholastic philos., theol., 1225?-1274
 Aristotle. Gk. philos., 384-322 B.C.
 Augustine. Bishop of Hippo, philos., theol. 354-430
 Bacon, F. Eng. philos., statesman, author, 1561-1626
 Barker, Ernest. Eng. historian, 1874-
 Bergson, Henri. Fr. philos., 1859-1941
 Berkeley, Geo. Irish philos., 1685-1753
 Boodin, J. E. Amer. philos., 1869-
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